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ABSTRACT
This thesis concludes that oui" commonplace conviction tliat dieams ai"e dreamt during 
sleep and remembered or forgotten upon waking is, at best, a speculative hypotliesis open 
to a very reasonable scepticism. The conclusion follows from a defence of the 
Dispositional Analysis, that to remember or forget a dream is to retain or lose an ability 
acquired during sleep to tell without invention or inference a fictitious story as if of 
events witnessed and deeds done. According to the Dispositional Analysis everyday talk 
about dreams being dieamt during sleep stands open to contradiction by empMcal evidence 
supporting Globot's Hypothesis that the content of our awakening narratives is explained 
by peculiarities in tlie manner of awakening. According to tlie Dispositional Analysis, 
our ordinar y assumption that 'telling a dream' is an exercise of memory can only be tested 
within a theory enabling us to predict whilst a person is asleep what, if any, dream he 
would tell, if awoken in a normal manner, prompted to say what appears to have 
happened (no matter how incredible or unimaginable), and not distr acted.
Chapter One ("Events Wimessed and Deeds Done") argues tliat sober reflection on 
what we aheady know shows that, in 'telling a dream', a person usually does not 
remember perceptions and actions from sleep. In Chapter Two ("The Unimagined and 
Unimaginable") argues Üiat tire ability to tell a dream cannot be reduced to memory of 
droughts and intentions directed towards images. The conclusion drawn from Par t One 
(What Appears To Be Remembered) is not merely that there is no general account of what 
dreaming consist in, as if the fact that we do not remember illusory perceptions, droughts 
or images shows that we do remember something else, some ineducible mental activity. 
The conclusion is that when we 'remember dreams' we generally remember nothing of 
whathapperred dmiirg sleep.
Chapter Three ("'Actions' During Sleep") argues drat the scierrtific study of 
sleepwalking, sleeptalking, night terrors, prearranged 'signalling' during sleep fail to support dre hypothesis that a person rememberes droughts and intentions from sleep. 
Chapter Four ("'Perceptions During Sleep"), it is argued drat neither evideirce of 
physiological activity peripheral to dre central nervous system (e.g. eye movements, 
muscular twitches, penes erections, etc.) interpreted as 'covert behaviour' during sleep, nor 
evidence of neurological activity of the forebrain interpreted as critical responses to 
internally generated 'stimuli' supports dre Received Opiirion that dreams are episodes 
remembered from sleep. Part Two ("Scientific Studies of Sleep arrd Dreaming"), 
concludes that experimental sleep research is consistent with dre conclusion that a person 
telling a dr-eam is typically not remembering mental acts, events, states or processes from 
sleep.
Part Three ("The Dispositional Analysis") questions the implications of dre 
coirclusioir drat tire Received Ophrion is false. Chapter Five ("Dreaming Widrout 
Experieirce") ar gues drat our conviction drat dreams are dreamt or 'occur' dmmg sleep is an 
empirical hypothesis which survives the falsification of dre Received Opinion. Tire 
conclusion drawn here departs both from that of Malcolm's (1959) argumeirt that the 
concept of dreaming is irot a dreoretical corrcept arrd fr om drat of Squir es' (1973) argument 
drat dreaming is a bad dreoretical concept. Chapter Six, argues drat assumptions about 
the causal explairation of telling a dream whilst central to our talk about dreams being 
dreamt or occurring during sleep cannot not explain our commoirplace conviction drat 
dreams are remembered from sleep. In particular, it is argued against Dennett (1976) drat 
a causal-cum-repiosentational analysis of remembering dreams does not escape tire need to 
distinguish between dre everyday notion of memory appropriate to retaining air ability to 
tell a dream arrd a technical notion of storage in short-term 'memory'.
The Conclusion ("A Tnidr of Underwhelming Importance?") reflects upon the gap 
forced by the dresis between the mrreasoning coirfidence of oui awakening conviction drat 
dreams are remembered from sleep and the speculative justification accorded to it by the 
Dispositional Analysis. It recommends air uireasy resignation to tire conclusion that our 
undoubting faidr drat something is remembered reduces to nodring more substantial tlran 
the hypothesis drat 'telling a dream' is the exercise of air unconsciously acquired aird 
retained disposition to awake widr a merely appaient memory of episodes occuiring during 
sleep.
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CAUTIONARY QUOTATION
"A person in the witness box says: 'Just as I entered tlie room, I saw tlie 
accused raising the gun, pointing it at the victim, and shooting him dead. The 
whole scene is clearly before my eyes; I doubt that I will ever forget it.' The 
witness knows tliat his memory is true, indeed, he is absolutely convinced of it. 
The strong feeling of the veiidicality of the memory somehow is immediately 
given in tlie recollective experience [and] need not be inferable from other 
knowledge. The basis of such a belief is a deep mystery ...
When others tell us that something is wrong, we may be persuaded by 
evidence that speaks to the issue ... [but] our subjective feeling of veiidicality of 
the recollective experience remains unchanged even when we intentionally accept 
the verdict of others."
(Bndel Tulving Elements of Episodic Memoiy 1987 p.40)
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INTRODUCTION 
AWAKENING CERTAINTY & EMPIRICAL THEORY
1. I defend the thesis that our commonplace conviction that dreams are dreamt 
during sleep and remembered or forgotten upon waking is, at best, a speculative 
hypothesis open to a very reasonable scepticism, notwithstanding our apparent 
inability, in the context of awakening with a dream to tell, to doubt that 
something is remembered.
2. The thesis follows from the Dispositional Analysis, that to remember a 
dream is to have acquired during sleep and not lost an ability to tell without 
invention or inference a story as if of events witnessed and deeds done which is 
not a memory of waking life, if awoken, prompted and not distracted, and given 
that there is a 'normal* m anner of awakening such that the content of the story 
told is causally determined by events occurring during sleep.
I defend the conclusion that to remember or forget a dream is to retain or lose an 
ability acquired during sleep to tell a story upon awakening as if of events 
witnessed and deeds done which is not a memory of waking life. It follows that 
our commonplace conviction that dreams are remembered (and sometimes 
forgotten) from sleep is not justified by evidence presently available to us. For, 
according to the Dispositional Analysis, the truth of the hypothesis that a 
person had a certain dream during sleep can only be tested within a theory 
enabling us to predict whilst a person is asleep what, if any, dream he would 
tell, if awoken in a normal manner, prompted to say what appears to have 
happened (no matter how incredible or unimaginable), and not distracted. No 
such theory is at hand. It remains a long-term ambition of psycho-
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physiological research to justify content-relative inferences between bodily 
movements during sleep and awakening narratives, thus establishing 
generalities about the circumstances under which a disposition to tell this or 
that dream is acquired, lost or retained during sleep. But, as things stand, the 
proposition that something is remembered from sleep in the usual case of 
awakening to 'tell a dream' is not a matter of common sense nor of established 
scientific fact. It is a speculative hypothesis open to a very reasonable 
scepticism.
The defence of the Dispositional Analysis is shown by the following 
scheme of argument:
SCHEME OF ARGUMENT
1. It is preferable that our conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and 
remembered or forgotten upon awakening be taken as a speculative hypothesis 
yet to be confirmed or disconfirmed by future scientific research than tliat it be 
taken to be an hypothesis for which we already have sufficient evidence, 
where what evidence we already have, if sufficient to pass judgment, would 
render our conviction false.
2. The Received Opinion that dreams are perceptions, thoughts, images, or 
some such mental acts or events occurring during sleep is false judged by what we 
already know about sleeping and waking, and we know pretty much all about 
sleeping and waking that is relevant.
3. It is preferable that our conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and 
remembered or forgotten upon awakening be understood as a speculative 
hypothesis open to future scientific investigation than that it be 'saved' from 
possible disconfirmation by being rendered empirically empty.
4. According to the Reductive Analysis, to say that a person 'remembers' a 
dream from sleep does not strictly speaking imply tliat he remembers anything;
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it is simply a metaphorical way of saying that he has an apparent memory of 
events upon awakening which is not a memory of waking life.
5. The Causal Hypothesis, that 'telling a dream' is typically caused by brain 
processes similar to those which explain a witnesses' report of what he 
recently saw and did, is a speculation one might reasonably make in virtue of 
the programme of scientific research suggested by it, though we are not entitled 
to assert it with any confidence on the basis of evidence presently available.
6. It is better that our conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep be 
taken to imply the Causal Hypothesis than it be taken to imply the Received 
Opinion.
7. It is better that our conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep be 
taken to imply the Causal Hypothesis than that it be rendered trivially true 
by the Reductive Analysis.
8. Scientific confirmation of the Causal Hypothesis would not confirm the 
Received Opinion, for it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
'remembering' in everyday discourse that a person's words or actions have a 
certain causal explanation; at most it would show that our dispositions to 
apparent memories if awoken are acquired and retained with an order, pace 
and duration analogous to the acquisition and retention of a witnesses ability to 
report events perceived.
9. Additional confirmation of the Representational Hypothesis, that a 
person's description of his dreams corresponds to a brain structure realised 
during sleep in virtue of common representational qualities, would not confirm 
the Received Opinion for it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
'remembering' in everyday discourse that a person's words or actions correspond 
to some structure in his brain process in virtue of its representational qualities; 
it would not show that a person knew (was aware of, conscious of, experienced.
Introduction: Awakening Certainty & Empirical Theory
or represented to himself) his brain structure under the interpretation given to 
it by cognitive scientists.
10. Scientific confirmation of the Causal Hypothesis would show that 
something, namely, the ability to tell a dream, is remembered from sleep; for it 
is a sufficient condition of 'remembering' in everyday discourse that a person 
exhibit a know-how previously acquired and not lost.
11. Our conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep is best miderstood as the 
speculative hypothesis that 'telling a dream' is typically the exercise of a 
capacity to tell without invention a particular story as if of events witnessed 
and deeds done (no matter how improbable or impossible), a story which is not 
a memory of waking life and need not be a memory of occurrences during sleep, 
but the capacity to tell that story ratlier than another having been acquired 
during sleep and not lost.
3. The Dispositional Analysis is preferable to an analysis of dreaming which 
implies the Received Opinion (that dreams are perceptions, thoughts, images, 
sensations, or some such mental acts or events) for the Received Opinion is 
empirically false.
In the Investigations, W ittgenstein questioned whether our undoubting 
acceptance of a person's awakening narrative as if of events witnessed and 
deeds done as a true description of his dreams implies that the dreamer is 
genuinely remembering what he seemed to see and tried to do during sleep. 
W ittgenstein's rhetorical suggestion was that our everyday narratives of 
dreams are logically independent of the hypothesis that, in 'telling a dream', 
a person is remembering perceptions, thoughts, images, sensations, or some such 
mental acts or events, occurring during sleep. What is it that a person 
undoubtingly accepts when he awakes with a vivid impression as if of events
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recently witnessed and deeds recently done and supposes that he is not 
remembering episodes from waking life? I assume that a person awakening 
witli a dream to tell is confident that something ('a dream') is remembered 
from sleep, I assume that the confidence of his conviction has a psychological 
explanation in the vividness of our awakening impressions and our natural 
inclination to relate a narrative in the past tense. And I assume that this 
confidence may, in the context of awakening with a dream  to tell, be 
unshakeable by rational argument. But I take it to be open whether, in telling a 
dream, a person implies that what is remembered ('dreams') are events which 
happened during sleep. That is, I take it to be open whether the Received 
Opinion is essential to our conviction tliat dreams are dreamt during sleep and 
remembered or forgotten upon awakening.
How is it to be decided whether or not our commonplace conviction that 
dreams are remembered from sleep implies that dreams are perceptions, 
thoughts, images or any other mental act or event? hi contradiction of Malcolm 
(1959) I suppose that whether our commonplace conviction that dreams are 
remembered from sleep implies the Received Opinion cannot be decided 
independently of the empirical question about what, if anyüiing, we remember 
in circumstances in which we undoubtingly assert 'X remembers dreaming p'. 
Malcohn argued that our commonplace convictions about dreaming cannot imply 
that dreams are perceptions, thoughts, images or anything else (except dreams) 
occurring during sleep because it is neither a logical truth nor an empirical 
hypothesis that dreams are perceptions, thoughts, etc. It is not an empirical 
hypothesis because, Malcolm claimed, in paradigm uses of sentences of the form 
'X dreamt p' (that is. where X was sound asleep, sincerely related a narrative 
as if of events witnessed and deeds done without invention, and is not 
remembering episodes from waking life), there are no possible observations
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which we would commonly take to establish with certainty that X perceived, 
thought, imagined (here one may insert any mental verb except 'dreamt') p 
during sleep.
I agree with Malcolm that sleep is ordinarily sound. A person asleep is 
usually indisposed to do or say anything unless awoken. This is an obvious fact. 
I agree with Malcolm that behavioural evidence that a person was inert and 
unresponsive is sufficient to render doubtful the hypothesis that he seemed to 
see, tried to do, thought or imagined anything corresponding to the events 
wihiessed and deeds done ostensibly referred to in a typical dream narrative. 
This is an inference of a kind commonly drawn without hesitation in everyday 
life. It follows tliat anyone who takes a person's narrative to be an ordinary 
case of telling a dream cannot consistently assert that it is certain that the 
dreamer is remembering episodes from sleep. Hie fact that an undoubting faith 
in the Received Opinion would be unreasonable gives a good (though 
admittedly insufficient) reason to distinguish our confident conviction that 
dreams are remembered from the Received Opinion. But tliis is not Malcolm's 
central line of argument. His central argument relies upon the principle that 
every assertoric sentence expresses either a logical truth (accepted without 
doubt or justification by anyone who understands tlie language) or an empirical 
hypothesis verifiable in circumstances presupposed in its ordinary use. His 
reliance upon this principle is regrettable. For philosophical interest in 
dreaming generated by Malcolm's elaboration of Wittgenstein's remarks all but 
burnt itself out in the (no doubt very worthy) task of establishing that this 
principle is unsound.
My insistence that it is an empirical matter what happens during sleep and 
whether any of it is remembered owes much to Squires' (1973) attempt to renew 
an attack on the Received Opinion which duly grants the success of Puhiam's
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(1962a) refutation of Malcolm's verificationism. As I understand it, the 
Received Opinion is the empirical hypotliesis that in the circumstances in 
which we undoubtingly assert X remembers a dream' it is (coincidentally) true 
that X remembers perceptions, thoughts, images or some such mental acts or 
events occurring during sleep. I follow Putnam and Squires in supposing that 
this hypothesis may be true or false independently of w hether it is 
fundamental to our ordinary concept of dreaming. It is possible that, as Squires 
argued, the Received Opinion is both central to the ordinary concept of 
dreaming and false. Hius, in line with Putnam and Squires, I reject Malcolm's 
supposition that where a sentence is used in ordinary circumstances and where 
there is observable evidence of a kind we commonly accept to establish its truth 
with certainty it cannot be intelligibly questioned whether that sentence is 
true. It is possible that what we commonly take to be certain beyond doubt or 
question, namely, that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or 
forgotten upon awakening, may be discovered false.
However, I do not follow Putnam and Squires in supposing that our ordinary 
conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten 
upon awakening is equivalent to the Received Opinion. If it were shown both 
that ordinary talk about dreaming is compatible with tlie conclusion that the 
Received Opinion is false and that belief in the Received Opinion is 
manifestly inconsistent witli what we already know, there may be reason to 
conclude that ordinary talk about dreaming does not, despite superficial 
appearances to the contrary, entail that tlie Received Opinion is true.
I suppose that, if we were to persist in our confident conviction that dreams 
are remembered from sleep, in the face of evidence disconfirming the 
hypothesis that dreams are episodes occurring during sleep, it would be 
charitable to suppose that our persistent conviction did not imply the Received
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Opinion. And I suppose that the best way to test how we would talk about 
dreams if we did not believe the Received Opinion is to take seriously the 
empirical evidence already available to us that nothing, or nothing much, of 
what happens during sleep is remembered by us upon awakening. As someone 
who has taken such evidence very much to heart. I'll hazard the prediction 
that ordinary habits of talk would not undergo a radical change if it were 
widely recognised that tlie Received Opinion is false. This does not, in itself, 
confirm Wittgenstein's suggestion Üiat tiie Received Opinion is marginal to our 
concept of dreaming as it presently exists. As Putnam (1962a) noted, a 
continuity in our habits of speech may superficially disguise the passing of 
familiar idioms about dreaming from living tiieory into a mere figures of 
speech. But, even on Putnam and Squires' assumption that the Received 
Opinion is fundamental to ordinary talk, taking seriously tiie possibility that 
it is false provides a powerful motive to look for a revisionary analysis. Such 
an analysis might be recommended as a change in meaning or it might be 
presented as a pragmatic justification of what was and will continue to be a 
'strictly speaking' erroneous manner of speech.
The discovery Üiat the Received Opinion is false, together wiüi the fact 
that we could quite reasonably continue to talk about dreaming much as we do 
now if it were false, would not, of itself, show that the Received Opinion is 
marginal to our ordinary concept. However, were it to be shown that the 
Received Opinion is, not merely false, but false by consistent application of our 
everyday theories about beliefs, intentions, thoughts, images and so on, to 
familiar facts about what people appear to remember upon awakening and 
about what happened whilst they slept, I thmk that there would be grounds 
for the charitable conclusion that the Received Opinion is not implicit in our
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present conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or 
forgotten upon awakening.
I believe that such an argument can be given. Its elements are found in the 
essays of MacDonald (1953), Malcolm (1959), Squires (1973), Mannison (1975) 
(1977), Hunter (1976) and Shaffer (1984) among others. The primary aim of 
these writers, with the exception of Squires and, possibly, Mannison (1975), was 
to argue that the ordinary concept of dreaming is distinct from that of any 
mental phenomenon found in waking life. The arguments employed to this end 
may be reconstructed to take the form of a reductio of the assumption that the 
Received Opinion is implicit in the ordinary concept of dreaming, showing that 
if we assumed the Received Opinion to be true, that assumption would be 
inconsistent with the bulk of our beliefs about the mental. It is the fact tliat, 
notw ithstanding our readiness to assent to the Received Opinion, it is 
inconsistent with what we generally believe, that shows tliat it is both false 
and peripheral to the ordinary concept of dreaming.
Squires departed from MacDonald and Malcolm in conducting the argument 
against the Received Opinion on the assumption that it is central, to the 
ordinary concept. He did not explicitly regard his argument as a reductio, the 
conclusion calling into question his assumption that the Received Opinion is 
fmidamental to everyday talk about dreaming. Presumably, he did not draw 
this conclusion because, firstly, he remained unconvinced by Malcolm's attempt 
to 'save' ordinary talk from empirical disconfirmation and, secondly, he saw no 
alternative justification of our ordinary conviction that dreams are remembered 
than that offered by the Received Opinion. In my view this was a more 
resolute course than that taken by Shaffer (1984) who, having concluded that 
the Received Opinion is false, failed to say either w hat alternative 
assumption justifies our conviction tliat dreams are remembered from sleep, or
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why, in the peculiar case of 'remembering dreams', justification is not required. 
However, it seems to me that an alternative justification of that conviction is 
illuminated by the Dispositional Analysis.
I am inclined to follow W ittgenstein's suggestion that the Received 
Opinion is logically independent of our conviction that dreams are remembered 
from sleep. But I am happy to agree with Squires that, if our common 
awakening conviction that something is remembered amounts to a belief in the 
Received Opinion, then the natural phenomenon of awakening with a dream to 
tell is a source of error and illusion against which we should take precautions 
(e.g. REM deprivation drugs) unless, as is very likely, the instrumental benefits 
(e.g. the fun and fascination) of awakening with apparitions of remembering 
events from sleep outweighs its unavoidable harms. These days one may be 
forgiven for taking a somewhat fuzzy view of the border between a descriptive 
analysis of the ordinary concept of dreaming and a revisionary modification of 
the concept rendering it coherent with the totality of our linguistic practices. 
So I prefer to state my case for the Dispositional Analysis a little 
circumspectly. Given that the Dispositional Analysis is preferable to either 
the Reductive Analysis or the Causal-cum-Representational Analyses, my 
conclusion is that either ordinary talk of dreams implies the Received Opinion 
and should be re-interpreted according to the Dispositional Analysis or 
ordinary talk of dreams does not imply the Received Opinion and is correctly 
in terpreted  according to the Dispositional Analysis. In short, the 
Dispositional Analysis represents 'the best' interpretation of ordinary talk 
about dreaming.
4. The Dispositional Analysis is preferable to the Reductive Analyses (that to 
'remember a dream from sleep' is simply to have an apparent memory of events
10
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upon awakening which is not a memory of waking life) for the Reductive 
Analysis 'saves' our conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and 
remembered or forgotten upon awakening from the conclusion that the Received 
Opinion is false only by rendering it empirically empty.
Malcohn (1959) argued tliat a dream is what a person appears to remember upon 
awakening where he is not remembering perceptions, thoughts, sensations or 
anything else except dreams. The appeal of Malcolm’s analysis is that it seems 
to offer a means of capturing the idea tliat a person has privileged authority 
about his dreams whilst resisting the temptation to explain that authority in 
terms of an infallible mechanism of introspection. Unfortunately, Malcolm's 
contention that 'telling a dream' is logically prior to dreaming can only be 
reconciled with our conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep at the 
price of allowing that, in this context, 'remembering' has a special sense 
distinct from the usual concept of memory, a sense in which tlie demand for 
justification is uniquely 'inappropriate'. Squires (1973) correctly distinguished 
the strengths and the weaknesses of Malcolm's analysis. He saw that the 
identification of dreams with what a person appears to remember upon 
awakening where he is not remembering waking episodes might save our 
narratives of dreams from the discovery that the Received Opinion is false. 
But he also saw that Malcolm's analysis offers no defence of our ordinary 
conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten 
upon awakening. Strictly speaking, dreams are not dreamt during sleep, they 
are only 'remembered' upon awakening. What we call 'remembering a dream' 
is, in the usual sense of the verb, remembering notliing. It is to have a merely 
apparent memory upon awakening.
The Reductive Analysis is, in itself, an incomplete account of the ordinary 
concept of dreaming for it gives no account of talk about dreams occurring at
11
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particular times within a period of sleep nor of dreams that are forgotten 
during sleep. The Dispositional Analysis may be regarded as an elaboration of 
Reductive Analysis in that it retains the identification of the content of a 
person’s dream wilh the content of his apparent memory on awakening, where 
he is questioned or otherwise prompted to try to remember events recently 
witnessed and is not distracted. But, in adding to the Reductive Analysis an 
account of what it is for a dream to be dreamt at a particular time within a 
period of sleep and to be remembered or forgotten upon awakening, the 
Dispositional Analysis introduces a tlieoretical assumption about the causal 
explanation of those among our apparent memories whose content is a dream. 
According to the Dispositional Analysis, our conviction that dreams are dreamt 
during sleep, that dreams are uniquely identifiable by the dreamer and time 
dreamt, implies the assumption that what dream a person would tell ’if 
awoken' is determined prior to and independently of the contingencies of the 
process of awakening. The Dispositional Analysis offers an account of the 
dreaming or occurrence of a dream as the acquisition of a disposition to appear 
to remember events, if awoken in a manner which is both normal and has no 
significant effect upon what a person appears to remember, where he is 
questioned or otherwise prompted to try to remember events recently witnessed 
(no matter how incredible or unimaginable) and not distracted.
It is sometimes said that any tiieory, however unwarranted by the evidence 
we have, is preferable to none. I suppose I must appeal to this principle in 
preferring the Dispositional to the Reductive Analysis. Even so, I admit to 
having at times been puzzled by the credence this saying enjoys. Hie justice of 
this principle lies, I suppose, in the virtue of our words and thoughts having a 
practical value in guiding actions. Hiere would be no charity about inferring 
the Dispositional Hypothesis (that telling a dream is typically the exercise of
12
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a disposition, acquired during sleep and not lost, to express a particular 
apparent memory upon awakening) into ordinary talk about dreams if it were 
an idle speculation disconnected from any foreseeable investigations and 
experiments. As I defend it, the Dispositional Analysis shares the advantage 
claimed for the Causal Hypotheses of anticipating a practical project of 
experimental research. According to the Dispositional Analysis, our conviction 
that dreams are remembered from sleep is not merely an idle speculation for, I 
argue, it is central to psyclio-physiological sleep-research.
Whether dreams told are dreams which would have been told if one had 
been awoken a moment earlier in a normal or standard manner is a hypothesis 
for which ordinary experience provides no evidence. For a brief period, in the 
late fifties and early sixties, it looked as if psycho-physiological research was 
beginning to establish correlations of some specificity between types of 
physiological phenomenon and types of dream narratives a person would tell if 
immediately awoken. The assumption that dreaming and waking perception 
correlate to common physiological processes was, and by and large remains, 
central to this research. Sadly, the promise of a theory enabling us to infer 
from physiological phenomenathe acquisition of a disposition to tell a certain 
kind of dream has gone unfulfilled.
Strictly speaking, the Dispositional Hypothesis, that telling a dream is 
typically tiie exercise of a disposition acquired during sleep and not lost, is not 
equivalent to the Causal Hypothesis. We could construe ordinary talk of 
dreaming narrowly to imply only the Dispositional Hypothesis. In which case 
ordinary talk of dreaming would not imply that dreams are dreamt with an 
order and pace analogous to waking experience. Dreams might be dreamt 'in a 
flash'. But it remains that the only kind of systematic 'do-able' experimental 
work in view is tied to the analogy between dreaming and perceiving, and that
13
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other possible means of charting the acquisition, retention and loss of 
dispositions to tell dreams are undirected stabs in the dark.
A pessimistic view of the prospects for the Causal Hypothesis may lead 
one to reflect that, perhaps, it is better we should be making idle speculations 
incapable of guiding a systematic research programme than that we should 
imply an analogical model the scientific value of which, whilst unrivalled, 
looks to be pretty well exhausted. But, if tliat were the case, it seems to me 
that the Dispositional Analysis would have no advantage over the Reductive 
Analysis of 'remembering dreams'. In rejecting Malcolm's verificationist 
conception of 'deep grammar', Putnam (1962a) recognised that there must be 
detectable differences in the use we have for the verb 'to dream', in what 
inferences we find plausible, what sentences we find 'odd', according to what 
theoretical assumptions, if any, underlie our concept of dreaming. If our 
conviction tliat dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten 
were merely an idle speculation, detached from the perceptual model, there 
would be nothing in our use of the verb 'to dream' to distinguish it from a merely 
metaphorical manner of saying that telling a dream is very much like 
remembering events witnessed, except, that is, in regard to whether anything is 
actually remembered.
Putnam  (1963b) allowed that empirical discoveries may lead us to 
radically revise our view of the relationship between a sentence and empirical 
evidence. The discovery that there is no 'cluster' of exceptionless generalities 
about dreams may lead us to regard one and only one exceptionless generality 
(i.e. dreams are what we appear to remember upon awakening where we are 
not remembering events from waking life) as unreviseable in the face of any 
empirical evidence. What was once a theoretical proposition becomes an 
'analytic' sentence, in virtue of a shift in the use we have for it brought about by
14
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empirical research. Suppose it were to turn out that Globot's Hypothesis were 
confirmed. The assumption read into ordinary talk by the Dispositional 
Analysis - that 'telling a dream' is caused by events occurring during sleep - 
would be shown to be false. Very likely we would carry on talking about 
dreams much as we do now. But our words would cease to have the import 
accorded to them by tlie Dispositional Analysis. We should then have to make 
do with the Reductive Analysis. Fodor & Chiliara (1967) grudgingly allowed 
that "we could perhaps learn to live" witli Malcolm's analysis were none better 
available. No doubt we could. But we would have to accept, as Putnam 
foresaw, that our statements about the events of a dream being dreamt during 
sleep, as if they could be known prior to an actual awakening, would survive 
only as a fiction comparable to the literary convention of an author's omniscient 
knowledge of tlie mental life of his characters.
5. The D ispositional Analysis is preferable to any functionalist analysis 
which implies the Representational Hypothesis (that a person's narrative of a 
dream  corresponds to its norm al cause in  v irtue of their common 
represen tational properties) for the R epresentational H ypothesis is 
superfluous to our conviction tliat dreams are remembered from sleep.
Malcolm saw a close connection between popular acceptance of the Received 
Opinion and the desire to explain our awakening impressions as the effects of 
events which happened during sleep. Malcolm regarded the urge to explain 
the phenomenon of 'telling a dream' as a source of confusion. He noted our 
willingness to infer from our apparent memories (e.g. the impression that it 
was raining) a causal explanation (e.g. that one has that impression because 
one felt the water sprayed upon one's face during the sleep) and warned that 
this can lead to confusion between a report of an incident (e.g. "I felt water
15
Introduction: Awakening Certainty & Empirical Theory
sprayed upon my face") and speculation about a likely-sounding causal 
intermediary ("I must have felt the water upon my face"). Malcolm thought 
that we are liable to confuse the proper causal explanation of telling a dream, 
whether it be a story about surface irradiations in the night, undigested cheese, 
'psychic forces' tirreatening to disturb sleep, or neuronal discharges in the 
brain-stem, with the hypothesis that we appear to remember thoughts, 
images, sensations, etc. because during sleep we tlrought, imagined, felt, etc.
I follow Malcolm in drawing a distinction between the Causal Hypothesis, 
presupposed by scientific sleep research, and the Received Opinion. The 
discovery that our apparent memories upon awakening have a certain internal 
aetiology, that typical of remembering events recently witnessed, would not of 
itself show that we remember anything that happened during sleep. The 
discovery of regular correlations between brain processes occurring during sleep 
and what a person appears to remember (if awoken in a normal manner, 
prompted and not distracted) might show that a disposition of a determinate 
content is typically acquired and retained during sleep. But this would not 
show that dreams are perceptions, thoughts, images, sensations or any other 
kind of event remembered from sleep. It would not show that we knew (were 
'aware' or 'conscious' of) anything that happened whilst we slept. It would not 
show that the acquisition of a disposition to 'tell a dream' (if awoken, etc.) is 
an 'experience', in any useful sense of that notorious term. Scientific sleep 
research will not give us any good reason to suppose that, in 'telling a dream', a 
person is demonstrating knowledge of events which happened whilst he slept. 
At most, psycho-physiological investigations may reveal that the ability to 
tell certain kmd of story, a know-how exercised only when awake, is acquired 
and retained during sleep.
16
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Functionalist analyses of 'remembering dreams', variously defended by 
Pufaiam (1963), Chihara (1964), Chihara & Fodor (1967) and Dennett (1976) 
against Malcolm's alleged behaviourism and verificationism, typically add 
the Representational to the Causal Hypothesis to account for w hat is 
remembered in telling a dream. As I see it, tlie Causal-cum-Representational 
Analysis is best taken to draw together the following propositions: that (a) 
dreaming is a brain process occurring during sleep which normally produces a 
disposition to 'tell a dream' (if awoken, etc.), that (b) dreams are remembered 
or forgotten from sleep if the disposition to 'tell a dream' (if awoken, etc.) is 
retained and lost according to mechanisms similar to those which explain how 
a person remembers perceptions, etc., that (c) rule-based computational models 
of brain function are indispensable to classify brain functions and thus decide 
wheüier or not dreams are remembered, and that (d) dreaming is an experience, 
rather than merely a token interpretable by brain scientists, if (i) the same 
brain process occurring when one is awake has the normal causes (environmental 
stimulus, other mental states) and effects (behavioural response and further 
mental states) appropriate to perceptions, thoughts, images, sensations, etc. or 
(ii) the brain process has at least a sufficient similarity in causal properties 
beneath the level of surface irradiations and environmental response to be 
interestingly classified under the common label 'experiences' or, possibly, (iii) 
the occurrence of tlie brain process is important as to the attitudes we adopt 
towards the person (e.g. our sympathy or moral concern for him) [see Horne 
(1984)].
The most sophisticated presentation of these diverse strands of the Causal- 
cum-Representational Analysis is found in Dennett (1976). Dennett did not 
assume that confirmation of the Representational Hypothesis would show that 
dreams are objects, events, actions, processes occurring during sleep. He
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distinguished between the neural representation of tlie content of a dream and 
what is represented, the intentional object of such a representation. There is, 
according to Dennett, a further question about whether the acquisition of such 
an internal representation is an 'experience', i.e. something of which the 
dreamer is simultaneously aware.
Dennett took the phenomenon of dreaming to illustrate a problem facing 
any attempt to reduce 'introspection' to dispositions to first person utterances. It 
is a feature of our ordinary notion of experience that what we have experienced 
can outstrip our capacity to currently express it; it is a feature of our ordinary 
notion of experience tliat we can remember more than could be shown by our past 
disposition. But what, in the absence of evidence about past dispositions to 
verbal behaviour, could decide whether or not a person is presently 
remembering? Dennett's suggestion, here, was that re lev en t criteria may be 
provided by storage models of memory of the kind advanced by cognitive 
psychologists. He proposed that if telling a dream were caused by some 
internal process corresponding to the 'laying down of a memory trace' according 
to a storage model of short-term perceptual memory, then telling a dream 
should be accounted a species of remembering and, hence, dreaming should be 
accounted an 'experience' akin to waking perception.
However, Dennett recognised that 'laying down a memory trace' could not 
be regarded as a sufficient condition of 'experience'. It must also be shown that 
the means by which the memory trace is established (the means by which we 
acquire the capacity to tell a dream if awoken) is interestingly similar to 
waking perception or imagination. The issue about whether dreaming is an 
'experience', Dennett concluded, could turns upon whether there is an analogy 
between the peripheral physiology of waking perception and StageREM sleep. 
It might turn out, Demiett explicitly allowed, that 'experience' is a term which
18
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has no theoretical value. Even supposing our use of the term 'experience' and its 
cognates to have an indispensable role in expressing attitudes towards ourselves 
and other 'subjects of experience', it is an open and theoretical question whether 
this non-cognitive role is supervenient upon reference to some internal property 
of a person which explains his behaviour.
1 assume that the Cartesian notion of introspection as a privileged 
knowledge of mental representation beyond scientific scrutiny is false and that, 
to the extent the Cartesian notion is implicit in ordinary talk about dreaming, 
ordinary talk about dreaming is false and in need of revision. 1 do not argue this 
assumption. The demolition of the idea that dreams are inner representations 
known with certainty by the dreamer, whilst merely inferred by others from 
the dreamer's waking report or behaviour during sleep, seems to me to be the 
unassailable result of Malcolm's application of W ittgenstein's thought to 
dreaming. I take it that Malcolm’s linguistic deflation of the appearance of 
privileged authority is an improvement upon Cartesian versions of the 
Representational Hypothesis. The only serious rivals to the Reductive and 
Dispositional Analyses of dream ing are interpretations which imply a 
materialist version of the Representational Hypothesis, abandoning the idea 
that our introspective or retrospective knowledge of our dreams can be justified 
a priori without reference to the brain sciences.
1 argue that the Representational Hypothesis is superfluous to our 
conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep. It is not necessary that a 
person have previously represented knowledge he presently remembers. It is 
sufficient that he exhibit an ability previously acquired and not lost. The 
ability retained may be an ability to say what happened, to sing a song, send 
birthday cards on time, predict the future, or, in the case of remembering 
dreams, to express a story without invention as if of events witnessed and deeds
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done, which is not a memory of waking life. There is no necessity that, in 
acquiring an ability remembered, one exercise that ability or even be aware of 
the fact that one has acquired it. Were the Representational Hypothesis 
discovered to be false, it would not decide that dreams are not remembered from 
sleep. Further, were the Representational Hypothesis true, it would not follow 
that we remember internal representations from sleep. For the fact that 
cognitive scientists can map structures in the brain to narratives of dreams 
according to some syntactic model of natural language would not show that the 
dreamer knew the sentences tokened in his brain under the interpretation given 
to them by the the scientists.
Dennett finds a problem with the identification of the content of a dream 
with the content of an internal token or 'memory-trace', a problem about the 
failure of cognitive science to make space for any notion of 'experience'. 
'Experience', it is true, does not seem to be reducible to representing; not even for 
the convenience of philosophers like Fodor who cannot abide the idea that 
there is more to common sense psychology than you get by being realist about 
representations. In setting up this problem, Dennett seems to me to suppose (or 
rather, to invite his readers to suppose, since Dennett always covers himself) 
either that 'experience' is a necessary condition of remembering, or that, if the 
acquisition of a disposition to tell a dream is 'experienced', then what is told is 
a report of what happened during sleep. It is sometimes said that knowledge 
remembered must be acquired 'through experience'. But, if so, the tag 'through 
experience' adds nothing to the requirement that knowledge remembered must 
be knowledge previously acquired. It is not necessary that a person acquire 
knowledge remembered through perception, unless it be knowledge of what is 
happening or seems to be happening. But a person's knowledge of his dreams is
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precisely not knowledge of things perceived or misperceived, nor of the 'inner 
processes' by which his disposition to tell a dream is acquired.
The distinction I draw between the Received Opinion and the Causal-cum- 
Representational Hypotheses assumes tliat our everyday mental explanations 
in terms of beliefs and desires are by and large justified by common experience. 
My attack on the confidence of our everyday conviction that dreams are 
remembered is emphatically not part of a general revisionist programme like 
that envisaged by Churchland (1981) who regards even prepositional attitude 
talk as a botched attempt at a causal theory. Ironically, my argument for the 
thesis that our ordinary conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep is a 
speculative hypothesis open to scientific confirmation or disconfirmation 
depends upon the contention tliat ordinary attributions of beliefs and desires 
are not speculative hypotheses open to scientific confirm ation or 
disconfirmation. By and large, I agree with Ryle (see, e.g., his preface to The 
Concept of Mind) that the easy confidence of our everyday attributions of 
beliefs and desires is entirely justified by its evident success. By and large, that 
is, for the ordinary concept of dreaming is a notable exception.
I do not take Fodor's (1992) view that the success of our ordinary 
rationalisations of action in terms of beliefs and desires can only be explained 
by supposing that such practical reasonings correspond pretty well to internal 
computational-cum-causal processes. But even supposing tliat ordinary mental 
talk aims to pick out the internal causes of behaviour and that it is by and large 
successful in doing so, there are good reasons to doubt that dreams are 
perceptions, thoughts, sensations, etc. For, from what we know of tlie causes of 
perceptions (e.g. an impression of a tiger is typically caused by light-rays 
reflected upon the retina from a tiger or from some middle-size, middle-distant 
object like one) and from what we know of the behavioural effects of
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perceptions (e.g. seeing a tiger typically causes one to run away or at least try 
to run away), there is good reason to be sceptical about the hypothesis that we 
appear to remember events witnessed and deeds done on awakening because, 
during sleep, we seemed to perceive and tried to do these things. Even if 
perceptions, thoughts, sensations, etc. are central brain processes, we would 
require some special explanation of why these processes do not have their usual 
peripheral causes and effects when they occur during sleep (e.g. the kind of 
story sometimes attem pted w ith colourful anthropom orphism  in the 
physiological literature about the cerebral cortex m isinterpreting stimuli 
generated in the brain-stem and vainly sending out signals to a motor-response 
system paralysed by sleep). That such an explanation can be given is, at best, a 
matter of speculative science, at worst, a question-begging prejudice. The 
undoubted success of folkpsychology offers no pre-scientific justification of our 
commonplace conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep, even 
supposing (which 1 do not) that this success assures us that our everyday 
rationalisations of action correspond pretty well to internal processes governing 
behaviour.
It would be prudent of me to suppose that some reader (of course, not you. 
Dear Reader!) will rem ain unpersuaded by what he derides as the 
’behaviourism ’ or 'instrumentalism ' of my defence of the Dispositional 
Analysis. 1 shall be content to persuade such a reader that there is a 
remarkable gap between the undoubting confidence of our awakening conviction 
that dreams are remembered from sleep and the evidence we have for it. The 
best justification that can be offered for our conviction by m aterialist 
philosophers sympathetic to Representational Theories of Mind is tliat there 
is no good reason to judge that any rival hypothesis is true, tliat there is no good 
reason to judge that this hypothesis is false, and that this hypothesis has the
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pragmatic virtue of suggesting a programme of experimental research. The 
conclusion follows that, even supposing the Represen ta tional-cum-Causal 
Hypothesis about dreaming to offer (like nothing else in town) the prospect of a 
multi-billion dollar bonanza of relevant experimental work, we have at 
present no body of evidence making it reasonable to assert with any confidence 
that future scientific results will confirm it. All we have is a hunch, no more 
than a speculative hypotheses, and the desire to collect some experimental 
data .
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PART ONE
WHAT APPEARS TO BE REMEMBERED FROM SLEEP
CHAPTER ONE 
EVENTS WITNESSED AND DEEDS DONE
1. Simply to say that evidence presented against the Received Opinion is 
'inappropriate’ because dreams are an extraordinary kind of 'experience' is, in 
effect, to admit that dreams are nothing other than w hat we appear to 
remember on awakening, where nothing is remembered from waking life and 
whether or not episodes are remembered from sleep.
In this chapter and the next, 1 argue that the Received Opinion is false. The 
relevant evidence is provided by familiar everyday observations about what 
people appear to remember upon awakening and about what happened whilst 
they slept, rather than by formal scientific investigation. Sober reflection on 
what we already know shows that, m 'telling a dream', a person usually does 
not remember any actions or events which occurred whilst he slept.
Whether or not dreams are remembered from sleep depends upon what 
dreams are supposed to be. The supposition tliat there is a common property 
between dreams and waking perceptions, thoughts, images, etc. is usually 
expressed by the dangerously convenient term 'experience'. The trouble with 
the view that dreams are 'experiences' occurring during sleep is that its aura of 
invulnerability to reasonable contradiction rests largely upon the obscurity of 
the relevant notion of 'experience'. One is often told what dreams are not, what 
causes and effects they do not have, what evidence is not appropriate, without
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being told anything about what dreams are. No sooner has one rattled some 
alleged evidence mooted in favour of the traditional view than, unabashed and 
with no loss of confidence, its defender will insist (sometimes with a respectful 
nod to Science or, worse. Future Science) that some other kind of evidence (1 
know not what') shall prove decisive.
Time and again, the self-styled Defender of Common Sense, outraged by the 
suggestion tliat a person telling a dream generally has no good reason to suppose 
that he is describing something which happened during sleep, will insist that 
the demand for evidence is misdirected or simplistic. When pressed for an 
account of what he genuinely remembers he will say that it is, of course, not a 
real tiger nor exactly a little picture of a tiger on the retina, but...Something 
Else! Unfortunately, it is all too easy to mistake saying what dreams are not 
for giving an account of what dreams are. Simply to meet the demand for 
justification of the claim to remember by denying, at every step, that evidence 
presented against the hypothesis is appropriate because dreams are an 
extraordinary sort of experience is in tlie end to say nothing about dreams being 
'experiences' at all. It is, in effect, to admit that dreams are what a person - 
often very vividly - appears to remember on awakening, where he is not 
remembering anything from waking life and whetlier or not he is remembering 
episodes from sleep.
In this chapter, 1 take the Received Opinion to assert that, in the typical 
case of telling a dream, a person genuinely remembers what he seemed to see 
and tried to do during sleep. After all, dream narratives are usually stories as 
if of beliefs, desires and emotions formed in earnest and credulous response to 
events perceived. It is open for someone to come up with an alternative accotmt 
of 'experiences' occurring during sleep, according to whicli dreams are even less 
akin to the ostensible objects of our waking impressions than 'seeming to see' and
25
What Appears To Be Remembered: Events Witnessed & Deeds Done
'trying to do the things' we appear to have seen and done. But, as an attempt to 
protect the hypothesis that dreams are experiences, this approach strikes me 
as second best. It only magnifies the problem of justifying the claim that, in. the 
typical case telling a dream, a person remembers such experiences, even should 
it be supposed that he had them during sleep. In the next chapter, I consider 
the view that what we remember, dreaming, is less a matter of believing and 
more a matter of imagining, entertaining thoughts, pretending to believe or 
some such similitude of perceiving emd doing. This alternative to the notion 
that dreams are delusions serves only to discover additional difficulties for the 
hypothesis that we remember experiences from sleep.
The concept of an hallucination is not the concept of some extraordinary 
'state of consciousness', best known to hippies or chronic alcoholics, which the 
rest of us commonly encounter only in the nightlife of our dreams. An 
hallucination is an interconnected web of false perceptual beliefs and frustrated 
intentions, and there are no more familiar psychological phenomena than 
beliefs and desires. We are everywhere masters of a theory of beliefs and 
desires. There is no shortage of evidence of the kinds of circumstances in which 
we confidently assert or deny the existence of mistaken impressions and 
thwarted desires. 1 argue that consistent application of our ordinary standard 
for judging what a person does or does not believe and does or does not intend, to 
the known facts of sleeping and waking, leaves no reasonable doubt that, in the 
typical case of telling a dream, a person remembers nothing believed or 
intended during sleep.
Once the ground rules of this argum ent are accepted, it is almost 
embarrassing how obvious and trivially true are the reasons forthcoming 
against the Received Opinion. The philosophical interest of the argument is 
sustained, however, by the revelation that here, as elsewhere in hum an
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experience, is a phenomenon that commands assent to a proposition out of all 
proportion to its rational justification. The 'defence' of the Received Opinion is 
a giand tour of question-begging attempts to explain away the obvious evidence 
against it, of analogies drawn and distinguished ad hoc, of confirmations 
anticipated and disconfirmations forgotten, all conducted w ith a breezy 
confidence which betrays an ill-disguised prejudice that it 'must' be true. It is 
as if the natural phenomenon of awakening with an impression as if of events 
witnessed and deeds done, where notiring is remembered from waking life, were 
a potential source of illusion, compelling us to assent to the hypothesis that 
something is remembered, whatever its rational justification.
There are propositions, some famously examined by Hume, popular faith in 
which may be supposed to be practically indispensable. In these cases we can 
note the arguments and conclude, "So much the worse for human reason!". But 
Hume, very correctly, imposed rigourous restrictions upon what beliefs may 
escape the censure of reason. He did not, for example, place the rhetoric of 
theism within his category of 'natural beliefs'. Is there any more reason to 
suppose that faith in the Received Opinion has a value which mocks the 
efforts of philosophers to disprove it? Our seeming unwillingness to allow that 
the Received Opinion might be false is certainly no guarantee that there must 
be good arguments to be found in its favour, albeit that those arguments lie 
beyond the compass of understanding we presently have. Either it cannot be 
false, in which case it is not a genuine empirical hypothesis, or it should be 
allowed to stand or fall according to the evidence we presently have in view.
hi this chapter, 1 argue that popular faith in the Received Opinion relies 
upon an unwarranted inference from an incontestable premise (that, in 'telling a 
dream', a person typically awakes with a vivid impression as if of events 
witnessed and deeds done but does not remember anything from waking life) to
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the doubtful conclusion (that, in 'telling a dream', a person typically remembers 
what, during sleep, he seemed to see and tried to do). Tlie premise assumes that 
there are good reasons why we suppose that a person is not remembering what 
he seemed to see or tried to do zohilst awake, that there are recognised 
standards according to which we distinguish among vivid impressions as if of 
events witnessed between memories of hallucinations and hallucinations of 
memory. I argue that consistent application of these standards conclusively 
settles that, in 'telling a dream', a person typically does not remember what, 
during sleep he seemed to see or tried to do. The conclusion that dreams are not 
hallucinations does not show that dreams are something else remembered from 
sleep. It leaves only the uncontested premise tliat, in telling a dream, a person 
typically appears to remember events witnessed and deeds done, where nothing 
is remembered from waking life.
2. The principle that a person remembers what he appears to remember, even 
were it valid, w ould not support the hypothesis that dreams are false 
perceptual beliefs, unless it is further supposed that what a person appears to 
remember, whether he appears to remember seeing object O or seeming to see O, 
is one and the same thing, namely, a copy, image or representation of O.
It is sometimes urged that where a person's memory about the recent past is 
generally reliable we should take him at his word about what he seemed to see 
or tried to do, notwithstanding that he was sound asleep. Suppose, for the 
moment, the principle that where a person appears to remember something p he 
genuinely remembers p. This principle would not, of itself, support the claim 
that in remembering dreams one genuinely remembers what one seemed to see or 
tried to do. It is interesting to see what additional assumptions are required to
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lend any plausibility to tlie argument from the general reliability of a person's 
memory about the recent past.
From the principle that where a person appears to remember something p 
he genuinely remembers p, it would follow, in the case where a person awakes 
with an impression that he seemed to see certain things, that he genuinely 
remembers seeming to see tliose things:
(A) X appears to remember seeming to see O; therefore, X remembers seeming to 
see O.
Clearly this is not the argument we require to support the view tliat dreams are 
misperceptions. It is a familiar fact that, in remembering dreams, we typically 
do not so much as appear to remember seeming to see or trying to do things; we 
appear to remember actually seeing things (like tigers) and actually doing 
things (like running away). Tlie inference we need to justify is, rather, the 
following,
(B) X appears to remember seeing O; therefore, X remembers seeming to see O. 
When a person awakes with an impression of having done and seen various 
things and then assures us that he seemed to see these things or tried to do 
them, it is not immediately in question whether his memory is reliable. What 
is primarily at issue is his inference from the apparent memory of one thing to 
actually being aware of something else. The fact that his memory is generally 
reliable is no reason to take his word for granted about the explanation of his 
apparition of memory.
In ordinary circumstances we would understand a person who, on awakening, 
prefaced his narrative with 'It seemed to me' simply to mean It seems to me, 
but I don't credit it'; that he has an impression as if of events witnessed but 
believes that no such events took place. But if he were earnestly to insist tliat 
he was, in some sense, aware of something during asleep then we are entitled to
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some account of what he was aware of and the evidence that he was aware of 
it. Let us suppose tliat there is evidence which supports his inference. Suppose, 
that is, that a person has an impression that he saw and did various things 
and, further, that there is independent reason to say that he seemed to see and 
tried to do these tilings. It does not follow that he remembers seeming to see or 
trying to do these things. The fact that a person seems to remember seeing O 
because he seemed to see O does not guarantee Üiat he remembers seeming to see 
O. Even if a person's inference to false perceptions during sleep were valid, it 
would not follow that he remembers anything.
I do not mean to argue that when a person appears to remember seeing or 
doing a certain thing, it is never correct to say tliat he really remembers 
sometliing else, namely his seeming to see or trying to do those things. It would 
be wrong to maintain that, where X has an impression as if of seeing O, it cannot 
be said that he remembers seeming to see O but only that he knows that he 
seemed to see O by inference from his present impression. In some circumstances, 
the following scheme of argument is valid:
X appears to remember seeing O 
X seemed to see O
X remembers seeming to see O.
However, there is no little confusion about the circumstances in which this 
schema is valid. That confusion arises, in part, from a mistaken conception of 
what is remembered when one remembers seeming to see O, which stems , in 
turn, from a mistaken conception of what is seen when one seems to see an object 
O.
The mistake is a familiar one in the philosophy of perception. It is to 
suppose that when a person sees an object O, he sees a copy or image, a sense 
datum  or representation of O. It is sometimes said that a person directly
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perceives only 'appearances' or that he directly knows only his 'experiences', 
and that he must infer from these representations the existence of material 
objects. Similarly, it is sometimes said that when a person remembers seeing O 
he remembers (or directly remembers) only an 'experience' (appearance, 
impression, copy, image, engram, trace) of O. It then looks as if the both 
following inferences are valid:
(C) X remembers seeing O; therefore, X remembers seeming to see O.
(D) X appears to remember seeing O; therefore, X appears to remember seeming 
to see O.
It should be noted that, even if these inferences were valid, it would not follow 
from the fact that a person appears to remember O, that he remembers seeming 
to see O, any more tlian it would follow tliat he saw O. We would first have to 
re-examine the supposition that it is reasonable to infer that a person 
remembers what he appears to remember. However, it is now easier to see why 
someone might suppose that the principle that a person remembers what he 
appears to remember could be of service in support of the Received Opinion. He 
may tacitly be relying on the following, doubly questionable, line of reasoning:
(E) X appears to remember seeing O; therefore, X appears to remember seeming 
to see O; therefore, X genuinely remembers either seeing O or seeming to see O. 
There is, however, an important truth in the above mentioned confusion over 
what is remembered when one remembers seeming to see an object O. The truth 
is that when a person seems to see O, there is something tliat he sees; and that, 
when a person remembers seeming to see O, there is something that he 
remembers seeing. The mistake is to suppose that what is seen or what is 
remembered is a copy or image of O. This mistake is made when one supposes 
that what is remembered is an experience as if of O, where 'an experience as if 
of O' is thought of as having something in common with a case of seeing O (its
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'subjective appearance') and yet is supposed not to be a case of seeing any object 
P, Q or R.
3. The fam iliar evidence of behaviour and responses which defeats an 
inference from a person's impressions of things seen and done to seeming to see 
and trying to do these things w hilst he was awake, equally defeats an 
inference to seeming to see and trying to do these things whilst he was asleep, 
unless there is some other positive reason to believe that sleep causes concurrent 
illusions of perception rather than subsequent illusions of memory.
When a person tells a story as if of events witnessed and deeds done, where no 
such events or actions happened, we do not automatically conclude tliat he 
seemed to see or tried to do these things. There is a good probability that he 
did not seem to see or try to do any sucli things and that, for some other reasons, 
he merely appears to remember. When a person suddenly has an impression of 
having just been chased by a tiger, the fact that he had been sitting quietly 
with his eyes shut is good reason not to believe that he seemed to see a tiger 
and tried to get away. Evidence that he did not see any objects having an 
appearance similar to a tiger, and that his behaviour betrayed no signs of 
alarm and struggle, is perfectly adequate to defeat the hypothesis that he 
believed himself to be pursued by a tiger.
It is a mistake to think that this kind of evidence is insufficient to counter a 
person's impression that he remembers something. This is plain when we 
reflect tliat we do not suppose that a person telling a dream does so because he 
seemed to see and tried to do various things whilst azvake. The reasons why we 
do not suppose a person to be remembering what he seemed to see and tried to do 
when awake are, perhaps, so obvious that it is easily overlooked that we rely 
upon them. A cursory glance at his environment, behaviour and responses when
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awake is generally quite enough to assure us that the history of a person's 
beliefs and desires has no correspondence with the adventure he appears to 
remember when he tells a dream. The same kind of evidence shows equally 
that his awakening impressions are not caused by seeming to see and trying to 
do anything during sleep when he was asleep. It is a familiar fact that a 
person asleep typically sees nothing he might have mistaken for something 
else and shows no sign of trying to do anything.
Even if it is supposed tliat someone is remembering an hallucination, it is 
reasonable to ask zuhen the hallucination occurred. The evidence of 
environmental stimulus, behaviour and responses gives no obvious reason to 
suppose that a person generally remembers what he seemed to see and tried to 
do whilst asleep 7‘ather than when awake. If our impressions of past events 
give a reason to infer past hallucinations, there must be further reason to infer 
that the hallucination occurred during sleep rather than whilst awake. 
Otherwise, we are left with noüimg positive about what happens during sleep. 
We are left only the negative point that, when a person awakes with an 
impression as if of things recently seen and done, there is usually good reason to 
suppose that he does not remember what he seemed to see or tried to do whilst 
awake.
4. It does not follow from *X remembers an illusory object O' that X remembers 
anything, unless what is meant is that X remembers some object O under a false 
description.
The problem with the traditional view that dreams are 'experiences' is to find 
something tliat is remembered. To say that an 'experience' or 'appearance' is 
what is remembered when one does not remember seeing this or doing that, may 
be just be giving a name to nothing. It is like saying that a person remembers ein
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illusory, imaginary or fictional object. All that may be meant is that he does 
not remember anything, for no such objects exist. If what is meant is that he 
remembers something that happened, some aspect of a past occasion of seeming 
to see, imagining, hearing tell of the Unicorn, or whatever, some account must be 
given of what this is supposed to be.
MacDonald (1953) pointed out that, in the usual case in which someone 
seems to see something, there is something that is seen which is mistaken for 
something else in virtue of its sensible appearance. Sometimes this is a copy, 
picture or image, which one mistakes for the original in virtue of its likeness. 
But it need not be a copy, picture or image. Often an object which is not the 
product of any representational intention has the sensible appearance of 
another and is mistaken for it. Something is seen and is mistakenly believed to 
be something else. Similarly, in the usual case that someone remembers 
seeming to see something there is something that is remembered but it is 
mistakenly remembered as something else. For example, McDoughball, 
watching birds in the garden, catches glimpse of the neighbour's ginger tom 
blurred and magnified through his binoculars. He mistakenly supposes that a 
tiger, escaped from Corstorphine Zoo, is running amuck through the dahlias of 
Morningside. McDoughball makes swiftly for safety in the greenhouse and bars 
the door. Some hours later, his wife, Lessa, attempts to coax him back to the 
house for tea. He tells his story of being chased by a tiger. He appears to 
remember seeing a tiger. Does he remember seeing a tiger? No, Does he 
remember seeing anytlring? Yes. He remembers seeing Fluffy, the neighbour's 
ginger tom. But he remembers Fluffy under a false description, namely, 'the 
tiger amid the dahlias'.
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5. The identification of an object impinging upon a person when sound asleep 
with an object apparently remembered upon awakening must rest upon our 
general experience that objects of such and such a kind are readily mistaken for 
objects of such and such another kind, unless we have a positive reason to 
assiune that a person asleep is constitutionally disposed to perceptual errors. 
Evidence is required to show that a person saw and remembers some object 
which appeared to him as the object he appears to remember. But it is no 
discovery that a person asleep generally sees nothing. His eyes are closed. And 
even if it were supposed tliat through seemingly closed lids he perceived what 
went on in his bedroom, what goes on in tlie bedroom while a person sleeps is 
typically nothing like what he appears to remember when he awakes. It is a 
matter of experience that, from a distance, square towers look like roimd towers, 
that straight sticks look bent in water, and so on. It is not a matter of experience 
that pitch darkness, the ticking of an alarm clock and the occasional rustle of 
the curtains appear one night as a tiger in the jungle, the next as an erotic 
encounter witli the milkman, another time as a skiing holiday on Mars.
It may be objected that, in order to identify objects in the sleeper's 
environment with what he appears to remember upon awakening, we do not 
have to appeal to regularities in what kinds of things are commonly mistaken 
for others. Sometimes we can reasonably judge that a person misidentified an 
object without reliance upon general truths about what objects are readily 
confused with others in virtue of its appearance. For example, we can suppose 
that McDoughball mistook Fluffy for a tiger, without implying that anyone 
else in like circumstances would make the same mistake. It may be a matter of 
general experience that there is some resemblance in colour and shape between 
tigers and ginger toms viewed through poorly focused magnifying lenses. But 
that is hardly sufficient explanation for McDoughball's actions. What we
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additionally suppose is that McDoughball is an uncommonly foolish fellow. 
There is assumed to be something constitutionally defective about poor 
McDoughball in virtue of which the remotest resemblance between objects can 
lead to erroneous confusions. It is as if McDoughball were a known alcoholic 
and a tell-tale sherry bottle had been spotted beneath the bird-table.
Does not a similar assumption account for tlie identification of the events of 
a dream  w ith happenings during the night, notw ithstanding that the 
similarity of appearance, to someone of a normal waking constitution, is too 
remote to explain an error? It is not readily supposed that people who tell 
dreams are, like McDoughball, unusual in their liabilities to confuse objects 
according to their appearances. And the hypothesis tliat sleep, like the demon 
drink, makes fools of us all, begs the question of what evidence counts in its 
favour. In the case of McDoughball, we have evidence of his actions and 
responses to Fluffy which show that he believed there was a tiger and that he 
intended to run away from it. It may also be supposed that we have similar 
evidence in a history of like cases which establish what an unusually credulous 
lummock McDoughball is. If it were not for such evidence, there would be 
nothing in favour of the hypothesis that McDoughball remembers Fluffy, 
except the proposition that a ginger tom seen through mifocussed binoculars has 
a vague resemblance to a tiger. Similarly, it is a matter of record that those 
who have taken to drinking completely are liable to find that their senses play 
tricks upon them. Take a walk through Edinburgh's grassmarket and there is 
your evidence. The incongruous reactions of chronic inebriates directed towards 
what is plainly in their view and hearing is what shows us that alcohol can 
bring about an abnormal propensity to confuse objects having only the remotest 
similarity in appearance.
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It is possible that sleep may bring about a similar change in our 
constitutions. But what is the evidence that this is what happens? Drowsy 
people are sometimes confused about what tliey see, it is true. But, then, the 
more tired a person becomes, the less likely he is to form any opinions at all 
about what's going on arotmd him. It is much more characteristic of a person 
who was close to sleep that he does not subsequently remember what was going 
on rather tlran he remembers it under a false description. One can hum and ha 
about which way the balance of such evidence goes as far as drowsy people are 
concerned. But its weight cannot seriously be supposed to explain away the 
obvious evidence that a person asleep is not so much as trying to make sense of 
his surroundings. The Received Opinion is not defended simply by conceiving of 
hypotheses which, if true, would save it from the disconfirming evidence 
which confronts us. Unless the evidence in favour of the hypothesis that sleep 
makes a person unusually prone to perceptual error is commensurable with the 
contradictory evidence that sleep makes us deaf, insensitive and blind, its 
advocacy is a disreputable piece of special pleading.
To establish an identity between what a person appears to remember upon 
awakening and what he misperceived during sleep, we are forced to rely upon 
such generalities of experience as, for example, that alarm clocks sound a little 
like fire bells, snores have some resemblance to thunder, and a spray of water 
feels like rain. For, in the circumstances typical of a person asleep, we have 
nothing better to go upon. The problem remains tliat resemblances between the 
appearance of objects impinging upon a person during somid sleep and subsequent 
awakening impressions are the exception rather than the rule. For every 
association between sometiiing a person appears to remember and sometliing in 
the bedroom which, taken in isolation, would suggest tliat the sleeper is aware 
of his environment and making mistakes about it, there are many things which
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a person appears to remember which have not the remotest similarity to what 
passed in the night. Many, many things! It is not simply that these 
disassociations are left unexplained by tlie hypothesis tliat the sleeper was, in 
some respect, aware of his surroundings and was earnestly trying to make sense 
of what was going on around him. Without that hypothesis, the mystery was 
how it comes about, without him trying to see or do anything during sleep, that 
a person appears to remember events that did not happen when he wakes up. 
With it, the problem is a new one about how a person who is trying to to make 
sense of his environment fails even to get his eyes open and does not realise it!
6. It is not a m atter of experience that physiological processes m ediating 
perception are m istaken for external objects in virtue of sim ilarities in 
appearance.
The problem of identifying anything that the dreamer seemed to perceive or 
tried to do during sleep tempts one to suppose that tlie objects of perception and 
our responses to them are hidden from view. They are very small and occur at or 
beneath the interface between a person and tlie 'external world'. Wliy is it not 
evident that a person sees things and does things during sleep? Answer: 
Because we are not looking with the instruments appropriate to detect these 
objects and actions. Scientist, however, have discovered techniques for 
measuring various sensory stimuli impinging upon a person, their pathways 
beneatli the skin and the subtle bodily responses evoked. Can we not suppose 
that scientist will discover, perhaps somewhere behind the retina or ear-drum, 
the objects perceived during sleep and misremembered upon awakening? Have 
not the scientist already discovered many of the phenomena in question, albeit 
under descriptions with which we are unfamiliar?
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The trouble is that we have no idea of what mistakes a person might 
conceivably make about the events in his retina or inner ear m virtue of their 
appearance to him. The fact that we appeal to scientists aided with special 
instruments to discover what a person is supposed to see, hear and feel during 
sleep shows that these are not the kind of things that we readily recognise by 
their appearances. If what we have to go on are generalities linking events 
occurring during sleep with what we appear to remember in virtue of their 
known resemblance when viewed in a certain manner, Üien we have notliing to 
go on where those events are supposed to be internal processes discovered by 
physiologists and brain scientists. We have no knowledge of what brain 
processes look like 'from the inside'. We have no knowledge of what they look 
like when viewed with tlie naked eye. We do know how they appear on the 
m onitor of the scientist's electrographic equipment. But, viewed in this 
manner, the physiological processes associated with perception and action 
have no resemblance to what a dreamer appears to remember upon awakening.
It may be that much has been discovered about, for example, what electro­
chemical modifications occur inside a person when he sees a certain object O or 
any other object (P, Q or R) that emits a similar pattern of light-waves to that 
emitted by O. It is tempting to suppose that, were it discovered that Üiese 
chemical modifications occurred during sleep, a person should be said to 'seem 
to see' O. The convenience of this mamier of speaking would be, perhaps, 
unavoidable. It may also be unobjectionable. So long, that is, as it is not 
implied that something is seen. But, once admitted that there is no reason to 
suppose that something is seen when these electro-chemical modifications 
occur, then it cannot consistently be argued that, should these internal events 
produce m their host a disposition to tell a story as if of seeing O or some object 
(P, Q or R) like O, something is remembered.
39
What Appears To Be Remembered: Events Witnessed & Deeds Done
7. The fact that events impinging upon a person during sleep have a similar 
appearance to what he appears to remember upon awakening, may causally 
explain his apparent memory, without it being entailed that he misperceived 
those events during sleep.
Fester rises at noon and tells us that she heard hymn-singing. Shouldn't we 
apologise for disturbing her at ten with Radio Four's morning service? We 
begin. But Fester interrupts. (She always does.) She was in Heaven. All 
around, Angels were in chorus. Peter conducted and Fester strummed along on a 
golden harp. Did Fester hear the radio and then elaborate her experience in a 
dream? Is that to say she was awake when the hymns were broadcast? And, 
awake or asleep, did she mistake the bedroom for Heaven, the BBC choir for 
Angels, and Gladly (my cross-eyed bear) for the conductor?
It is well known that there are non-accidental connections between what a 
person appears to remember and the appearance of events impinging upon a 
person whist he slept. But is there any good reason to infer that the causal 
comiection between sensory stimulus during sleep and apparent memory upon 
awakening is mediated by misperception of the event? Squires (1973) drew an 
analogy with the phenomenon of 'subliminal advertising':
"The claim that the audience must have seen the images (though it didn't) or 
that the sleeper must have been aware of the water on his face (though he wasn't) 
can be taken in two ways. It may mean that the images and the water affected 
their victims by a similar mechanism to that which would have operated had 
they actually seen the images or felt the water. This vague physiological claim 
is very likely true. On the other hand it may mean that, despite appearances, the 
members of the audience did see the images, that the sleeper actually identified 
the water on his face. This seems to be false." [p.251]
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The fact that an object acting upon a person's sensory apparatus during sleep has 
a similar appearance to what he appears to remember when he awakes offers a 
causal explanation of his apparent memory without calling into question the 
supposition that he was unaware of anything happening around him. The fact 
that sounds striking Fester's ears during sleep have a similar effect to that 
likely had she heard the Morning Service need not be taken to show that, after 
all, she actually heard the Radio and misinterpreted or misremembered it as a 
chorus of Angels in Heaven.
The recognition that we can explain non-accidental connections between 
what went on in the bedroom and what a person appears to remember upon 
awakening without supposing that a person perceived or did something (and 
was trying to see and do much more) frees us from the encumbrance of explaining 
how a person could perceive or do this much and no more; how he could hear the 
crash of the vase falling during the night, mistake it for gunfire from his 
pursuing enemies, yet fail even to realise that he was going nowhere with his 
eyes closed. There is a world of difference between the hypothesis that our 
sensory apparatus is operative during sleep and the hypothesis that we are 
systematically deluded about the events going on around us. It is one thing to 
suppose tliat a parent's ear is critically attuned to discriminate tlie infant's cry 
amid the traffic's roar, and quite another to suppose that he is carefully 
employed trying to converse with snowmen on Mars, count the humps on a 
camel's back, or make a date wiüi Doris Day.
8. In cases where there is a causal connection between an object O acting upon a 
person's sensory apparatus w hilst he slept and his subsequent w aking 
impression as if of some object (P, Q or R) resembling O, any attempt to identify 
the dreamt object (P, Q or R) with O in virtue of its sensible appearance is
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defeated by a failure to identify the dreamt object (F, Q or R) with O in virtue 
of its apparent location in time and space.
We suppose that the sounds of the radio caused Fester's auditory impressions 
upon awakening. How might we establish that Fester heard the radio whilst 
she slept? This is really a question about whether we can identify Fester's 
waking impression as an impression of the Morning Service and not merely an 
effect of it. The qualitative resemblance between the sound of the radio and 
Fester's waking impression of hymn-singing is reason to look for a common cause 
but not sufficient to establish identity of perceptual object. What other 
features could Fester's waking impressions have m common with the sound of 
the radio? Well, the hymn-singing appears to Fester to have taken place in 
the past and in her immediate environment. This, at least, looks promising. If 
it were not for this, if Fester's impressions did not have so much as an apparent 
location in her sensible environment and in the past, the idea tliat she is 
remembering past perceptions would never have occurred to us.
However, if the events perceived and deeds done which appear to locate 
the impressions in her past cannot be identified with anything Fester did 
perceive or do, we have no good reason to conclude that these sensory 
impressions deserve a place in her biography. In die typical case of 'telling a 
dream', the dreamt object appears in die context of events perceived and deeds 
done which did not occur. Where did Fester hear the hymn-singing? In 
Heaven, where the Angels live. When did it happen? When Fester strummed 
upon her golden harp. If this is what Fester has to say (she won't be 
contradicted) who is to say that she actually heard the radio in the bedroom 
whilst she slept? In those cases where the sensible appearance of an object 
acting on a person during sleep explains the sensible appearance of an object in 
his dream, the evidence of what he appears to remember typically gives us
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good reason not to identify the object which explains his apparent memory 
with the object he appears to remember.
Sometimes it is tempting to suppose that a person may be aware of some of 
the events occurrmg whilst he sleeps and that these events may figure in his 
dream albeit in a strangely transformed appearance. One might like to say, for 
example, that the dreamt crash of gmifire in the Zulu wars is the misperceived 
crash of the vase tliat fell at four o'clock in the morning. But it is also tempting 
to insist that the events of a dream, like Üiose of a completely fictional world 
of illusion or imagination, occur only as and where and when they appear to 
occur to the dreamer. The theory that dreams are misperceptions occurring 
during sleep cannot have things both ways in its favour. The problem of 
establishing that what a person appears to remember was falsely believed by 
him to exist in this world, that is, at the time and in the place where he lay 
asleep, camiot be avoided by offermg a location among further non-existent 
objects. To say that the events of a dream narrative were perceived as located 
'in a dream t world' is no defence of the hypothesis that they were 
misperceived as located in the bedroom during tlie night.
9. Even were it supposed that the illusory object was not a misperception of 
something seen, we require evidence that it was believed by the dreamer to 
exist in the context of objects and events around him whilst he slept.
MacDonald (1953) argued that it is a necessary condition of seeming to see 
something that something be seen in relation to which the illusory object may 
be given a spatio-temporal identity in this world. What is seen need not be a 
copy or image of what one seems to see. Indeed, it need not have any generally 
recognised likeness to what is seen. But what is genuinely seen must appear to 
have a spatial and temporal relation to what seems to be seen. Illusory objects
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and events appear in tlie context of genuinely perceived objects and events. For 
example, Lilly is frightened by a sinister figure in the doorway. There is 
notliing there to be seen. Even so, Lilly is seeing something. She sees the 
doorway in which the illusion makes its frightening appearance.
It need not be supposed that when a person remembers seeming to see 
something that there is something he sees and mistakes for something else. 
The attraction of the supposition that, during sleep, a person mistakes one 
thing for another was the hypothesis that causal connections between objects 
acting upon a person during sleep and his subsequent waking impressions are 
good evidence of delusions during sleep. But, whether or not an illusory object is 
supposed to be a misperception of something, we require evidence that the said 
object was believed by the dreamer to exist in tlie world around him as he slept. 
That is, we require evidence that something was seen in relation to which the 
illusory object can be given a notional location in the world. Evidence of what 
apparent location the dreamt object had for the dreamer, supposedly provided 
by his waking impression, typically yields no description of the world around 
him whilst he slept. False descriptions of what went on around him won't do 
tlie trick of confirming tliat tlie dreamer asleep believed a non-existent object to 
have a place in existence.
Do we require descriptions at all? Can we not coherently suppose that the 
illusory object appeared to the dreamer 'hereabouts' and 'just before he woke 
up'? We could suppose this, perhaps, but our problem is one of evidence not of 
intelligibility. A person asleep does not point, nod or otherwise gesture that 
his beliefs are about tlie 'here and now'. We might suppose that a person 
remembers making some inner mental demonstration by thinking to himself 
'This is die end of me' (as he is chased Üirough the jungle) and 'nozu is the time 
for prayer' (as the tiger catclies up). It would not follow that he believes of
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himself in the bedroom as he slept that here and now he is tiger-chased 
through the undergrowth. To urge that we give up the attempt to identify 
what a person appears to remember with what happened to him  in the 
bedroom by establishing tliat some of what he appears to remember (e.g. that 
he was the Caliph of Damascus) was true seems to me to be a council of despair 
for the Received Opinion.
10. A person who remembers what he did or would have done may be judged to 
rem em ber false perceptual beliefs which rationalise those actions and 
dispositions to action even where he does not appear to remember any illusory 
object.
Perceptual beliefs are ordinarily attributed to a person in order to explain what 
he does or would do. Evidence of what a person did or would have done whilst 
asleep might give us a reason to attribute perceptual beliefs which would make 
tliose actions and dispositions to action reasonable. And, what is more, if it 
could be established that a person remembers what he did or would have done 
during sleep, he might be said to remember the false perceptual beliefs which 
make those actions or dispositions to action reasonable. Hiis might be thought 
to afford a means of justifying the hypothesis that dreams are delusions. It 
promises to establish that tlie illusory objects have an apparent location in the 
perceptual environment of the dreamer whilst he slept by reference to what he 
did or would have done. It appears to free us, at least initially, from the 
burden of establishing that the illusory objects have an apparent location in 
the perceptual environment of the dreamer whilst he slept by reference to 
objects and events in that environment genuinely remembered upon waking up.
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Squires (1973) gives an example of someone properly judged to remember 
false perceptions on the grounds that he remembers what he did or would have 
done:
"Suppose McX walks into a mirror under the impression that it is a 
doorway between two rooms. His action is explicable by reference to a state of 
affairs which does not obtain. He may remember the whole incident, including 
stepping forward and smashing into the glass. As a result of the impact, 
however, he may only recollect walking towards the mirror when told to 
circulate or being surprised that there were so many guests at the party, or saying 
to himself, 'I'll go through that door into the other room'. He remembers being 
under a false impression even in these cases because he recalls doing something 
which was, whether he knows it or not, to be explained as appropriate to an 
imagined situation ... McX may only remember things he would have done. 
For instance, he may remember that he would have pointed to the mirror if asked 
for the way out. Provided that the explanation of what he would have done lies 
in specifying the imagined situation, he still remembers being under a false 
impression. But if he does not recollect what he did or would have done, at the 
party, he does not recall being under any impression." [pp.254/5]
Can we find anything that a person did or would have done during sleep tliat 
he remembers when he tells a dream?
It is a familiar fact about sleep that, in the usual case, people do not do 
very much. Certainly the elaborate and interconnected sequences of actions 
pertinent to a person doing the kinds of things one typically seems to remember 
upon awakening, like going on an Alpine holiday, are very seldom things done 
during sleep. Perhaps it is not extraordinary for someone to perform isolated 
movements during sleep. It might even be supposed that these isolated 
movements often enough have some resemblance to what a person would do if he
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thought he was doing the things he subsequently appears to remember. 
However, in the usual case, it would require an unrestrained flight of fantasy to 
sustain any connection between the abbreviated movements of a person asleep 
and the complex narrative sequence he appears to remember upon awakening.
Mark appears to remember climbing the Eiger. In the ordinary case, we 
would not expect to find that he had clung to the pillow, 'cramponed' up the 
mattress, and swung an imaginary ice axe towards the bedhead. He could have 
done these things. But, given what we know about sleep, we don't usually have 
anything like as much evidence to go on. Perhaps, in a typical enough case, we 
might find some odd behaviour appropriate to the actions apparently 
remembered. Suppose that it is not improbable of someone narrating a dream 
(e.g. Mark telling us about his ascent of the White Spider) that he did some 
isolated movement during sleep appropriate to someone engaged in the 
adventure he relates (e.g. that Mark dug his fingers into the pillow). Would 
this show that he remembers something he did during sleep in virtue of which 
we might say he remembers believing that he was climbing the North Face?
The hypothesis is that Mark's fingers clenched around the pillow confirm 
that he remembers seeming to climb the Eiger. The problem is that, if Mark's 
behaviour shows that he remembers seeming to climb the Eiger, it must be 
supposed that Mark was aware of clawing at the pillow, albeit under a false 
description (e.g. 'pulling up on the chock-stone below Üie final overhang'). But 
why should we suppose both that he was aware of some particular bodily 
movement and that he was unaware of the fact that he is failing to do all the 
oÜier movements that would be appropriate to climbing? If it is supposed he 
was aware of his bodily movements, then, taken in isolation his tensed fingers 
may suggest that he remembers seeming to grip the rock. But this evidence must 
be balanced against the fact that, if he were aware of his bodily movements.
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he would promptly realise that he was not succeeding in doing very much at 
all, and would not be under the misapprehension that he is making headway 
towards the final overhang. There is nothing to be gained from supposing that 
Mark does not realise that he is doing nothing appropriate to cramponing up 
the verglass and swinging his axe at the ice bulge. For, if tliat were the case, 
we would have no reason to consistently assert that he was aware of his fingers 
clawing at the pillow, and that he remembers Üiese movements under tlie false 
description, 'pulling up on tlie chock-stone’.
It might be thought that a solution is afforded by the hypothesis that 
what a person remembers is not successfully or rmsuccessfuUy doing movements 
appropriate to the actions he appears to remember but trying  to do the 
movements, and that, in virtue of tliis, we can conclude tliat he remembers being 
deluded in sleep. On this hypotliesis, the evidence of Mark's clenched fingers 
is to be taken to be evidence that he tried to climb the Eiger, rather tlian to be 
evidence that he was aware of grappling with the pillow under a false 
description. It is not argued tliat he was aware of the failure nor the success of 
his intentions to produce the appropriate movements, only that he remembers 
certain intentions. But Squires (1973) pointed out that this will not do. Even if 
it were clear that Mark tried to do all the kinds of movements appropriate to a 
mountaineer, it would not follow that he remembers these attempts:
"Suppose Jennings attempts an anagram one morning by eating fish for 
breakfast and gazing into a crystal ball, intoning the letters of the anagram one 
by one. He fails. That afternoon he claims to remember, or is inclined to think 
he remembers, having solved the anagram. It by no means follows that he at 
least remembers trying to solve it, even though he obviously did try to solve it. 
When we ask him further questions, we may find that he has no recollection of 
any of the steps he took ..."
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Very likely, Mark does not so much as appear to remember by what processes he 
attempted to move his limbs up the North Face. And, if Mark does not 
remember his movements nor his attempts to move, there is no reason to infer 
that he remembers any false perceptual beliefs which would make those 
movements or 'attempts' reasonable.
11. Evidence about what a person would do if he were not 'frustrated by sleep' 
fails to support the hypothesis that he is deluded.
Dozy is hungry. Why doesn't he get up and make for the kitchen? Because he 
camiot (but he would if he could). Why can’t he? Because he's paralysed by 
sleep (only he doesn't realise it). So he would raid the fridge if he were not 
asleep? Should we wake him up, to help him do what he wants? Perhaps not. 
If we woke him up he might very well stop feeling hungry! So the fact that he 
is asleep does not explain why, if he's hungry, he doesn’t get up and eat? What 
is the explanation then? Is he on a diet?
Where it is supposed that a person was frustrated from doing what he 
would, evidence can be given by providing him with the opportunity to do it. A 
person is provided the opportunity precisely where the obstacle which 
explains why he is frustrated is removed. If it is said that he can't be given an 
appropriate opportunity, or that the only means of providing an opportunity 
are likely to make him change his mind, then we are robbed of any explanation 
of why someone with those those beliefs and intentions did not do the 
appropriate actions. The fact that he did not act in the appropriate mamier 
stands as good evidence that he did not have those intentions and beliefs.
A person telling a dream often appears to remember things he would have 
done if he'd had the chance. Mark tells us that he wanted to place another 
piton before tackling the overhang, but he'd run out of gear. How might we
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have tested tlie hypothesis tliat Mark is remembering being under the false 
impression of climbing tlie Eiger, in virtue of the fact that he remembers what 
he wanted to do, if he'd had anotlier piton? The obvious idea is that we could 
have tested this hypothesis by having given Mark a piton and watched what 
he did with it. Suppose we had put a piton in his hand. (Mark's bedroom is 
full of pitons.) He does nothing with it. Perhaps he doesn't realise there is a 
piton in his hand? (Not surprising, really, since he's asleep.) What can we do 
other than wake him up and tell him? I give Mark a poke. He tells me where 
to stick it (the piton, that is).
Mark also tells us that we'd interrupted a Really Good dream about 
climbing the Eiger, in which he'd got to a point where he desperately wanted a 
piton, just before we woke him up. Remarkably, our prediction of Mark's 
awakening narrative was correct. But what justification does this give us for 
thinking that Mark's annoyance at our attempt to help him do what he wanted 
to do is unreasonable? The causal connection between his behaviour during 
sleep and the dream he tells does not itself justify the hypotheses that he is 
remembering what he tried to do. According to our ordinary means of finding 
out what a person would do if he could, we have no reason to assert that a 
person telling a dream remembers what he would have done when asleep. 
Hence we have no reason to infer that had any of the false beliefs according to 
which such dispositions to action would be reasonable.
12. A person's narrative of a dream is not confirmed to be a memory of episodes 
occurring during sleep by its effects in waking life.
Mandy thinks that she watched Navratilova beat Evert in the semi-finals. 
She checks with Sue. Yes, Sue says, she and Mandy were together on the sofa, 
the semi-final was showing on T.V., and didn't that big strapping Czech do
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well. So Mandy switches on expecting to watch her heroine in the finals. Oh 
no! Navratilova is not on court. Evert is there, rooted to the base-line as usual. 
What a bore! Mandy's memory is shown to be mistaken, not by disagreement 
w ith Sue's observations (they were both hopelessly drunk), but by its 
rmreliability as a guide to subsequent events. A person's memory of past events 
is often confirmed or disconfirmed, not according to whetlier it corresponds to 
otlier contemporary observations of those events, but according to its coherence 
with tlie pattern of subsequent events, according to whetlier subsequent events 
are the probable consequences of the events remembered. Similarly, a person's 
narrative as if of perceptions remembered from sleep could be confirmed by 
what follows in waking life. But is it? It seems to me that it is not.
Shaffer makes the point about decisions:
"Dreaming that I decide to change my career plans has no carryover into 
subsequent waking actions, intentions, desires choices reasons proferred, 
deliberations, waverings, or changes of mind. It is not that upon awakening I 
change my mind, forgot my nocturnal 'decision', or undergo weakness of will. It 
is as if I has never made the nocturnal decision, and the most reasonable 
explanation of why it is as if I had never made the decision is that in fact I never 
did." [p. 138]
There are some comiectioiis between the content of a person's narrative of a 
dream and events in waking life. For example, a person who tells a dream of 
being terrified by a giant spider may well show signs of terror. According to 
Malcolm (1959) the fact that this person is genuinely terrified when he wakes 
up with an impression of having seen an enormous spider, implies that 'in his 
dream' he was terrified of the monster. His awakening impression of the 
dream is shown as much by the sweat on his brow as by the words he utters. 
However, it would be misleading to say that his waking behaviour and
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appearance 'confirms' his narrative. It is, rather, part of the phenomenon of 
'telling a dream', a speech act consisting not merely in uttering words as if 
describing events witnessed but also in behaviour characterising an emotional 
attitude to those events. The point remains that, in general, the connections 
between the events of a dream narrative and our waking emotions, attitudes 
and feelings go no further tlian the manner in which we tell the story upon 
awakening.
Granted that we should not infer from Single's having dreamt tliat she 
paddled her own canoe that, whilst asleep, she was disposed to act and speak 
as one under the impression that she successfully paddles a canoe by herself, it 
remains that there are, sometimes, further connections between the content of a 
person's awakening narrative and what we do and say in waking life quite 
apart from the manner of telling a dream. For example. Single's boyfriend, 
having learned of her dream, is less surprised when she dumps him. We 
sometimes expect certain things to follow in waking life from having such-and- 
such a dream to tell. There are empirical connections between what a person 
appears to remember upon awakening (where he is not remembering events 
witnessed before he fell asleep) and events in subsequent waking life apart from 
his awakening impression. But, just as a person's dream narrative is not 
generally confirmed by independent evidence about what happened whilst he 
slept, so it is not generally confirmed by any waking consequences it might be 
supposed to have if it were a description of mental events and acts occurring 
during sleep.
Single's decision to go it alone may have a causal explanation in her 
having dreamt that she paddled her own canoe without supposing that the 
cause was sometliing which happened during sleep and was remembered upon 
awakening. Perhaps her merely appearing to remember paddling alone made
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her see that she didn't need a man ("All men are Bastards!"). Sometimes, for 
example, a person's dreams have a dramatic impact on his wakiiig life because 
he takes seriously a particular theory of dream interpretation. No further 
explanation may be required of the connections between his dreams and waking 
life other than that, given his beliefs about the significance of dream  
narratives, whether he eats fish, plants his garden, spends lavishly, trusts no 
one, or stays in bed is decided according to the daily flavour of his awakening 
impression. Very likely, of course, such beliefs about the significance of dreams 
will imply that whatever causes a certain awakening impression will also 
cause other tilings to happen in waking life. It may, for similar reasons, be 
conjectured that both Single's awakening impressions and her giving Loverboy 
the push are effects of a common cause, an unfulfilled desire for independence. 
However, even supposing that there are sometimes connections between what 
dream a person has to tell and what he does in subsequent waking life which 
invite an explanation in terms of some common cause, Eind even supposing that 
cause to be a process occurring during sleep, it does not follow tliat such a process 
consists in beliefs, intentions, sensations, images, feelings or anything else that 
we appear to remember; it does not follow that such connections 'confirm' a 
person's awakening narrative to be a description of what happened during 
sleep. The hypothesis, for example, that an unfulfilled desire for 
independence (call it 'subconscious' if you want) caused both Single's awakening 
impression of solo canoeing and her boyfriend's grief, is not a hypothesis that 
Single remembered anything that happened to her during sleep.
There are some cases where what a person does upon awakening is 'just as if 
he had experienced the events related as a dream. For example, it would not be 
surprising, nor need it be unreasonable, for someone to visit a dentist after 
having dreamt a toothache. Sugar's dream of a toothache reminds her of the
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perils of neglecting one's teetii. Tliis is not surprising, for dreams often prompt 
prudent reflections on waking life. She makes an appointment for a check-up 
that very afternoon. Her reason for going to the dentist could just be the 
recognition, brought about by her dream, that it is unwise to neglect one's teeth. 
Alternatively, it could be that the dreamt toothache itself is also among 
Sugar's reasons to visit the dentist. Suppose that she believes the cause of her 
dreaming a toothache to be the poor state of her teeth. If dreams can guide us 
about our waking needs, it should not be an accident that they do so. It is not an 
implausible hypothesis that a person with tooth decay is more likely to have 
anxious dreams about her teeth than one whose teeth are in good health. 
Sugar's dreamt toothache, like tlie real toothache which hits her on the way 
to the surgery, tells her tliat a molar on die lower left side is in urgent need of 
repair. However, to draw that inference. Sugar need not assume that her 
dreamt toothache was a toothache felt during sleep.
Should Sugar be inclined, in a moment of theoretical extravagance, to 
populate her sleep with a felt toothache (or, worse, a 'subconsciously felt' 
toothache) acting as an intermediary between rotten tooth and dream t 
toothache, she would need evidence to identify tlie dreamt toothache with its 
hypothesized cause (a toothache felt in sleep). The identity is not sufficiently 
established by an association between what she appears to remember and the 
rotten tooth which caused it. For the fact that she appears to remember a 
toothache must be weighed against the fact that she appears to remember it 
having occurred during an Arctic expedition. Suppose some further evidence is 
found. Suppose that, just before she awoke. Sugar's tooth is struck by a cold 
draught from the window which makes her countenance darken, jaw tighten 
and lips quiver. Overlooking, for a moment, that she appears have felt the 
toothache when eating ice cream with the Eskimos, we m ight take this
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evidence to confirm that Sugar's dreamt toothache is a remembered toothache. 
All the same, the point is not whether there could be cases in which 
experiences are remembered from sleep. The point is not even whether there 
are in fact cases where events dreamt are events remembered from sleep. The 
point is that these cases are exceptions to the typical phenomenon of 'telling a 
dream'. After all, tlie fact that Sugar remembers her toothache does not show 
that, when suffering the pain during the moments prior to waking up, she 
believed herself to be in the vicinity of the North Pole, driving a team of 
Huskies, and heading for the warmth and comfort of her igloo. Rather, the 
evidence that she appears to remember feeling the pain during an Arctic 
adventure calls in question the supposition that the nocturnal irritation of her 
tooth caused her apparent memory by way of a toothache felt dm'ing sleep.
13. Our attitudes towards beliefs, intentions, sensations and so on, differ 
according to whether these phenomena are supposed to be the content of a 
dream narrative.
The hypothesis that beliefs and intentions are remembered from sleep is 
disconfirmed, not merely by observations of sleep, but by what does or does not 
follow in subsequent waking life. Among the subsequent waking events which 
disconfirm the hypothesis of beliefs and desires remembered from sleep are 
further mental phenomena. When a person tells a dream, we do not expect 
events to follow as if he has seemed to see and tried do things during sleep. 
When a person tells a dream, we do not adopt the same attitudes towards him 
as we would if he had.
Few points in recent analytic philosophy are ever argued with the scathing 
rhetorical wit with which Bouwsma (1957) contrasted our attitudes towards 
the mental life of our dreams with the embarrassment and shame of a person
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who has discovered himself to be deceived. Something of the flavour of 
Bouwsma's lampoon "On Many Occasions I Have In Sleep Been Deceived ..." is 
found in Shaffer (1984), and its rising tone of barely suppressed exasperation is 
echoed in Mannison's (1977) parting jibe at Curley (1975):
"If it should turn out that every night during the war Churchill had dreamt 
that he was a German spy, are we to conclude that 'throughout the war' Churchill 
frequently believed that he was a German spy? Shall we decide that: he had 
contradictory beliefs; he had a dispositional belief that he was not a spy 
contradicted by a series of occurrent beliefs that he was a spy; that he held one 
set of beliefs during the day and another set of beliefs during the night; he had a 
dispositional belief that he was a spy and a series of occurrent beliefs that he was 
not a spy; he had contiadictory dispositional beliefs; he had a dual personality\ he 
wanted to be a spy but never got round to it; he wished to be a spy but did not 
know how to go about getting himself recruited; he intended to take up spying 
for the Gemians but was too busy pursuing the war against them; he wished to 
be a spy but was irresolute-, he was a gullible old coot who, much to his I'elief, 
discovered each morning that he had been too easily convinced that he had 
tiaitorous tendencies?" [p. 81].
The point is, of course, that the inference from telling a dream to beliefs and 
intentions during sleep is thoroughly incoherent with our ordinary notions about 
beliefs and intentions. The conclusion which these philosophers drew was, not 
merely that the hypothesis that dreams are hallucinations is false, but that it 
is inconsistent with our ordinary talk about dreaming.
Augustine took seriously the possibility that our intentions and attitudes in 
dreams may be sinful. Anthropologists have reported tribes that conduct 
serious trial about offences committed in dreams. And it is midoubtedly true 
that the dreams a person has to tell may reveal features of his cliaracter
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deserving censure or praise. Even so, there are clear differences among the 
moral judgments we suppose it reasonable make according to whether a person 
was dreaming or reacting to illusory events. Lustful Richard may disgust us 
when he gleefully relates how he forced his way upon Modest Mildred in his 
dream. But his enjoyment of dreamt violence is morally distinguishable from 
his enjoyment of an actual rape; and it is also distinguishable from his 
enjoyment of what he mistakenly believed to be rape. If he had jumped on 
Mildred during the night supposing her to be unwilling (though in fact she 
wanted it and enjoyed it, or so the Judge insisted) our opinion about his just 
deserts would be very different from that following upon his having dreamt he 
forced her. The tlieory tliat narratives of dreams are different from historical 
reports only in that the physical objects and events ostensibly referred to are 
illusory makes unreasonable any distinction drawn between what follows from 
mental attitudes and reactions to events according to whether these events were 
illusory or were events in a dream.
The fact remains that what a person dreamt does have some implication 
for our judgments about his character. We may not console Sugar for her dreamt 
pain nor abhor Richard's dreamt intentions in just the same way as we would 
feel for Sugar's real tootliache or condemn Richard's nocturnal attempts upon 
Mildred, but what a person dreams is not nothing, it does make a difference. 
This does not entail that dreams are something other than what story a person 
is inclined to tell upon awakening, stories from which we can draw interesting 
conclusions about his worries, motives, ambitions and so on in waking life. Our 
ability to draw such inferences suggests the existence of a kind of process 
occurring during sleep wliich explains how his character and history come to be 
reflected in the stories he is disposed to tell upon awakening. This process we 
commonly call 'dreaming'. But our reasons for supposing that 'telling a dream'
57
What Appeal's To Be Remembered: Events Witnessed & Deeds Done
is the exercise of a psychologically significant disposition do not show that he 
remembers anything about the production of that disposition during sleep.
14. W here discontinuity betw een dreams and w aking life dispels the 
'apparition' of remembering past perceptions and actions without investigation 
beyond the immediate context of awakening, it does not justify an inference to 
some other mental phenomenon (e.g. seeming to see or trying to do) remembered 
from sleep.
So far, 1 have argued that the similarity between telling a dream  and 
remembering events witnessed and deeds done goes no further than the 
immediate awakening phenomenon of relating a narrative in the past tense 
without invention. The wider context of what happened in the bedroom during 
the night and of what the dreamer subsequently does and says upon awakening 
contradicts the hypothesis that telling a dream is remembering what one 
seemed to see and tried to do. Our reactions and attitudes to dreams also suggest 
that, notwithstanding our readiness to assent to the Received Opinion, we do 
not believe dreams to be hallucinations remembered from sleep.
There is reason to suppose that, even within the immediate context of 
awakening, we do not usually believe ourselves to be remembering what we 
seemed to see and tried to do durmg sleep. Clearly, the fact we do not look for 
evidence beyond our capacity to relate without invention a narrative ('1 saw, 1 
did ..') which superficially resembles a report of events witnessed does not 
show that we take our words at face value to be about events seen and deeds 
done. Nor does it show that we take ourselves to be undoubtably remembering 
what seemed to us, during sleep, to be happening. Rather, the fact tliat we do 
not ordinarily look for evidence beyond the narrative of a dream also shows 
that we do not take it to be about what a person seemed to see and tried to do
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during sleep. For if we did suppose a dreamer to be remembering hallucinations, 
we should require an explanation of what caused his false perceptions and why 
he was not disposed to act as one hallucinated.
The similarity between telling a dream and remembering events witnessed 
and deeds done is not sustained even within tlie context of awakening. In the 
usual case, no one is fooled, even for a moment, into mistaking our 'memories' of 
dreams for memories of what we saw and did. If we are generally fooled by the 
similarity it is in our willingness upon reflection to assent to the proposition 
that dreams are 'experiences’ remembered or forgotten from sleep. Even this 
tendency to homespun theoretical reflection has, as Malcolm argued, little or no 
practical effect on our everyday conduct. The only significant consequence of our 
assent to the Received Opinion is, perhaps, a predilection for anthropomorphic 
interpretation of the results of psycho-physiological sleep research.
In the usual case, a person immediately recognises his impression of a 
dream for what it is, and could, if he chose, precede his narrative with the 
qualification 'I d ream t...'. How is this possible? Does the reason we have for 
spontaneously discounting as fictitious our inclination to tell a story in the past 
tense give us a reason for assuming that we hallucinated the adventure 
narrated? Or is it, rather, that we have grounds confidently to disregard any 
thought of past perceptions, real or illnsoiy, without further investigation?
The traditional explanation given by philosophers is that, w hilst 
dream ing is 'like' waking life, the adventures of a dream are generally 
discontinuous with what we know of waking life. This discontinuity, 
philosophers have agreed, is not difficult to detect when we wake up. 
Philosphers have, of course, been troubled to say whether or not a test similar 
to tliat of discontinuity, a test of incoherence, could be relied upon by a person 
whilst he is yet asleep (with or witliout the aid of a benevolent deity). For
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narratives of dreamt events which are discontinous from waking life not 
infrequently exhibit internal coherence. Philosophers have usually supposed 
that there is nothing intrinsic to an object being dream t that makes its 
appearance distinguishable from an object perceived. This supposition of the 
traditional sceptical argument is not (directly) my concern; but I'll observe in 
passing tliat it is not clear how it is justified. Hunter (1983) argued that the 
premise rests upon an assumption that if there were a difference between objects 
dreamt and objects perceived we would have noticed it. He suggested some 
interesting ways in which this assumption might be questioned. However, the 
test of discontinuity has usually been thought sufficient where one is awake 
and the events of a dream, even be they internally coherent, are compared with 
one’s impressions of waking life before falling asleep and upon awakening.
Sometimes, upon awakening, people do mistake dreams for waking life. 
Dement (1967) (1972) describes the practical problem faced by narcoleptics, 
victims of sudden and irresistable sleep attacks. Hiese attacks do not last long, 
but their victims tend to pass very quickly, without the usual physiological 
preliminaries, into Stage REM sleep, and frequently awake with dreams to 
tell. Often enough, these dreams are of a fairly prosaic character, their content 
reflecting the recent concerns and experiences of the dreamer. The narcoleptic's 
inability to rely upon the usual cues which intimate the onset of sleep easily 
leads him to mistake his dreams for what was recently going on. He does not 
realise that he had suddenly 'dropped off and readily mistakes it for a 
memory of events witnessed and deeds done. The problems which beset 
narcoleptics serve to remind us how infrequently, in the normal course of 
sleeping and waking, we mistake dream narratives ('I saw, I did ...') for 
memories of their ostensible contents. In part, this is because we are familiar 
with our liability upon awakening to have waking impressions as if of events
60
What Appears To Be Remembered: Events Witnessed & Deeds Done
witnessed which are unreliable guides to what went on whilst we slept. Unlike 
the narcoleptic, we are well aware of the fact that we have just been asleep 
and are quickly able to judge Üie discontinuity of our awakening impressions of 
dreams from what we remember of events preceding sleep. More elaborate tests, 
like looking under the bed, consulting the neighbours, or phoning the local zoo, 
are not required.
The 'discontinuity' of Fester's dreams with the particular course of her own 
waking life, w ith w hat is likely and probable in her dreary suburban 
character, in her dreary suburban neighbourhood, is sufficient to explain how, 
even in tlie immediate context of awakening with a dream to tell. Fester does 
not mistake dream for real life. Fester does not stop to look beneath the sheets 
for the handsome prince of her dreams. Nor does she check for sooty smudges 
left by the Coalman whom she might have mistaken for a handsome prince in 
the night. "I'd ratlier have a memory than a dream ...", Fester sings wistfully 
to herself (she does a fair Judy Garland imitation), for she knows tlie difference 
all too well. She does not begin to investigate the hypothesis of perceptual 
beliefs (true or false) during sleep because the beliefs of her dream are too 
incongruous with what she knows of waking life to warrant such labomi
Obvious discontinuities between the adventures of dreams and one's 
perceptions and memories of waking life are usually sufficient to belie the 
appearance of remembering events perceived witliout further investigation. If 
these discontinuities raised, as it were by default, the hypothesis of 
hallucinations during sleep, we would have reason to look for evidence of false 
beliefs and frustrated intentions. The fact that we ordinarily do not attempt to 
explain away these facts about sleep, or look for exceptions to the norm, 
suggests that the obvious discontinuities between events dreamt and events
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remembered, do not lead us to infer tliat we are remembering what we seemed to 
see and tried to do.
The fact that, even within the immediate context of awakening, we have 
sufficient reason to see straight through the resemblance between telling a 
dream and remembering events witnessed is not itself reason to raise the 
hypothesis that something else is remembered. If nonetheless we supposed, 
without reason, that something is remembered that supposition should be 
shown in our anticipation of evidence apart from the phenomenon of 'telling a 
dream'. The fact that we do not ordinarily look for extraordinary evidence of 
what a person was disposed to say and do during sleep, or attempt to explain 
away tlie obvious behavioural evidence, shows that we do not infer that he 
remembers what he seemed to see, tried to do, tliought, imagined, felt, intended 
or any sucli mental phenomenon encoimtered in waking life.
15. The fact that events of a dream are often improbable, even to the extent 
that they defy the laws of nature, tells against the hypothesis that these 
events happened, w ithout the need of external evidence; it also tells against 
the hypothesis that the dream er previously believed such events to be 
happening, for we have no plausible explanation of how such incredible events 
might come to be believed, certainly not when they occur in conjunction with 
observations and calculations exhibiting an extraordinary degree of 
rationality .
Hume famously argued tliat we should reject testimony of miracles upon the 
intrinsic improbability of the events reported, even should the testimonial be 
given by one of undoubted sincerity and general credibility. Suppose that our 
impressions of past events are so unfailingly reliable that, for most practical 
purposes, our genuine memories may be regarded as self-intimating, wearing
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their credentials up-front. Suppose that the general reliability of such 
'memories' makes it highly probable tliat, in any given case, a person's sincere 
testimony of events witnessed is true. Even so, m any particular case, the very 
great improbability that a person be mistaken must be weighed against the 
intrinsic improbability of the events he appears to remember. Where someone 
appears to remember something which is so improbable as to be thought 
miraculous, there is always sufficient reason to doubt that his memory is 
reliable.
The fact that the events of a dream narrative are often improbable, even to 
the extent that they contradict the most familiar laws of nature, gives us 
reason to doubt that we remember such events witliout any further need to check 
what happened whilst we slept. Indeed, the fact that dreamt events are often 
so incredible counts against the inference to any ordinary kind of perceptual 
mistake. If dreams are delusions, they are not delusions of any modest 
proportion. It would be quite inexplicable, in the normal course of life, how 
someone of Churchill's character and history could come to believe, whilst 
lying in bed, that he was a German spy. It would be inexplicable how anyone in 
any circumstances might come to believe that he was flying, talking under 
water, juggling with the stars or such like. Yet such fantastic things happen 
quite ordinarily in dreams.
It is question-begging to suppose that dreaming gives us a model for 
explaining how someone might have believed events which are intrinsically 
improbable. Unless we have some explanation of how a person might have 
believed the incredible, the fact that the events of a dream narrative are 
bizarre and improbable gives us adequate reason to assume, with no further 
investigation, that the narrator no more seemed to see than saw such events. As 
things are, we have no analogy at hand which might support the hypothesis
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that a person remembers seeming to see things which no one could reasonably 
believe.
Computer assisted simulations of Gulf war air attacks, deep-sea diving 
missions, moon-buggies and the like have begrm to give technical substance to 
the imaginations of sceptical philosophers. But if dreams are delusions, we 
still have no idea how such sophisticated delusions might be brought about. 
Bouwsma (1947) illustrated our inability to imagine in any detail how an Evil 
Genius might set about to systematically delude a person even where the 
sequence of events is entirely natural and coherent with our general knowledge 
of the world. How is one to invent something of such devilish cunning that the 
deception is never suspected? Bouwsma's attempt to imagine how the Evil 
Genius would proceed quickly runs into difficulty. Paper dolls aren't quite 
enough like the real thing to fool a lover for long. The problem isn't that the 
Evil Genius hasn't power enough, that he hasn't the money, time and industry. 
The problem is Üiat we haven't any explanation of how his powers are to be 
employed. In the end, all Bouwsma found himself able to imagine was tliat 
tlie Evil Genius employed liis power to substitute one set of objects and events for 
another qualitatively identical set. The victim of this monstrous ingenuity 
cannot tell the difference. But, Bouwsma questioned, is he deceived?
Our problem is not to say whether a person placed in another qualitatively 
identical world is deceived in his beliefs. Our problem is to explain how any 
circumstances might bring a person so much as to believe in events which defy 
the supposed laws of nature, and to explain this with sufficient plausibility to 
invite investigation beyond the immediate context of 'appearing' to remember 
such events. Even if substitution of an identical world were an explanation of 
systematic deception, and (let's pretend) were the sort of nocturnal devilry a 
person might hesitate to discount without further investigation, it would not
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explain how a person might come to have believed during sleep what he camiot 
reasonably believe to have happened upon awakening. The intrinsic 
improbability of many of the events one often appears to remember upon 
awakening is sufficient to inunediately dispel any illusion either that one saw 
or that one seemed to see such events in the past, w ithout any further 
investigation of what went on in sleep. My point is not that it is impossible to 
believe the kinds of things that a person seems to remember having perceived 
but tliat, given what we know about tlie kinds of things people believe and how 
they come to believe them, it is entirely improbable, from the intrinsic 
character of the narrative itself, that a person ever so much as believed the 
umiatural sequences of events that often crowd his awakening narratives.
Illusionists can make it look as if the impossible is happening. But the arts 
of an illusionist give us no explanation of how someone might be so taken m as to 
believe that the miraculous is happening. Confidence tricksters show us how 
weak-willed people can sometimes come to acquire thoroughly crazy beliefs. 
Religious conversion beats everything (even philosophy) when it comes to 
finding a model for a person adopting the most improbable beliefs. But when 
faced with tlie professions of the Miraculously Converted we are likely to 
question how someone could possibly believe what he claims to have witnessed. 
We look for ways of understanding what he says which take the belief out of 
his 'beliefs'. He is expressing an attitude of faith. His words have a symbolic 
significance. Some such story. Not that he is remembering what he seemed to 
perceive. That anyone might seem to perceive such incredible events is almost 
as incredible as that anyone might have perceived such events.
A crazy person may, of course, readily be supposed to believe what normal 
people find incredible. That's what makes them crazy. The fact that a person 
telling a dream often appears to remember having believed the most bizarre
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and unnatural tilings might be offered as evidence that sleep renders a person 
temporally irrational. However, any weight this evidence has m ust be 
balanced against the observation that we often appear to remember having 
demonstrated the utmost reason and clarity of mind amidst our most fabulous 
adventures. This observation is m ade in a m arvellous passage from 
Dostoyevsky:
"Sometimes one dreams strange dreams, impossible and unnatural, and upon 
awakening you remember them very clearly and are amazed by a very strange 
thing. You remember before anything else that your reason did not desert you 
throughout the whole dream: in fact you remember that you acted with extreme 
cunning and logic throughout... You remember all this clearly. But how in the 
same space of time can your reason be reconciled with the manifest absurdities 
and impossibilities with which your dream was filled? One of your murderers 
changed into a woman before your eyes, and from a woman into a clever 
loathsome little dwarf - and you accepted all this instantly as absolute fact with 
hardly any surprise at all, and precisely at the time when otherwise your reason 
was at its highest pitch and showed extraordinary power, cunning, clarity, and 
logic." [Quoted in Foulkes (1985) p. 12, from The Idiot]
Those aspects of the intrinsic character of dream narratives which lead us 
to distinguish them from memories of events seen and deeds done, also give us 
reason to doubt that we are remembering what we seemed to see and tried to do. 
In some respects, even in its immediate appearance, telling a dream is typically 
quite unlike remembering either what one saw and did or what one seemed to 
see and tried to do.
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PART ONE 
WHAT APPEARS TO BE REMEMBERED
CHAPTER TWO 
THE UNIMAGINED AND THE UNIMAGINABLE
1. There are two versions of the hypothesis that, in telling a dream, a person 
remembers what he imagined during sleep.
In tlie previous chapter, 1 challenged anyone to say why we should believe a 
person to remember anying if it is not the events and deeds he appears to 
remember. The appeal of the hallucination theory was that seemings and 
tryings are by far and away the most obvious substitutes for the ostensible 
referents of a typical dream narrative. It seems to me that any other mental 
acts postulated to explain the occurrence of our awaking impressions would be 
too unlike what we typically appear to remember for it to be plausible to 
identify them as 'dreams'. Still it is open for someone to propose an alternative 
characterisation of what, in telling a dream, a person remembers. Some 
philosophers have been tempted by the idea that, at least in some cases, 
dream ing is akin to vivid imagining or earnest pretence, that it is like 
watching a film, being caught up in the action of a novel, 'metliod' acting, or 
some such mental activity akin to perception except that belief is suspended.
There are two versions of the hypothesis tliat, in telling a dream, a person 
recalls what he imagined during sleep. According to die first, a person telling a 
dream remembers what he vividly imagined as such; he remembers that he 
imagined the adventure, he remembers having entertained it without belief;
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he recalls, perhaps, that he was lying motionless, eyes-closed in his bed. 
According to the second, a person telling a dream remembers (or misremembers?) 
w hat he vividly imagined as if he had believed the adventure to be 
happening, whether or not he is under the misapprehension that he now recalls 
seeing or seeming to see.
It is the second version of the hypothesis that promises a general defence of 
the Received Opinion tliat telling a dream is remembering 'experiences' from 
sleep. For the proposition that a person remembers that he imagined die 
events of his dream is true, if anywhere, only in exceptional cases of telling a 
lucid' dream. Even those who, like LaBerge (1986), have sought to show drat 
die phenomenon of 'lucid dreaming' is more widespread than traditionally 
supposed, have not for a moment questioned drat, in dre ordinary case, dreams 
are remembered as if one had believed dre events of dre dream to be real. Of 
course, the second version of the hypothesis, the proposition that a person 
remembers (or misremembers?) events imagined as if he believed tire events to 
be happening at the time he imagined them, must be established by inference 
from evidence appart from his awakening 'recollections'. We are not invited 
simply to take tire narrator of a dream  at his word about w hat happened 
during sleep. For the proposition is that, in some sense, he appeal's to remember 
that these events happened, though in fact they were imagined. The appeal of 
the hypothesis that dreams are imaginations lies not in the positive evidence 
of our awakening impressions but rather in the seeming invunerability of that 
hypodresis to the behavioural evidence which tells so heavily against the 
hypothesis that dreams are hallucinations.
Tire temptation of the hypodresis that dreams are vivid imaginings is that 
it seems to offer a defence against tire charge that a person asleep does and says 
none of the drings one would expect of someone who believes himself to be
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caught up in the adventures of a typical dream narrative. It is not rmusual that 
a person imagining events should lie quietly with his eyes closed. A person 
may be w rapt up in his reverie, so that it is difficult to distract him  by 
questions about what is going through his mind. An interuption may sometimes 
prove so disruptive as to drive a person's musings right out of mind so that he 
cannot easily say w hat it was that he contemplated. It also seems more 
plausible that a person may imagine having beliefs and desires entirely 
incongruous with his everyday beliefs and desires than that he have tliem, 
especially where these beliefs and desires are, in many respects, crazy. It is a 
mystery how someone might seem to see the green grass below and blue sky 
above when he has his eyes closed, it is pitch dark and he is lying in bed. 
Wliat could substitue for tlie complex systematic patterns of retinal stimulation 
provided by light-rays reflected off the trees, the children running through die 
park, the ducks in the pond? But it is no wonder that someone imagine a brass 
band marching past, a view from the gazebo and every detail of a simply 
lovely picnic, whilst slumped on the sofa looking at nodiing.
Wliat's the game? To avoid disconfirmation? Or to find something diat is 
remembered? If one were defending die hypothesis diat a person remembers 
the events he is spontaneously inclined to relate, die burden of proof might lie 
against die doubters. Tliat is not the hypodiesis suggested here. What is 
suggested is diat, in some sense, a person telling a dream appears to remember 
events perceived (allowing that we may see straight through any such 
'apparition'). It is not suggested diat he appears to recall events imagined. 
Rather the hypothesis is that 'despite appearance' he in fact remembers 
events entertained w ithout belief; the hypothesis explains away the 
appearances (even though the appearance does not ordinarily mislead anyone). 
The hypothesis that he in fact remembers events imagined cannot be
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established by simply asking tiie dreamer what he remembers or appears to 
remember. If w hat a person superficially appears to recollect establishes the 
burden of proof, then that burden lies against the hypodiesis diat he remember 
events imagined.
The challenge is not to construct a hypothesis which could be true and 
which sidesteps the objection that dreams are not hallucinations. The 
challenge is to offer evidence diat somediing wliich happened during sleep, 
some 'experience' more akin to imagination tiian perception, occurred during 
sleep and is remembered upon awakening. The hypodiesis diat we remember or 
misremember events imagined as if w e  had perceived diem has no virhie miless 
it is supported by evidence that we imagined events during sleep corresponding 
to the events we appear to recall upon awakening. But die most cursory 
reflection upon what a person was disposed to do and say tells heavily against 
the hypothesis diat he imagined die adventure he is inclined to relate upon 
awakening. If diere is evidence of imagination in sleep corresponding to what a 
person appears to recall it is to be found in cases of lucid dream' reports where a 
person appears to recollect thoughts and intentions directed towards images 
vividly but unbelievingly entertained.
So far, I have played radier fast and loose widi die contrast between what 
a person appears to remember and what he remembers. It is time I made myself 
a little clearer about how a person may be said, in some respects, to appear to 
recall events witnessed and deeds done whilst not being under die slightest 
illusion that he remembers sucli events and whilst even believing himself to 
remember somediing quite different, perhaps what he vividly imagined.
I suppose diat a person could remember events imagined widiout supposing 
that he ever saw, seemed to see, imagined or in any manner entertained the 
idea of such events happening. A person may have an 'impression' as if of
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events witnessed without supposing himself to recollect perceptions, thoughts, 
images, sensations or any such mental acts or events. That is, he may find 
himself able to relate, without invention, a narrative as if of events witnessed, 
without taking the narrative at face value as a description of historical events.
Perhaps, but not necessarily, tliis ability may be accompanied w ith a rich 
Humean phenomenology of more or less vivacious and forceful imagary, feelings 
of familiarity, or whatever the inward gaze is supposed to reveal. If the 
content of his narrative corresponds to what in fact he imagined, he may be 
said to remember what he imagined, even though he does not remember that he 
imagined any sucli thing.
A person who recalls events imagined as if he had credulously perceived 
them need not but could judge (falsely) that he perceived tliese imagined events 
fi'om memory. But a person could not judge from memory that he imagined what 
he remembers as if he had perceived it. Where a person spontaneously j
discounts images or words which come to mind as if he were recollecting events j
witnessed on the grounds of its obvious discontinuity witli the bulk of what he |
appears to recall or on tlie grounds of his general knowledge of nahiral 
improbabilities it may be inappropriate to draw a contrast here between what 
he infers and what he appears to recollect. A person may remember images as 
if he were recalling perceptions w hilst seeing straight through the 
'apparition' of recalling perceptions. Equally, should he fail to discount his 
impression he may suppose himself to remember having perceived without 
inferring that he perceived. His mistaken judgment that he perceived may be 
said to be a mistake of memory, not merely a mistake of inference. However, I 
do not see how a person who remembers events imagined as if he had 
credulously perceived could take himself to remember without inferring that 
he imagined from independent observations of what he did and said during
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sleep. Hie contrast between memory and inference, I am prepared to admit, is 
not as sharp as philosophers have often supposed. But here, it seems to me, 
that it is entirely appropriate to invoke tiie contrast between a judgment from 
memory and a judgment by inference. A person could not recall tliat he imagined 
what he remembers as if he perceived it.
2. Even supposing that, in a typical case of telling a dream, images (together 
with thoughts and intentions about them) are in fact remembered from sleep 
(either as mere representations or as credulous perceptions) it does not follow 
that dreams can be identified with what was imagined (and thought or 
intended about such images)
An objection which touches either version of tlie hypothesis that, in telling a 
dream, a person remembers Üioughts and intentions about images passing before 
his mind during sleep is that neither is clearly a defence of the hypothesis 
tliat dreams are remembered from sleep. Even supposing that images (togetlier 
witli tlioughts and intentions about them) are remembered from sleep when we 
tell dreams, it does not follow that the content of our narratives ('dreams’) can 
be reduced to sucli images, thoughts and intentions. There could be grounds to 
identify dreams with imaginations remembered. Tlie prospects for such an 
identification seem more promising where a person 'telling a dream' at least 
appears to remember the images entertained without belief in the events and 
actions represented by them. But even here, there are reasons to suppose that 
w hat we appear to remember when we tell a dream typically transcends what 
is or even could be represented by the images, thoughts and intentions wliich we 
remember from sleep. An examination of our beliefs about dreams, the 
properties we attribute to them, the knowledge we suppose we have of them, 
shows that our ordinary concept of what is dreamt is too unlike that of what is
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imagined and thought to bear identification. If we appropriated the word 
'dream' for images remembered from sleep, we would have to find another word 
to characterise the content of what a person typically appears to remember 
upon awakening where he is not remembering anything from waking life.
What a person dreamt cannot be reduced to what he thought and intended 
about images passing through his mind during sleep. A typical narrative of a 
dream consists in much more than a person could know of his thoughts, images 
and intentions, even supposing he had perfect recall of Üiem. Evidence that we 
remember imaginations from sleep might be taken to show that, in telling a 
dream, images, droughts and intentions are misremembered upon awakening as 
if the images had a representational significance beyond the dreamer's 
droughts and intentions; misremembered as if dre objects and events of the 
dream drus represented took place among other objects and events not imagined. 
It would by no means follow from the fact drat a person telling a dream co­
incidentally remembered vivid imaginations from sleep that during sleep the 
dreamer entertained these images as representations of objects and events 
beyond the significance given to drem eidrer by dreir sensible appearance or by 
his concurrent thoughts and intentions about drem. Even if the narrator 
remembers images,thoughts and intentions occurring during sleep, no account is 
provided of his apparent knowledge of dre objects and events of a dream beyond 
his remembered interpretation of and invention upon images. A person’s 
avowed 'knowledge' of dre objects and events of a dream which transcends dre 
content of remembered images, thoughts aird intentions is not accounted for as 
knowledge of sometiring which happened during sleep.
3. In some respects, telling a dream is more like saying what one presently 
imagines than reporting historical events.
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The argument of this chapter is not drat dre analogy between dreaming and 
imagining is entirely misguided. The analogy between telling a dream and 
saying w hat one presently imagines is a useful corrective to the analogy 
between telling a dream  and reporting historical events. Similarily, the 
analogy between telling a dream and saying what one previously intended, in 
circumstances where nothing in a person's behaviour nor in what passed 
through his consciousness shows what he intended, provides a useful corrective 
to a perceptual model of remembering one's own 'past' states of mind. But none 
of these analogies provides a satisfactory model for explaining telling a dream 
as a remembering what one was aware of during sleep.
Malcolm drew an analogy between dreaming and imagining:
"In general tlie expression 'I dreamt', as we use it, serves as a sign tliat tlie 
ensuing naiTative of incidents in sleep is to be taken in tliis special sense, 
namely, tliat it will be inappropriate to request grounds for tlie statements tliat 
compose it. One could say: we accept the narrative witliout proof, not because 
we assume it will be tine but because the concept of tr uth tliat applies here has 
notliing to do witli proof. In this respect telling a dream is like imagining 
sometliing ('You are the mama tiger and I am tlie baby tiger'). It is unlike in the 
important respect tliat in it tliere is no place for inventiveness, for changing 
one's mind, for having things as one will. One tells a dr eam under the influence 
of an impression - as if  one was faitlifully recalling events that one witnessed. 
Telling a dream is undoubtedly a queer phenomenon"(1959, pp. 85/86). 
Malcolm took the exclusive authority of sincere first person narratives of 
dreams to constitute a distinction between dreaming and other psychological 
phenomena:
"...if anyone holds tliat dreams are identical with or composed of, tlioughts, 
impressions, feelings, images, and so on (here one may supply whatever otlier
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mental nouns one likes, except 'dreams'), occurring in sleep, then his view is 
false." [p.52]
What then are dreams? What mysterious kind of mental event occurs during 
sleep about which we can have no evidence other than evidence about what tlie 
subject is inclined to say upon awakening? Malcolm thought such questions to be 
"metaphysical" and unanswerable. The urge to ask them is symptomatic of a 
failure to reflect on our actual practice of telling dreams:
"...I am not trying to say what dreaming is: I do not understand what it 
would be to do tliat. I merely set fortli tlie reminder tliat in our daily discourse 
about dieams what we take as determining beyond question tliat a man dreamt is 
tliat in sincerity he should tell a dream or say that he had one." [p.59]
The distinction on which Malcolm insisted, between reports of events one has 
perceived and narratives of dreams, lies not in tlie causal properties of dreams 
and perceptions, nor in Üie cognitive mechanisms by which we detect them. 
The distinction is 'logical' or 'grammatical' and is meant to be transparent in 
our practices of accepting, doubting, and justifying stories which have the same 
superficial form of expression ("I saw, heard, felt, though t. . . ") and an often 
strikingly similar narrative phenomenology (that of faithfully describing an 
impression of one's own past perceptions, tlioughts and feelings), Malcolm 
distinguished between the 'dream-telling' and 'historical' uses of first-person 
past-tense psychological sentences. It is a distinctive feature of the dream- 
telling use that, whatever tlie content of the sentence, it is inconceivable 
(barring slips of the tongue or misunderstanding of the language) that a person's 
sincere awakening narrative be mistaken about his dream.
4. Even were incorrigible or infallible retrospection possible, the perceptual 
model of imagination could not account for the knowledge we have of objects and
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events dreamt beyond anything that m ight be inferred from the sensible 
qualities of images before our minds.
My objections to the identification of the ostensible referents of dream 
narratives with objects imagined are twofold. Firstly, my objection is that it is 
precisely tlie similarity indicated by Malcolm between telling a dream and 
saying what one presently imagines (namely, that what one sincerely says, 
given that one attends to the question, is not distracted and expresses oneself 
competently, is ordinarily taken to conclusively establish what one imagines) 
which calls in question the hypothesis that one is remembering. As Malcolm 
pointed out, in support of his contention that dreams are 'remembered' in a 
special sense of the word, there is nothing analogous in our practice of telling 
dreams to the justifications that might be given for die reliability of a person's 
memory of what he imagined. Secondly, my objection is tliat the analogy 
between dreaming and imagining is often drawn on die questionable assumption 
that (at least where images come to mind, as it were 'unbeckoned', widiout
I
invention or control) saying what one imagines is like describing the sensible 
qualities of a scene or interpreting 'what is going on' in a picture (except that 
the scene and one's mode of viewing it are peculiar in that no one else take a 
look and, so it would appear, one's own view is infallible). It is this second 
objection which I wish to develop in this chapter.
My objection to die inhospective account of a person's capacity to say what 
he imagines is not that the notions of incorrigibility and infallibility are 
unfounded, and should be replaced by some alternative notion of access 
(perhaps analogous to our normally reliable perceptual contact with the 
theoretical objects investigated by scientific means). There are good 
W ittgensteinian reasons to think that the very notion of 'access' is 
inappropriate to the relationship between a person's capacity to say what he
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imagines or what he dreamt and the facts about what he imagined or dreamt. 
However, for tlie time being, I am prepared to go along with the supposition 
that we commonly take ourselves to know incorrigibly and infallibly 'what 
went on in a dream'. My present objection to the analogy between telling a 
dream and introspection of images or other 'items of consciousness' is that, even 
were incorrigible and infallible introspection possible, it would not account for 
our knowledge of the kinds of tilings which ordinarily compose a narrative of a 
dream. The argument of this chapter is not that dreaming bears no comparison 
to imagination but, rather, that the attempt to explain the similarity between 
telling a dream and saying what one imagined in terms of 'inner perception' 
cannot account for the knowledge we appear to have when we relate the 
adventures of our dreams, even supposing tliat our memories are entirely 
reliable about the sensible qualities of the images that passed before our minds 
during sleep.
Hunter (1976) pointed out a puzzling feature of dreams which he took to 
suggests that "it is somehow not on the basis of what we experience while 
asleep tliat we tell our dreams" [p. 128]:
"A puzzle may emerge ... if we ask how it is tliat, on tlie basis of tlie 
incomplete and peculiar fragments tliat are given in a dieam, we so matter-of-fact 
report as it were a fully-articulate incident or sequence - being chased by a tiger, 
seeing an interesting roof, having an absorbing conversation - ratlier tlian 
perhaps as 'racing through notliingness pursued by a tiger's head', 'seeing a roof 
on a house tliat neither did nor did not have windows and doors', or 'having a 
conversation witli a voice out of nowhere'." [p.l28]
Hunter's attempt to characterise the contrast between the apparent sureness 
and completeness of our knowledge of dreams witli tlie paucity of the visual, 
auditory, tactile images we have in mind, emphasises the inadequacy of the
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'inner theatre' model. Hunter suggested an alternative model for dreaming, the 
model of a 'raconteur' who illustrates his story w ith w hat, to the 
unenlightened onlooker, appears to be a collage of fragmentary impressions 
capable of bearing any number of equally doubtful interpretations; but tlie 
raconteur himself would not have to interpret these fragments in order to tell 
for certain what they meant.
Hunter warned that he had no wish "to add tlie raconteur to the homunculi 
w ith which the hum an psyche is sometimes populated". The point of the 
notion of a raconteur is negative. Its point is to free us from "tlie idea that 
dream tellings are a special kind of eye-witness report" [p.129], that "truthful 
dream tellings are derived from the passing (inner) show" [p.130]. Hunter's 
objection was not that the 'inner show' model is incoherent (though he may 
well have supposed it to be incoherent). He argued that, even if logically 
private experiences were possible, the perceptual model could not serve to 
explain our knowledge of dreams.
5. The perceptual model of memory and imagination makes it look as if a 
person’s judgment about the inadequacy or incompleteness of his own narrative 
of a dream were answerable to something independent of what he is sincerely 
inclined to say.
1 take it to be a virtue of the analogy drawn by Malcolm between telling a 
dream and saying what one imagines that it emphasises the peculiar autliority 
we ordinarily attach to a person's account of his dreams. It is a shortcoming of 
the perceptual model tliat it fails to account for this authority. The model 
suggests that a person's best account of his dream, wliilst incorrigible, is not 
infallible. And it makes it look as if its incorrigibility were a contingent 
matter, an accident of our condition, a potentially removable obstacle to human
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understanding. It seems to me that the connection between what a person 
dreamt and what he says is misrepresented by the fiction of incorrigibility. In 
one important respect, the connection between what a person dreamt and what 
he is able to say of it without invention or inference is better characterised by 
the fiction of infallibility. For it is nothing other Üian a person's judgment that 
his narrative is an 'inadequate' or 'incomplete' account of a dream that makes 
it look as if tlie narrative is fallible.
First hand witnesses of events sometimes exliibit their memory of what 
happened in a manner quite unlike tliat of someone who merely knows the facts 
about what happened. When asked about the details of w hat went on, the 
expression of a face, the colour of her eyes, tlie cut of her dress and so on, an eye 
witness will often attempt to conjure images of what he saw, as if he were re­
creating his visual field in order to 'have another look’ into the past. It is as if 
the image enables the witness to observe details which had previously escaped 
his notice, as if he were discovering what had happened. This picture of 
remembering as a form of perception, an original source of knowledge, has 
tended to distort philosophical theories about memory. The analogy with 
looking at a photograph of a scene captures an aspect of telling a dream. But 
the differences are more numerous than tlie similarities. The differences are 
not exhausted by the obvious point that there is no analogy to the comparisons 
we routinely make between various observations and records of the same scene, 
that the dreamer's account of his dream  is never checked against evidence 
apart from what seems to him to have happened.
Tlie analogy suceeds in suggesting that, in telling a dream, one chooses one's 
words as if responsible to something independent of what one says. Telling a 
dream demands care and attention. A casual attitude leads to mistakes which 
could, in principle if not in practice, be corrected by reference to what one would
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have said if one had considered tlie matter more carefully. Telling a dream is 
quite unlike making things up or having them at one's will. The analogy also 
succeeds in pointing out that sometimes, very often in fact, a person is 
dissatisfied witli his attempt at a narrative. He may be able to improve upon 
his first attempt. But often he is not able to do so, or cannot do so to his own 
satisfaction. He remains frustrated in his efforts to 'put the dream' into words. 
Sometimes, this frustration reflects the strangeness and mystery of tlie events of 
a dream. Sometimes this frustration reflects the notorious tendency of dreams 
to 'melt and fade' upon awakening. The introspective account tends to lose sight 
of the fact (hat tlie measure of a person's frustration with his own best efforts to 
tell his dream is notliing otlier than his own impression of the dream. That his 
words are 'inadequate' to the dream  is itself a feature of his considered 
narrative.
The perceptual analogy tends to distort the fact that dreams are often 
strange and uncertain. It makes it look as if there could be some intelligible 
account of the dream  only the dream er’s capacity for comprehension, 
interpretation or expression is inadequate to die task. It makes it look as if a 
person's best narrative of a dream, whilst unquestionable by any conceivable 
observations we might make, is far from infallible. Sometimes, of course, we do 
look for iiitelligable interpretations of the strange events of dreams, 
interpretations wliich are supposed to explain away their mystery. But here 
we are giving an interpretation of what a dream means or an explanation of 
what causes us to dream what we do, not an account of what the dream is. The 
starting point or material of this interpretive exercise is what a person is able 
to say without invention or inference. Sometimes we censure a person for 
anticipating an interpretation or explanation in his telling of a dream. Some 
dieorists are worried that the practice of psychoanalysts tends to collapse the
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distinction we ordinarily make between telling and interpreting a dream; but it 
is supposed by most psychoanalysts to be no clinical disadvantage that die 
'manifest dream' told on the couch is, in some measure, an artifact of the 
programe of analysis. In ordinary practice, however, we take a person's 
considered judgment that the events of a dream were mysterious or ineffable to 
be a feature of the dream, either of a feature of die events themselves or of die 
responses of die characters within the dream.
The analogy with describing an inner picture seems to be adaptable to one of 
die most striking features of telling a dream, namely, their liability to be 
forgotten within the first few moments of awakening, even before one is able to 
say what the dream was about, fixing it more securely for future recall. Freud 
described this phenomenon with his characteristic eloquence:
"It is a proverbial fact that dreams melt away in die inoming. They can, of 
course, be remembered; for we only know dreams from our memory of diem 
after we awake. But we very often have a feelimg diat we have remembered only 
a dream in part and diat diere was more of it during the night; we can observe, 
too, how die recollection of a dream, which was still lively in die morning, will 
melt away, except for a few small fragments, in die course of a day; we often 
know we have dreamt, without knowing what we have dreamt; and we are so 
familiar widi die fact of dreams being liable to be forgotten, that we see no 
absurdity in die possibility of someone having had a dream in die night and his 
not being aware in die morning either of what he dreamt or of the fact diat he 
has dreamt at a ll. . .  " [Freud The Interpretation of Dreams p. 106]
On waking up, a person is sometimes convinced that he had a dream, but is 
unable to say anytliing as to what it was about. It is as if a rich pagant of 
colom'ful figures had just now passed from clear view and suddenly one cannot 
remember a single detail of the procession. In otlier cases, images wliich
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accompany one's awakening conviction, whilst often vivid and striking at first, 
have a remarkable capacity to vanish before one can put any definite words to 
them.
However, the perceptual analogy misrepresents tlie relationship between 
what a person dream t and his best account of a dream. Unless a person’s 
narrative is contrasted with what he would have said if not distracted or what 
he would have said if awoken a moment sooner we have no measure of its 
inadequacy other than what he is inclined to say about it. We have only a 
person’s own impression that his account, whilst incorrigible, is yet fallible. 
But, in practice, we treat a person's considered judgment that his narrative is 
inadequate as if it were infallible. Wliat we dreamt is not determined by tlie 
images that pass and fade before our minds indepedently of the words which 
seem appropriate to the dream er to 'describe' them, given that he was 
attentive, careful, sincere, competent in Üie language and in the expression of 
the words intended. Equally, what we dream is not given by the transitory and 
fragmentary images independently of one's own judgment of the adequacy of tlie 
words which one arrives at.
Whilst telling a dream has some resemblance to describing a fleeting 
glimpse of a scene, the dream told is not the scene described so much as the 
dreamer's most attentive impression of it. Who were the character's? Wliat 
was going on? A dreamer may have difficulty in answering these questions. 
One usually has the impression that there was more to a dream than one can 
tell. But where a person promptly and carefully attends to his dream upon 
awakening , it is nothing but his impression that his narrative is incomplete 
which establishes that there is more to the dream than tlie story he relates. It 
is, of course, hopeless to suppose that a person's 'impression' of the images 
flitting in and out of view is itself another item on the stage which we might
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know by further introspection. Our interest in what a person dreamt would 
simply be redirected towards our impression of that impression of ... If a dream 
is an 'impression', this impression is not some painted representation lost to 
sleep, nor yet some 'memory image' presenting itself momentarily to waking 
view. It is what a person is able to say without invention, as if he were 
describing a scene, except, of course, that no scene is described.
6. The hypothesis that dream narratives, whilst ostensibly about events and 
actions, are in fact memories of what a person imagined during sleep, vividly 
but without full credulity, fails to account for the apparent representational 
character of such images.
Boardman (1979) proposed an analogy between dreams and dramas. He was not 
particularily clear whether he supposed the similarity to lie between 
representing fictitious events and telling a dream upon awakening or between 
representing fictitious events and dreaming a dream during sleep. Boardman's 
remarks, it seems to me, would best be taken to be about what Malcolm would 
have called the 'grammar' of telling a dream. He does not give us a model for 
tlie explanation of telling a dream but, rather, a characterisation of that 'queer 
phenomenon' itself. However, Boardman attributed to Malcolm the 'mistaken' 
conclusion that dream reports are not descriptions of antecedently existing 
events. I am not sure Malcolm would have accepted this formulation of his 
conclusion, but I am happy to suppose that this is the conclusion he should have 
drawn. Boardman suggested that Malcolm's conclusion was a mistake resulting 
from an attempt to make the reporting of a dream altogether like the writing of 
a play; but he did not say exactly why it is a mistake to push the analogy so 
far. Perhaps he had in mind only that, if the conclusion is true, that dreams 
are identical w ith the content of our merely apparent memories upon
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awakening (subject perhaps to the restriction tliat these apparent memories 
have a causation in sleep), it is not a necessary truth of the kind that Malcolm 
sought to establish. However, taking Broadman's suggestion to be that dreams 
are entertained by the dream er during sleep as représentions largely 
independent of his will, one is immediately beset by problems about how the 
representational properties of images could be known during sleep and 
remembered upon awakening, even supposing that a person's memory of sensible 
qualities of tlie images, together with his thoughts and intentions towards 
them, is entirely reliable.
Bouwsma (1945) raised some of tlie fascinating questions tliat surround the 
identification of objects and events which figure in descriptions of dreams with 
their nominal counterparts in descriptions of the perceived world. He 
questioned Descartes identification of tlie T who perceives and acts in the 
dream with the T who lay asleep by the fire. How could the identification be 
established except by Descartes sitting awake by the fire knowing full well 
that this is the fire he now perceives and this is the fire he oft has dreamt? 
Removed from the context in which that identification can be made and 
Descartes cannot sensibly question whether I who am asleep by Üie fire am now 
perceiving this fire which I now seem to see and feel.
Boardman explored these issues in more detail, draw ing an analogy 
between dreaming and tlie autliorship of plays in which people from real life, 
including oneself, may have, more or less, whatever characteristics the autlior 
attributes to them, allowing, of course, that "plays are intentionally and 
deliberately contrived, whilst dreams are not" [p.222j. Boardman concluded:
"At any rate, except in tlie case of mistaken identifications which turn on 
eiTors regarding tlie reference of names and definite descriptions, and witli tlie 
possible exception of self-deception, we do not allow any autliority to any
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identifications of any dream-characters save tliose made in tlie dieam report... In 
general we do not allow tliird party identification of the satirist's targets because 
tlie representations have been established by tlie autlior's intentions. Altliough 
tliere are no parallel intentions of a dreamer which can explain why we do not 
overrule a dreamer's identification, nevertheless we do not overrule tliem." 
[p.223]
If our knowledge of the identities of objects and characters in our dreams is 
supposed to be knowledge remembered from sleep, we require some accomit of 
w hat during sleep established the identification. We are cautioned, 
immediately, to rule out the creative process of autliorship. If something went 
on inside R, L Stevenson's head during sleep, which was analogous to what 
went on when he sat at his desk writing Dr. fekyll and Mr. Hyde, it was not 
remembered by him upon awakening, it was the inferred cause of his dream, not 
the dream itself. The dreamer does not, on Boardman's analogy, know what 
tlie play is about because, like the playwright, he establishes what it is about 
by liis creative intentions. There is no more reason to suppose that the dreamer 
decides for himself what the images passing tlirough liis mind represent during 
sleep Üian to suppose tliat he makes his mind up upon awakening. He does not 
seem to be making things up upon awakening, it is true. But neither does he 
appear to remember making things up during sleep.
Does tlie dreamer know what is going on in the dream in tlie way the 
audience of a play knows what tlie actors on the stage represent? Tliis does not 
seem promising. Where is the stage, where are the actors? How is it viewed, 
how are tliey heard? Someone watching a play sees and hears somediing, even 
though he imagines it to be somediing else, and may even remember it as if he 
actually believed it were what he imagined it to be. Some account is required 
of the medium in which the play is presented and die means by which it is
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apprehended. More importantly, even were some account forthcoming about tlie 
medium in which the 'inner drama' is staged and the lights by which we see it, 
the problem would remain about how the dreamer 'knew' what the images 
before him represented. Similarity or resemblance won't do the trick. People 
and places in dreams can look notliing like tliey do in real life. This was a 
point about dreams Boardman wanted to draw attention to by his analogy with 
drama. People and places in satires can look nothing like they do in real life. 
The author's intentions establish die identity nonetheless.
An autlior's intentions are for the most part immanent in tlie presentation of 
the drama. But the schools of drama are distinguished above all in the 
conventions they employ to intimate tlie identity of the players, the setting of 
the play, and tlie significance of tlie actions. Our knowledge of the characters, 
locations and events of dreams do not seem to be bound by any of tlie familiar 
conventions of the theatre. There is no narrator. Hie characters in dreams do 
not intimate themselves in the manner of the artisans of the play witliin 
Shakespeares' Midsummer Night's Dream. They do not voice their thoughts 
and intentions out loud to us in convenient monologues. Sometimes things may be 
presented this way in dreams. But the plain fact is that we are able to say 
without doubt exactly what was going on in the dream without being able to 
justify that claim by reference to the sensible presentation of events during 
sleep. Hunter (1981) made the point that the sensible appearance of dreams is 
often what we are least sure of about them. A person may have no hesitation in 
telling us what went on in his dream, yet be quite unable to tell us the colours of 
objects dreamt or even whether they had any colour at all.
It is, however, a virtue of the analogy between dreams and dramas that, 
there are limits imposed by the author's intentions, by the conventions of the 
theatre, upon what is represented, limits which show the difference between
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watching a play and merely regarding actors on the stage. "Wliat was the 
colour of the King's robes?" may have no answer in a play where it is 
established that the king has put his robes on by word or gesture, or by some 
token representation like a tinsel chain or a paper sash. The setting of a play 
may be deliberately vague, for a purpose or because it simply doesn't matter. 
The identities of character may be kept mysterious. Even where no mystery is 
intended, there will be no end of questions about tlieir life and morals which, 
should we choose to raise them, will find no answer in the play. The audience 
may be kept guessing about what is going on. But there may be no fact of the 
matter about what Rosencrantz and Guildenstem were up to, should anyone feel 
curious enough to ponder tlie question. However, this common feature of dreams 
and dramas is not illuminated by the postulation of images entertained by die 
dreamer whilst he slept. The poverty of the imagery enjoyed during sleep is no 
explanation of the 'completeness' of a person's knowledge of his dreams.
7. Narratives of dreams may be representations of what we know about the 
objects and events of our dreams where what is or is not represented is 
established, not by what the dreamer imagined, thought or intended during 
sleep, but by what he is able to say without invention upon awakening.
Mosely (1981) pressed the point against Boardman: either the dream er 
recognises the images of his dreams to have a representational function, in 
which case, implausibly, all dreams are 'lucid'; or the dreamer does not 
recognise tliat he is entertaining representations, in which case he is deceived. 
Mosely further questioned Boardman's assum ption tha t dream ing is 
representational:
"Boaidman admits that dreams contiast with plays in tliat tliere is notliing 
analogous to tlie playwright's intentions in dreams. He goes on,however, to list
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otlier similaiities and to assume that therefore, somehow, tlie characters in a 
dream have a representational function. But, first of all, since the playwright's 
intentions are what bring about die representational function, we need something 
to substitute for such intentions in dieams. Boardman does not give us anytliing 
which would do so. The best we are left witli is tliat there are otlier similaiities 
between plays and dreams. However, a dieam is much more of a show unto 
itself than a play. As mentioned above, tliere aie certain crucial elements 
'behind' tlie play which make it a play.
But dreams aie not context-dependent in tlie way plays are. There is no 
extrinsic dimension to dreams to give tlieii' characters a representational function. 
The characters in a dieam can be caused by the dreamer's acquaintance witli a 
certain individual, or can remind tlie dreamer of him when awake, but they 
cannot represent tliat individual." [p. 162]
I think Mosely's criticisms of Boardman are just. But, in a way, Mosely fails to 
take seriously the problem he raises against Boardman. Mosely seems to 
conclude that we have no account of dreaming as representing. This was 
precisely the conclusion argued by MacDonald (1953) against Descartes. Yet 
Mosely concludes that "for better or worse then, Descartes' dreaming problem 
survives to prod the complacent and tempt the ambitious" [p.162]. The way out 
of the problem which Mosely raises against Boardman is to give up the idea 
tiiat dreaming is representing truly, falsely or fictitiously during sleep, whilst 
retaining the idea that waking narratives of dreams are representational.
Once we see that a dream is the content of a fictitious story told in tlie past 
tense upon awakening, we can begin to supply a context whicli determines what 
the story represents. Mosely himself, in criticising Boardman's claim that 
there is a systematic ambiguity between tlie T of tlie narrator and the T of die
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personae in the dream, points to the manner in which the representational 
function of dreams is achieved:
"I attend a political rally where Nixon was speaking, I look at him, point to 
him and say I dreamt tliat he was tricked. I point to my next-door neighbour and 
say that I dreamt tliat he was attacking me. The referent of tlie pronoun 'he' is 
both tlie actual person standing before me and tlie object of my dream - one 
paiticulai individual." [p.l60]
MacDonald (1953) was wrong when she supposed that 'Westminster Abbey' 
named in the narrative of a dream could not be identified with Westminster 
Abbey. It can. W hat achieves the identification is, as Malcolm argued, 
nothing otlier than w hat the dream er is sincerely inclined to say upon 
awakening. We need not suppose that the dreamer chooses what he says as if 
he were a playwright making up a story. The descriptions and ostentions 
which fix the content of the dream  come to the dreamer upon awakening 
independently of his will. They are caused, presumably by neural events 
occurring during sleep. This cause may explain why the dreamer tells just this 
story rather than another or none at all; bu t it does not justify the 
identifications made by him. That a person’s disposition to 'tell a dream' is so 
caused may even be a necessary condition of its being a narrative of a dream, as 
Mannison (1975) suggested in contradiction of Malcolm. But this does not mean 
that the dreamer's waking narrative refers to what happened during sleep or 
tliat its content was previously represented by, or to, or in, the dreamer whilst 
he slept.
An analogy between telling a dream and saying what one imagined may 
illuminate the special authority we ordinarily allow to a person's account of 
his dream. But the analogy also calls into question any attempt to identify 
dreams w ith what we imagined. Even were a person telling a dream to
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remembers perfectly what images, thoughts and intentions he had during sleep, 
he would not thereby remember all that we suppose him  to know about his 
dreams. The fact that our identifications of the characters and objects of our 
dreams are accepted without question, in the manner of our acceptance of an 
author's identifications of the characters and events of an historical play, does 
not imply that we know what we dreamt because, during sleep, were in some 
sense 'aware' of the content of our dream.
8. Often, in  telling a dream, one appears to remember events which one could 
not possibly have imagined.
Mannison (1975) offered an explanation of how it is that dreams can differ from 
any mental phenomena found in waking life in the respect that the events and 
deeds of a dream may be quite unimaginable and impossible to believe. 
Mannison argued that, witliout abandoning tlie assumption that dreams are 
dreamt during sleep, (that the content of our disposition to tell a dream is 
determined by events occurring during sleep) the impossible features of dreams 
may be accounted for as merely features of tlie fictitious stories we are disposed 
to tell, witliout invention, when we wake up, and not features of beliefs, quasi­
beliefs, vivid imaginings or some sucli nonsense occurring during sleep:
"My model for 'dreaming' (or 'having a dream') is tliis: A person's dreaming 
or having a dream consists in his being disposed to tell a stoiy of a certain sort 
some relatively short time after awakening; such a disposition having been 
caused by neuial activity occurring whilst he was sound asleep.
... Tlie 'story' one is disposed to tell upon awakening is neitlier a report of 
anything tliat occuned whilst one was asleep, nor is it proffered for our 
consideration as a piece of highly imaginative fiction. It is not a description of
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anyüiing tliat did happen, nor of anytliing that one has imagined as a possible 
happening.
If tlie central nervous system is active and self-initiating whilst asleep, üieii 
tliere is no a priori restriction on what new or unusual patliways our neural 
findings will travel. If it is such activity tliat causes one to awaken with a 
disposition to tell a certain story, then tliere aie no a priori limits to tlie stories 
one might be supposed to tell. Since while asleep one has not been 'entertaining 
propositions' in any way, whatever conceptual or logical rules govern 
propositions have no application. The fact, if it is a fact, that most of or all of 
our dreams are not of what is senseless or logically impossible is explained by 
the quite plausible liypotliesis that it is easier, and hence, more likely, for neural 
firings to follow already established patliways tlian to establish new ones." 
[p.674]
Mannison is entirely right that tlie assumption that tlie impossible contents of 
a dream narrative are, in some sense, 'entertained' by the dreamer during sleep 
is an unnecessary encumbrance. The fact that, in expressing and accepting as 
true narratives of dreams, we accept tliat impossible things can happen does not 
show that during sleep a person 'accepts', either, as Descartes supposed, with 
erroneous belief or, as Rechtstaffen (1978) suggested, w ith 'single-minded' 
unreflectiveness or, as Coleridge would have us read a poem, with 'suspension 
of disbelief or, as Thomas (1953) suggested, with 'pretended belief, or with 
any such qualification, that such tilings were happening. What we accept is 
that in dreams the incredible and unimaginable can happen. It in no way 
follows that, during sleep, a person, in any sense, 'accepts' or 'entertains' the 
thought that the impossible is happening.
Broadman (1979) offered an ingenious explanation of how we can imagine 
impossible events, as it were in reply to Mannison's objection:
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"We may advert to a brief episode of Monty Python's Flying Circus in 
which the chaiacters had discovered a joke so enormously funny tliat anyone 
hearing it would literally laugh himself to deatli. The television audience was 
(cleverly) never allowed to hear tlie entir e joke; ratlier tliey saw tlie results of 
various characters' reading or hearing tlie joke. Similar devises are used by 
authors such as John Bartli: the point behind tliem is tliat while we readers 
cannot imagine the unimaginable, we can imagine how people would react when 
tliey discovered tliat what everyone had thought to be unimaginable turned out to 
be ... " [p.225]
It is true that, where a person is remembering tire events of a play, his 
descriptions are not automatically discredited should the events described fail 
to conform to tire laws of nature or logic, as they would be discredited were Ürey 
intended to be reports of genuine historical events perceived or misperceived. 
But where among the visual, tactile, auditory images we remember from sleep 
is the knowledge that impossible or unimaginable things are occurring in the 
dream? Perhaps a dreamer may remember imaginary reactions of otlier 
characters in the dream which shows them to have believed that impossible 
events were occurring. But the beliefs which informed his own contemporary 
reactions cannot be Icnown simply by remembering what he saw and did. 
Boardman does not explain what 'devises', analogous to tliose employed by a 
clever writer, opperate during sleep to inform a dreamer that unimaginable 
events are going on.
Hie analogy between dreams and drama fails if it suggests that telling a 
dream is like describing events depicted on stage or screen, for dreams often lack 
the conventions by which playwrights convey Üieir intentions about who and 
what is represented upon the stage, yet that does not prevent the dreamer 
knowing with certainty who is who and what is what. No doubt Boardman did
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not intend that the analogy between dreams and dramas to be limited to tlie 
model of inner perception'. Ratlier, he wanted to point out some of tlie features 
which distinguish our knowledge of dreams from perceptual interpretation. 
But it is not clear how the lessons of this analogy are to be reconciled with the 
belief that our knowledge of the contents or our dream is aquired during sleep 
and remembered upon awakening.
Wliat Boardman had in mind was, perhaps, that our memory of dreams is 
analogous to our memory of our own past intentions. If so, he should have been 
in agreement with Malcolm that memories of dreams are not reports of past 
images, thoughts or sensations. Wittgenstein (1953) made the point tliat our 
capacity to remember our intentions cannot be reduced to a capacity to report or 
interpret past elements of behaviour or consciousness:
" 'I was going to say ..." - You remember various details. But not even all 
of tliem together shew your intention. It is as if a snapshot of tlie scene had 
been taken, but only a few scattered details of it were to be seen: here a hand, 
there a bit of face, or a hat - the rest is darkness. And now it as if you knew 
quite certainly what tlie whole picture represented. As if I could read tlie 
darkness." [s.635]
W right (1984) argued that the lesson to be draw n from Kripke's sceptical 
argument about rule following was that, if we construe knowledge of intentions 
on the model of perceptual reports, there is no fact of the matter in which a 
person's past intentions consist; hence, we should construe a person's knowledge 
of liis past intentions upon what Wright called a 'constitutive', rather tlian an 
'investigative', model.
9. The argum ent that w hat we appear to remember cannot be reduced to 
perceptions, thoughts, images, intentions or any other mental phenomenon
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found in  waking life leaves no sufficient reason to suppose that we remember a 
unique mental phenomenon from sleep.
The argum ent of this and the preceding chapter, that popular faitli in the 
Received Opinion is incoherent with our everyday judgments about what a 
person perceived, intended, imagined, thought, etc., is tire reworking of an old 
tlreme. It clearly betrays, at least I hope it does, the influence of Bouwsma 
(1945) (1957), MacDonald (1953), Malcolm (1956) (1959), Squires (1973), 
Mannison (1975) (1977), Hunter (1976) and Shaffer (1984), among others. 
Indeed, even before Malcolm published his major work on dreaming, it was close 
to becoming the orthodox view in analytic philosophy, or at least in Oxford 
philosophy (which seemed like much the same thing in those days), that 
dreams are not hallucinations. Nagel (1959) expressed tire attitude drat 'quite 
enough' had already been said to establish dreams are not identical with any 
of the mental phenomena found in waking life.
However, Squires (1973) was the first to draw clearly the inference that, if 
dreams are not hallucinations remembered from sleep, then either dreams are 
what we merely appear to remember upon awakening (in which case we don't 
dream dreams during sleep and remember or forget them upon awakening) or 
that dreams are a kind of internal process which causes our awakening 
impressions (in which case, we are unaware of our dreams during sleep and don't 
remember or forget them upon awakening). Mannison (1975) proposed a 
compromise according to which dreams are dreamt in sleep' implies that our 
disposition to relate a particular kind of fictitious story upon awakening is 
caused by neural events occurring during sleep. On Mannison's account, since Uie 
story told is not a report of anything which happened during sleep, it would 
appear to follow that it is not a memory; and Mannison, wliilst not explicitly 
drawing the conclusion, says nothing in defence of our conviction that 'dreams
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are remembered or forgotten from sleep'. Dennett (1976) remains the only 
attempt to defend our conviction that dreams are dream t during sleep and 
remembered or forgotten upon awakening wliich takes the tlireat of theoretical 
elimination seriously.
Other commentators on dreaming, for example Curley (1975) and Dunlop 
(1977), seem so struck by the failure of Malcolm's verificationist arguments to 
show that dreams cannot be thoughts, images, sensations, etc. that it has 
skewed their own view of the central problem about dreaming. These 
commentators take the important issue to be, firstly, that dreams could be false 
beliefs and frustrated desires, as Descartes supposed them in fact to be, and, 
secondly, that science may discover some examples to bear the weight of a 
Sceptical Argument. Their concern with tlie Sceptical Argument distracts them 
from taking seriously the possibility tiiat, in the typical case of telling a 
dream, we don't remember seeming to see and trying to do the events related, 
and from questioning whether it would follow from this that dreams are not 
remembered from sleep.
Shaffer (1984) is the most recent article to address tlie issues of chapter one 
in any depth. He too argued that dreams are not hallucinations remembered 
from sleep. He also supposed that, in some cases, we might remember tlioughts, 
images and intentions from sleep, but that it would not follow that dreams 
consist in such thoughts, images and intentions. However, Shaffer did not 
question the proposition that dreams are remembered from sleep. Shaffer 
seems to combine MacDonald and Malcolm's view that dream ing is an 
irreducible mental activity occurring during sleep with the view that thoughts, 
images and sensations may occur during sleep, ending up with the curious 
position that a person may wake to remember thoughts which occurred during 
sleep simultaneous with and directed towards his dreams:
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"In this paper I have agreed with Malcolm, although for different reasons, 
that dreams do not consist of or entail psychological states found in waking life 
such as judging, deciding, experiencing emotions, having sensations, wanting 
something, etc. Thus they aie unique states of consciousness"
It seems to me that Shaffer overlooked the connection between the tlieoiy that 
dreams are hallucinations and our conviction that, in telling a dream, we are 
remembering something from sleep. The initial appeal of the hypothesis that 
dreams are hallucinations was that it alone seems capable of delivering an 
account of dreams as something sufficiently 'like' what we appear to remember 
to be identified with dreams. If dreams are not Üie events witnessed and deeds 
done to which we ostensibly refer in telling a dream, nor seemings to see and 
trying to do such things, but Something Else ("a unique state of consciousness"), 
what reason have we to suppose that we remember dreams? Not the facts about 
what we appear to remember upon awakening. Nor tlie tried and tested 'rule of 
thumb' that a person generally remembers what appears to him  to have 
happened. Unfortunately, Shaffer gives us nothing else to go on. All he says is 
that "it is a simple and natural interpretation" to take dream  narratives as 
"for the most part veridical memories." [p.l37]
This will not do. For what is 'simple and natural' depends upon how much 
we know. The 'simple and natural' similarity between narratives of dreams 
and reports of events remembered ends where it begins, that is, w ith the 
psychological fact tliat on awakening people are inclined to express themselves 
by the use of first person past tense sentences ostensibly referring to events 
witnessed and deeds done. Shaffer himself argues that, according to our 
everyday theories about the connections between mental phenomena, 
environmental stimulus, and dispositions to behaviour, we do not remember 
anything which has similar causal features to the false perceptual beliefs and
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frustrated desires which sometimes explain such narratives as memories of past 
experiences. Shaffer also seems to accept that where we might have evidence 
that something is remembered, there would yet be insufficient reason to 
identify dreams with what is remembered. Why then should it remain 'simple 
and natural' to insist tliat dreams are remembered from sleep? Perhaps we 
might conclude that we appear to remember a unique kind of mental 
phenomenon unlike anything found in waking life. But the reasons by whicli we 
arrive at this conclusion, it seems to me, are quite sufficient to call in question 
that there is anything in sleep corresponding to our awakening narrative of 
dreams.
If what Shaffer has in mind is that it is 'natural and simple' to suppose 
that we are remembering some "unique state of consciousness" why should it be 
supposed that this unique phenomenon occurred during sleep? We ordinarily 
decide, according to tlie wider context of our awakening impressions, tliat we 
are not remembering beliefs, intentions, thoughts, images, sensations, or even a 
'unique state of consciousness' from waking life. Don't the same reasons apply to 
sleep? Wliy not? Is waking life just too crowded with other mental riches? But 
then, isn't such preoccupation exactly what we require to explain the fact tliat, 
waking impressions excepted, we didn't appear to notice these strange mental 
episodes at any time in our past?
It seems to me Üiat Shaffer cannot shrug off Üie demand for justification. It 
is his acceptance of tlie possibility of justifying an identification of dreams 
with mental phenomena remembered from sleep which distinguishes his 
argument to tlie conclusion that dreams are unique from that of Malcolm. 
Shaffer argues the case that dreams are "a unique state of consciousness" from 
w hat he calls 'functionalist' considerations. These are evidential
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considerations about the probable causes and effects of beliefs, intentions, and 
other mental phenomenon given what we know about them:
"Given tlie right sort of empirical connections one might say tliat in [a 
particular] case dreaming tliat p was or involved believing that p, while still 
denying a general connection between dieaming tliat p and believing tliat p.
In these remarks, I am not endorsing behaviourism or functionalism, for I 
am not defining 'deciding' and 'believing' in terms of dispositions. But it does 
seem to me that it is a necessaiy condition for sometliing to be a decision or a 
belief that it produces a disposition to act in certain ways in certain 
ch'cumstaiices (not tliat we can state tliese dispositions with any precision). 
Decisions or beliefs in dreams are totally lacking in tliis feature....
Events in dreams do sometimes have connections witli real life.... [But] it 
is an exception which proves the rule (namely tliat tliere is no general connection 
between dreamed mental phenomena and real mental phenomena) because we 
have to cite specific connections to show in tliose exceptional cases that dream 
phenomena can involve real phenomena." [p.139/140]
If 'functionalist' reasoning is appropriate, then we have reason to demand some 
independent evidence about the supposed cause of our waking narratives. The 
failure to find any such independent evidence, having thoroughly considered 
what might be shown, is reason enough to conclude either that 'for functionalist 
reasons' dreams do not exist or that functionalist reasonings are inappropriate 
for 'dreaming' is not a theoretical term.
Malcolm's argum ent that dreams cannot consist in thoughts, images, 
sensations, etc. was precisely that it is inappropriate to demand any empirical 
justification for our conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep. When 
Malcolm concluded that dreaming was unique among mental phenomena, he 
meant that there can be no observations of sleep which confirm or disconfirm a
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person's awakening narrative. Hie uniqueness of dreams was supposed by 
Malcolm to be a logical feature of dream narratives, not a peculiarity in their 
nature, of their causal connectedness with stimulus and behaviour. Shaffer 
explicitly rejected Malcolm's conclusion that dreams cannot be beliefs and 
intentions. He takes it to be a theoretical matter that they are not. What, 
then, does Shaffer mean when he says tliat dreams are "a unique state of 
consciousness"? He does not give us a theory about dreaming indicating what 
peculiar system of causes and effects they underly. He only argues what dreams 
are not. I take the proper conclusion of Shaffer's argument to be that it is 
doubtful whether we are remembering anything from sleep, in the typical case 
of 'telling a dream'; tliat it is doubtful whetlier narratives of dreams generally 
describe any mental phenomena at all.', that dreaming is a unique mental 
concept in tliat there is unusually good reason to think that dreams are not 
dreamt. And 1 take the fact tliat Shaffer is blind to this implication of his 
argument to be as much a matter of philosophical interest as the conclusion 
itself.
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PART TWO
SCIENTIFIC STUDIES OF SLEEPING AND WAKING
CHAPTER THREE 
’ACTIONS’ DURING SLEEP 
(Scientific Studies of Sleepwalking, Sleeptalking, Night Terrors 
& Signaling that one is Dreaming)
1. What a person does and what a person says during sleep is the best evidence 
for or against the hypothesis that, in  telling a dream, a person is remembering 
thoughts, images, sensations desires, or some such mental acts or events.
In Court Procedure there is a formality known as the 'Best Evidence Rule', This 
rule places the disputants under an obligation to lead their evidence, not 
according to its quantity, but according to its kind. The idea behind this rule is 
tliat some kinds of evidence are qualitatively better, in tlie eyes of the law, 
than otliers. That is, if evidence of a certain Idnd told one way on the issue, it 
would outbalance an equal amount of evidence of an inferior cast. The fairest 
way to settle a dispute, the law has it, is to weigh the evidence like with like 
in the order of its quality. This procedure, it might be hoped, reduces the 
chance of impressionable jurors being overly impressed by an Advocate who 
lays before tliem mountains of detailed evidence of an inferior cast (usually 
delivered by an 'expert' witness witli a string of scientific qualifications), to 
the extent that they are blind to his failure to produce much evidence of tlie 
kind (albeit of a more familiar, homely nature) best able to settle the matter 
one way or another.
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Tlie best evidence for what a person thinks, imagines, feels, and so on, is 
what a person says and what a person does. It would be a mistake to think that 
Üiis kind of evidence is available only in cases where a person is positively 
disposed to do and say something. Evidence that a person asleep is disposed to 
say and do nothing is just as good. There are, it is true, a significant number of 
cases in which a person says and does tilings during sleep. Sometimes people 
talk in their sleep, tliey cry out, toss and turn. Sometimes sleepers leave their 
beds and engage in elaborate pantomimes of waking actions. A fair amount of 
this speech and behaviour is too fleeting, erratic and incoherent to sustain any 
interpretation as the product of purposeful mental activity but, often enough, it 
has sufficient organisation to invite an explanation in terms of a coherent 
pattern of beliefs and intentions. It is an open question whetlier such evidence 
confirms the hypothesis that, in some cases, a person remembers w hat he 
seemed to see and tried to do during sleep. But it is not an open question 
whetlier such evidence confirms tlie Received Opinion that, in general, 'telling 
a dream' is remembering episodes from sleep.
If the evidence of what a person was disposed to do amd say proves tliat, in 
some cases, a person remembers what he seemed to see and tried to do during 
sleep, then it also proves that, in general, telling a dream is not remembering 
such episodes. We already have enough evidence to conclude tliat the usual 
case of 'telling a dream' is not a case of remembering episodes from sleep. Even 
should it turn out (and it might not turn out) tliat, in every case where a person 
says and does things during sleep, he remembers something of this upon 
awakening, the balance of evidence would still lie against the Received 
Opinion. We have buckets of evidence, evidence of the best possible kind, that 
dreams are not thoughts, sensations, images, etc. remembered fmm sleep.
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No doubt I will be referred to expert witnesses who will tell us that such 
and such an experiment confirms that dreaming is a 'cognitive process' or 
'perceptual activity' occurring during sleep. I do not deny tliat physiological 
evidence is sometimes relevant to establish psychological facts. I'll bite my 
tongue when the next scientist or philosopher speculates that, in some future 
time, the print-out of a Celebrescope will be die best evidence about what a 
person tiiinks, feels, imagines, etc. In the next chapter I take a look at what 
the physiological investigation of sleep does and does not show in the présent 
time. My point for now is that, from what we already know about the 
symptoms of beliefs, desires and other mental phenomenon in normal human 
bemgs, physiological evidence is, as yet, a very poor second to observation of 
behaviour. Scientists may tell us that similar tilings go on in people asleep as 
in people awake, despite the difference in behavioural dispositions. But that 
is not to tell us that, despite the difference in behavioural dispositions, the 
psychological facts are the same, asleep or awake.
It is somewhat ironic that Malcolm's (1959) essay on Dreaming is widely 
regarded as a monument to tlie folly of 'logical behaviourism'. For what most 
outraged many of Malcolm's critics was not so much his claim that there is a 
necessary connection between the beliefs and desires a person has and his 
concurrent dispositions to speech and action as his claim tiiat tliere is no logical 
connection between what a person dreamt and his dispositions to behaviour and 
speech during sleep. Malcolm argued that it is a unique feature of dreaming, 
among mental phenomena, that evidence of dispositions to concurrent speech 
and behaviour is irrelevant to confirm or disconfirm a person's subsequent 
account of his mental life. For, in the normal context of narrating a dream, it is 
presupposed that tlie dreamer was sound asleep, that he was not disposed to do 
or say anything as he slept. Therefore, according to Malcolm, it is a distinctive
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feature of the concept of dreaming that a person's sincere awakening narrative 
of his dream cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence about what he 
said or did (or would have said and done) whilst asleep. He argued that, even 
in the exceptional cases where a person was not sound asleep, that is, where 
evidence is available.that a person did or would have done various things, 
such evidence that he thought, imagined, felt, intended this or that is 
irrelevant to what he dreamt.
Malcolm is commonly taken to have held tliat no mental phenomena other 
than dreams can ever be properly asserted to occur during sleep. For example, 
Shaffer (1984) [p.138 and p .144] attributes tliis view to Malcolm, before 
promptly rejecting it. But Malcolm did not rule out the possibility tliat we 
might attribute thoughts, sensations, feeling, desires to a person on the basis of 
his behaviour during sleep and tliat, on awakening, a person might remember 
something of these nocturnal goings on. He did argue tliat a person's behaviour 
and speech cannot bear psychological interpretation witliout qualifying tlie 
assertion that he was asleep, and tliat evidence that a person remembers such 
psychological phenomena is liable to call into question the hypothesis that he 
was asleep. This is not a very shocking proposition. Putnam (1962a), it is true, 
was shocked, but he was single-mindedly reading the verificationist sub-text. 
Admittedly, Malcolm supposed that our criteria of sleep are behavioural. It 
might be that physiological differences between sleeping and waking might 
help to resolve difficulties in deciding when a person's behaviour shows him to 
be aware of something without showing him to be awake, or showing him to be 
in a distinctive state, in some respects 'resembling sleep', as Malcolm (1959) 
[p.27] characterised sleepwalking. But it is not a foregone conclusion that there 
must be such a solution to the problems of classification.
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Malcolm also implied that, should a person's awakening narrative be 
supposed to be a case of remembering a mental life evident in his dispositions to 
speech and behaviour during sleep, then that awakening narrative should be 
distinguished from the phenomenon of 'telling a dream'. This, again, seems to 
me to contain an unexceptional truth. If it turns out that some of our waking 
reports are memories of what we said or did during sleep, and tliere is an 
explanation of why this is so, in these cases and not in general, tlie explanation 
given will not be a theory about dreaming but, ratlier, a theory about a distinct 
kind of phenomenon associated w ith sleep. The theoretical issue about 
dreaming is not whether, on this or that occasion, there was evidence that 
someone experienced something during sleep and remembered it upon 
awakening, but about whether the hypothesis that dreams are thoughts, 
images, sensations, or some such mental acts or events provides a good account of 
the phenomenon of 'telling a dream' in general. As Shaffer (1984) pointed out, 
exceptional cases only serve to prove the rule to which they are exceptions, 
namely, tliat dreams do not consist in beliefs, intentions or any other mental 
phenomenon found in waking life.
2. The assumption of the Received Opinion, that both 'sleep' and 'sleep 
mentation reports' are homogeneous phenomena that can be linked by a common 
explanation, is called in question by scientific scrutiny of these phenomena.
The important issue about dreaming is not whetlier tliere are some, or even quite 
a few, particular cases in which there is good evidence that a person remembers 
what happened during sleep. Hie important issue is about a general account of 
our apparent memories upon awakening which are not memories of waking life. 
Hie Received Opinion, as commonly understood, makes tlie assumption that 
both (a) sleep and (b) our apparent memories upon awakening which are not
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memories of waking life, are homogeneous phenomena. On tliis assumption, the 
Received Opinion attempts to link 'sleep' and 'dream reports' witliln a single 
explanation, claiming that our awakening apparent memories which are not 
memories of waking life are commonly memories of our mental life when asleep. 
So long as the Received Opinion is shackled to this assumption, it seems to me, 
the weight of obvious and familiar evidence lies heavily against it. The 
appeal to 'special cases', either reported anecdotally or systematically 
recorded by scientists, cannot upset tlie balance of probabilities. At best, it 
could show that there are some, perhaps numerous, exceptions to tlie general 
tru th  that, in 'telling dream s', we do not remember thoughts, images, 
sensations, desires, feelings and such like from sleep.
However, if there is one lesson which the systematic scrutiny of nature 
teaches before all others, it is that what we originally supposed to be a 
distinctive phenomenon inviting a homogeneous explanation, turns out to be no 
such tiling. The history of science is very largely the story of how, in one case, a 
syndrome of associated observables was analysed into various factors each the 
product of a different underlying process and, in another case, two superficially 
unrelated observables were found to have a common aetiology. The systematic 
study of 'sleep' and of 'dream  reports' recapitulates this very theme. 
Electrographic techniques have analysed sleep into a cyclical pattern of 
physiologically discrete periods, completely upsetting the traditional 
supposition that sleep is a fairly uniform state of bodily rest, varying only in 
proximity to waking life along a continum of 'depth'. The attempt to correlate 
physiological distinctive features within sleep to psychologically significant 
kinds of 'sleep mentation report' has lead scientists to distinguish dreaming 
from other types of mental phenomenon associated w ith sleep. This is 
especially evident in the once heated, but never satisfactorily resolved, debate
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about tlie frequency and character of 'dream reports' consequent upon awakening 
from NREM sleep.
Aserinsky & Kleitman's (1953) hypothesis that there is a unique 
correlation between Stage REM sleep and 'dream reports' is still widely 
publicised but has long-since been discredited. Herman, Ellman and Roffwarg 
(1979) provide a fascinating review of the strikingly divergent experimental 
results which provoked the debate about the proper definition of 'dream 
reports', together with the results of a study designed to assess tlie scope and 
extent of experimenter-induced bias in early studies once supposed to have 
established that dreaming is uniquely associated witli Stage REM. Perhaps it 
is not surprising tliat tlie identification of Stage REM sleep with dreaming still 
enjoys wide popular credence. It remains easily the best shot ever had at 
establishing a type-type psycho-physiological correlation generally 
applicable to a familiar mental phenomenon. And, it would seem, many 
people, though not so many psychologists or philosophers now, still suppose 
that progress in psychology must result in the discovery of such correlations.
The ability to predict the likelihood that a person will have a story to tell 
if awoken retains its place as the securest result in psycho-physiology. It is an 
im portant result, despite the failure of earlier ambitions to demonstrate 
content-relative correlations. Some such ambitions were for a time rekindled by 
LaBerge's (1985) work on 'lucid dreams'. But Hobson's (1988) program of 
establishing formal' rather than content-specific correlation is probably tlie 
mainstream of what survives of psycho-physiological dream  research. That 
reseach program is nowadays an altogether more modest giffair than it was in 
its hey-day of the fifties and sixties, w hen it flourished largely as a 
beneficiary of the U.S. defence budget reseach boom, and researchers could 
afford to believe that the 'scanning-hypothesis' pointed tlie way towards a
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wealth of type-type identities. Rechstaffen's earlier (1967) paper which 
attem pted to justify the assum ption that 'subjective reports' could be 
'validated' by correlations w ith physiological phenom ena (such as the 
supposed correlation of movements within a dream narrative to eye-movements 
during sleep which was offered in support of the notorious 'scanning 
hypothesis') was some time ago superseded by an equally influential (1978) 
essay in which he argued, in effect, that the phenomenological distinctiveness 
of dream  narratives among reports of mental phenom ena (features he 
characterised as the 'single-mindedness' and 'isolation' of dreams) is reflected 
in the failure of researcher's like himself to establish significant psycho- 
pysiological correlations. Foulkes, anotlier veteran, once in the cold-war 
vanguard of correlative research, has long since abandoned any ambition to 
answer the persistent questions about dreaming in 'hard' neurobiological terms. 
Foulkes (1978) (1985) has attempted, almost single handedly one might suppose 
from a glance at the literature, to integrate dream  theory w ithin the 
framework of cognitive psychology, attempting to show both that Freudian 
psyclio-dynamics is not the only alternative to Hobson's (1988) neurobiology, 
and that cognitive psychology can embrace the problems about motive and 
creativity raised by dreaming without compromising its hard-won scientific 
credentials.
Many researchers still suppose that NREM reports, whilst more frequent 
than originally believed, tend to differ in character from Stage REM reports, 
and classify NREM reports as 'tliinking reports' in contrast to the typical Stage 
REM 'dream report'. This maintains the appealing idea that there is at least 
some psychological distinction corresponding to tlie dramatic physiological 
contrast between Stage REM and NREM sleep. There is, however, no consensus 
about what exactly are the distinctive features according to which 'sleep
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mentation reports' should be classified. Some have despairingly questioned 
whether reports elicited from NREM sleep differ clearly in character from 
tliose of Stage REM sleep in any particular respect otlier tlian the average 
length of narrative.
It is, perhaps, unsurprising that there is little agreem ent about the 
significant differences and similarities among 'sleep mentation reports', given 
that leading theorists like Foulkes (1985) and Hobson (1988) take such 
radically variant views about what an explanation of mental phenomena in 
sleep should look like. (Foulkes, the cognitive psychologist, evidently regards 
Chomsky, Fodor and other m odular Representational Realists as his 
philosophical brethren, whereas Hobson is clearly of a mind-brain with the 
iden tity  theorist or, rather, w ith  elim inative m aterialists like the 
Churchlands.) Dement (1975), once the most active researcher in the field, 
suggested a furtlier source of indecision about the classification of waking 
narratives when he expressed doubts about whetlier to attribute distinctions 
between 'sleep mentation reports' taken from REM and NREM sleep to discrete 
kinds of mental life within sleep or to variations in the ability to remember 
witli uniform clarity and vividness what is in fact a homogeneous mental life 
more or less continuous throughout 'sleep'. More recently, LaBerge (1985) has 
further m uddied the classification issue by attempting to meet head-on tlie 
requirement stipulated by psycho-physiologists like Dement, Rechtstaffen and 
Hobson that kinds of reports be 'validated' by association with physiological 
variables in sleep. The fact that 'lucid dream' reports vary so strikingly from 
typical Stage REM reports presents a serious problem for theorists like Foulkes, 
Rechtstaffen and Hobson who regard dreaming as a form of credulous 
hallucination or of thinking and imagining marked by its lack of reflective 
awareness. According to LaBerge, many established dream researchers take
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common comfort in alternatively denying the existence of lucid dreams, 
attem pting to marginalise their importance, or simply yet ignoring them. 
LaBerge (1986) gives evidence of a sort tliat it is hard, for Hobson at least, to 
ignore, that narratives of lucid dreams are 'objectively valid' reports and are 
associated with Stage REM sleep.
If scientific scrutiny of sleep and dreaming has shown any one thing, it is 
that our pre-scientific concepts tend to disintegrate in tlie face of the amazing 
complexity of phenomena and tlieir inter-relationships which is discovered. 
Given this complexity, it cannot be expected that we come away from Nature 
w ith neat answers to questions initially posed. More likely, we will come 
away asking different questions. Sometimes with an answer, sometimes not. 
But almost certainly we will cease to attach the same importance to the same 
questions as we did when we started out.
This is not automatically bad news for the defender of tlie Received 
Opinion and good news for me. The claim that scientific discoveries not so much 
disprove the Received Opinion as render it obsolete, tells equally against the 
philosophical interest of my claim that familiar facts show the Received 
Opinion to be irredeemably false. The contention that scientific discoveries 
could not justify tlie Received Opinion, needs to be backed up with a plausible 
account of just what scientific discoveries could show. It is open for tlie 
traditional defender of the Received Opinion to revise his thesis and argue as 
follows; Granted that there is no general account of 'telling a dream' as the 
memory of what a person seemed to see and tried to do during sleep; this does 
not entail tliat there are merely odd cases where something is remembered from 
sleep following no regular pattern; there may well be distinctive kinds of cases 
(i.e. kinds of 'sleep' or kinds of 'sleep mentation report') for which it is a 
general truth that our awakening narratives are genuine memories of what we
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thought, im agined, in tended, felt, etc. during  sleep; Sleeptalking, 
Sleepwalking, N ight Terrors and Lucid Dreaming might tu rn  out to be 
distinctive kinds of phenomenon within 'sleep', each associated w ith a 
particular kind of what scientists (having abandoned using 'dream report' as a 
catch-all term) now inelegantly call 'sleep mentation reports'.
I stand by tlie claim of Chapter One that, from what we already know, tlie 
Received Opinion is patently false. But, in tliis cliapter I wish also to examine 
the evidence for and against 'specialised versions' of the Received Opinion, 
concerning Sleeptalking, Sleepwalking, Night Terrors and Lucid Dreaming, In 
cases where a person says or does something during sleep, is there a significant 
correlation between what he says and does during sleep and what he appears to 
remember upon awakening? In cases of Lucid Dreaming, where a person appears 
to remember, not events seen and deeds done, but visual, auditory and tactile 
impressions w hidi he entertained as vivid representations, sometimes subject to 
his will, whilst believing himself to be lying asleep in bed, is there any reason 
to doubt a person's word? And, supposing evidence to be required, is not this 
provided by the association of Lucid Dream reports witli pre-arranged 'signals' 
made during sleep?
3. Where an association between a person’s dispositions to behaviour and what 
he subsequently appears to remember upon awakening is good evidence that he 
remembers something tliat happened, it is also good evidence that he was 
awake at the time it happened.
Hie liypotliesis that someone remembers what he said or did during sleep is a 
curious one. Wlien Flashback claims to remember filling out tlie pools coupon in 
time for the five o'clock post, he wants all the independent evidence tliat he 
can conceivably muster to convince his wife that he conscientiously went
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through the motions, that he paid attention to what he was doing, that, in 
short, he'd filled in the coupon just as she'd told him. But later, in the pub, 
when Flashback boasts to his mates that he'd really filled in the pools coupon 
whilst asleep, his enthusiasm for independent evidence about what he'd done 
and said suddenly takes on a note of caution. For, if tlie independent evidence 
that he remembers is 'too good', it will also show tliat he was not asleep at tlie 
time he filled out the coupon. It is a curious feature of the hypothesis that 
someone remembers what went tlirougli his mind whilst walking, talking or 
'signalling' during sleep, that the evidence that he was aware of what he was 
doing, and hence remembers something, is necessarily pretty thin and tenuous.
Ayer (1974) tells an amusing story which plays upon die close connection 
between evidence for tlie conclusion tliat a person's behaviour is tlie product of 
intentions and beliefs and evidence for the conclusion tliat he is awake:
" . . .  it is related of one of the Dukes of Devonshire tliat he dreamed that 
he was speaking in tlie House of Lords and awoke to find tliat he really was 
speaking in the House of Lords. Even if this story is untrue, it does not appeal- 
to be self-contradictory." [p.239]
The humour of the story, as I understand it, rests upon tlie tacit implication 
that the Duke talked without meaning. He talked without meaning either 
because he was asleep and unaware of liis utterances or (the satirical point) 
because he was a stupid windbag, whose waking speech resembled the 
incoherent ramblings of a sleeptalker. The imaginary picture we are given of 
the Duke is one in which the evidence is indecisive as to whetlier he remembers 
what happened whilst he was asleep or whether he was awake but speaking, 
as it were, on 'automatic pilot', perhaps to delay the passage of a Bill, 
apparently unaware of the words he uttered.
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We can imagine the Duke’s behaviour. (Those who have witnessed the 
member for Perth & Kinross 'in action' won't need to image.) His eyes are 
closed, his head nods, he dribbles. His faltering, rambling monologue is 
irrelevant and incoherent. Suddenly his head jerks, he looks around, 
dumbfounded and confused. A momentary brightness comes to his eyes. "All, 
yes! As I was saying to my honourable friend, the member for Sidcup, in tlie 
eventuality of an infringement of clause four, subsection twelve of the present 
measure ..." And he's off again. The evidence that the Duke was asleep is 
exactly evidence that, even if not asleep, he was yet unaware of what he was 
saying, that his words were uttered without any intentional purpose. Tlie 
evidence that the Duke remembered what he said (i.e. the evidence that his 
subsequent narrative relates to thoughts and intentions which give his previous 
behaviour more coherence than was previously obvious) tends to show tliat he 
was aware of what he said, that his words expressed thoughts and intentions 
going through his mind at the time, that he was not on 'automatic pilot'. But 
this evidence of 'memory' equally tends to show tliat the Duke was not in fact 
asleep when he made his speech, that he was in fact awake.
It is tempting to argue that a person could only be deemed to have beliefs 
and intentions about an hallucinated environment where he showed sufficient 
awareness of his actual environment to be deemed awake or, if not fully awake, 
then at least in some peculiar state distinguishable from normal sleep. A 
person asleep might utter various words and go through various motions as if he 
were engaged with illusory people and objects. But if tliere is sufficient reason 
to suppose that he was unaware of these words and motions, and hence asleep, 
there is insufficient reason to infer from these words and motions that he is 
aware of a train of thoughts, sensations, intentions. What can be said to repel 
the argument that a person's utterances and behaviour reveal his beliefs and
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intentions only where tliey show that he was awake rather tlian asleep? It 
m ight be said that this argum ent rests upon an inadequate behavioural 
definition of sleep; that if we had  physiological evidence that the 
'sleeptalker' or 'sleepwalker' was indeed asleep, it need not bother us that he 
showed an unusual degree of awareness of his environment and behaviour for 
one who is asleep.
Unfortunately, the scientific study of sleep does not give reason to be 
confident that the judgement that a 'sleeptalker' or someone in the grip of a 
'n ight terror' is asleep rather than m om entarily awake. Both these 
phenomena are characterised by a marked interruption of the normal 
physiological patterns within sleep. Hie supposition that the proper criterion 
of sleep should be physiological only exacerbates the problem of establishing 
that the subject was asleep during the episode of talking or terror. In these 
cases, scientists cannot make the judgement that he was asleep independently 
of a psychological interpretation of tlie subject's dispositions to concurrent 
behaviour.
4. Scientists can rely upon a physiological criterion of sleep in cases of 
'sleepwalking*, but it turns out that, in these cases, a person remembers nothing 
he might be supposed, upon the basis of his behaviour and dispositions to 
behaviour, to have perceived, thought, intended, felt, etc. whilst asleep.
Hie problem of inferring mental processes from behaviour of which a person is 
unaware potentially is much more acute for sleepwalking than it is for 
sleeptalking. It is easier to suppose that a sleeptalker is unaware of his 
utterances than it is to suppose that a sleepwalker is unaware of chairs 
negotiated, doors opened, etc. But it turns out that, in the typical case of 
sleepwalking, in contrast to the typical case of sleeptalking, criteria of
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dispositions to concurrent behaviour may be relaxed because here one may place 
greater reliance upon (i) physiological criteria and (ii) criteria of subsequent 
amnesia for what happened.
It turns out that sleepwalking and sleeptalking are, in the view of 
scientists, distinct natural phenomena. Dement (1972) regards sleepwalking, 
like night terrors and bedwetting, as an unusual 'sleep disorder' common only 
among young children. Like these other 'disorders'. Dement comments, 
sleepwalking has a more appreciable clinical effect on the parents than the 
children themselves. It would seem to be tlie case that elaborate bodily 
behaviour, unlike typical bursts of speech within a period of sleep, occurs 
witliout major interruption of the usual electrographic criteria of sleep. Most 
cases of sleepwalking and 'night terrors' to have been recorded in the 
laboratories have taken place within the NREM sleep w hen the EEC 
measurement is least akin to that of waking brain activity. This gives us reason 
for more confident interpretation of a sleepwalker's behaviour as exliibiting 
thoughts and intentions directed towards his environment and sometimes 
towards illusory objects within it, without calling into question the supposition 
that he was asleep.
However, laboratory observations suggest that the behaviour typical of 
sleepwalking episodes invites no very rich interpretation of it as purposeful 
action:
"During the sleepwalking episodes, as tlie subjects walked about tlie 
laboratory, they appeared to be aware but indifferent to üieir environment. Tlieii* 
eyes were open and tlieir expressions were blank, creating an appeaiaiice of being 
dazed. Less often, a fearful expression was seen. Their movements were 
somewhat rigid, not uncommonly repetitive, and appeared to be puiposeless sucli 
as rubbing a blanket or a door. If spoken to during the incidents, tlie subjects
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answered monosyllabically, as if annoyed dr preoccupied. At no time did tlie 
sleepwalkers initiate contact or conversation with tlie personnel ..." [Kales & 
Jacobsen (1967) p.87].
It also turns out to be a distinctive characteristic of the phenomenon of 
sleepwalking, according to clinical and laboratory studies, that the 
sleepwalker, upon subsequent awakening shows no significant signs of 
remembering any of tlie things he did whilst asleep nor anything coherent with 
the tlioughts and intentions which might plausibly be inferred to explain what 
he did:
"Not only do the subjects fail to remember tlie acts perfoimed during tliese 
nocturnal incidents, but tliey are completely unaware of having had tlie incidents 
... This amnesetic characteristic was consistent in all our experimental 
observations; tliere was complete amnesia for all tlie incidents when tlie subjects 
were awakened in tlie morning, and they did not remember the events of tlie walk 
if tliey awakened or were awakened duinig a sleepwalking episode" [ibid. p.87]. 
Kales & Jacobsen (1967) concluded tiiat,
"It is difficult to assess tlie level of mental activity dming sleepwalking 
because of tlie total lack of recall. Observation of the somnambulist suggests 
tliat he is internally preoccupied and tliat there is a lack of interaction witli tlie 
external environment..." [p.91]
Kales & Jacobsen further suggested tliat tlie failure of researchers to elicit as 
many or as vivid 'dream reports' from NREM sleep as from REM sleep may 
reflect an impairment of memory associated with NREM sleep. Hiis assumes 
that what is 'going on' in the mind of the sleeperwalker is akin to what is 
remembered when we tell dreams. But, in tlie absence of further details about 
what the 'internal preoccupations' of tlie sleeperwalker are supposed to consist
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in, and why they are not remembered, no jury could deliver a verdict on the 
merits of this assumption.
Sleepwalking is a distinctive enough phenomenon to be distinguished by 
scientists from 'normal' sleep. If sleepwalking is a 'psychological' phenomenon 
within sleep, then it is an abnormality or disorder. Conclusions about cases of 
sleepwalking, even if favourable to the hypothesis that we sometimes 
remember what happened during sleep, could not be generalised in support of 
the Received Opinion. Tliis is just as well for die would-be defender of the 
Received Opinion. The fact that nothing is remembered of sleepwalking, 
quickly puts paid to the hypothesis tliat, at least in the 'special case' of 
sleepwalking, to 'tell a dream' is to genuinely remember sometiiing of what 
happened diuing sleep. If we were to hazard a generalisation from the special 
case of sleepwalking, our conclusion would be that we don't remember what 
happens during sleep, even where we were, in some sense, aware of it.
S. In the absence of an applicable physiological criterion of 'sleep', Arkin 
defines 'sleeptalking' as an utterance 'without simultaneous awareness', as 
established by evidence of an absence of dispositions to concurrent behaviour in 
response to environmental stimulus; he does not suppose that evidence of 
associations between nocturnal utterances and waking impressions might show 
that a person was, after all, aware of thoughts intentionally or unintentionally 
expressed by his utterances
It would be wrong to suppose that scientists can rely upon a physiological 
definition of sleep in cases where a person's utterances would otlierwise suggest 
that he was conscious. Hie question about whether sleeptalking should be 
regarded as a reaction to a momentary physiological arousal ratlier tlian as a 
reaction to on going thoughts and concerns of the mind in sleep, is taken
116
Scientific Studies: ‘Actions’ During Sleep
seriously by researchers. Arldn (1979) discusses the problem of defining sleep in 
relation to sleeptalking. The problem arises because the electrographic 
characteristics of most speech utterances indicate a disturbance or 'movement 
arousal' within the physiological pattern of sleep. Thus, for example, one 
study concluded that utterances associated w ith NREM sleep "are not 
exteriorized symptoms of true oneric activity" and may stem from "simple 
perceptual confusion during abrupt awakening" [p.519]. Other researchers have 
argued for the priority of the psychological interpretation of behaviour (e.g. 
the character of the speech episode) over the concomitant electrographic 
m easurem ents. Arkin accepts the view that a subject may rem ain 
'psychologically ' asleep through the m om entary blip  in the EEC 
characteristics of sleep. The 'psychological' criteria Arkin mentions are pretty 
rough and ready. They are, firstly, a lack of 'simultaneous critical awareness' 
of events happening around him and, secondly, a disposition to exhibit 
behaviour characteristic of someone 'waking up' in response to, let's say, an 
alarm clock.
Arkin (1979) offered a definition of sleeptalking as "the utterance of speech 
or other psychologically meaningful sound in association with sleep, without 
simultaneous awareness of the event" [p.513, em phasis added]. By 
"psychologically meaningful" I understand him to mean that the utterance 
invites an explanation as the product of inferred cognitive processes. He does 
not suppose Üiat tlie person need be aware of these processes any more than he 
is aware of the words he utters. Arkin's point is not that these processes may 
occur 'unconsciously' or 'in tlie unconscious' as if hidden in darkness from Üie 
'inner eye' but that, strictly speaking, they are not the person's tlioughts at all. 
The processing in question is allocated to a variety of cognitive sub-systems 
"which may operate outside of awareness" [p.531].
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When Arkin says that a person may be 'unaware' of the internal processes 
which explain his utterances during sleep and apparent memories upon 
awakening, he means that these processes may operate to produce dispositions 
to concurrent and subsequent psychological expressions of disassociated or 
discordant content, and sometimes to produce dispositions to concurrent 
utterances lacking any marked degree of 'linguistic organisation'. Similarly, 
when Arkin claims that a person is sometimes 'aware' of the operation of tlie 
internal processes producing his utterances in sleep and subsequent apparent 
memories upon awakening, Arkin meEins only that these internal processes may 
sometimes produce utterances having a certain degree of 'linguistic 
organisation' and a certain degree of association with what he subsequently 
appears to remember. Arkin's claim should not be taken to mean Üiat, despite 
tiie evidence that the speaker was asleep (i.e. that he was 'simultaneously 
unaware of the event*), he might really be aware of thoughts, intentions, 
feelings, etc. intentionally or unintentionally expressed by his utterances.
Let me elaborate the point of the preceding paragraph. A superficial 
reading gives tiie impression that Arkin supposed tiiat a person is sometimes 
aware of the cognitive processes which explain the 'linguistic organisation' of 
his utterances. This suggests, doubtfully, tiiat we can reason both that a person 
was not aware of sleeptalking (i.e. of utterances "without simultaneous 
awareness of the event") and that he was aware of tiie tlioughts and intentions 
tiiat are normally expressed by such words. The only escape from this, it would 
seem, is to allow that the evidence of a person's 'memory' shows that he was, 
after all, aware of the event, under some description. This 'escape' would, 
however, land Arkin back with the problem with wliich he started of giving a 
definition of 'sleep' which will embrace the episodes of psychologically
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m eaningful utterances w hich in te rrup t its norm al behavioural and 
physiological patterns.
A closer examination of what Arkin means by 'awareness' reveals that, 
when he infers 'awareness' from either the linguistic organisation of an 
utterance or its association with subsequent past tense narratives, he does not 
mean to imply that the person was, despite his lack of dispositions to 
concurrent behaviour, aware of anytliing. Arkin is not talking, except perhaps 
metaphorically, about w hat a person thought, imagined, felt, intended, etc. 
during sleep. He is talking about the 'access relationships' postulated to hold 
between various information-processing units operating within him, in virtue of 
which these sub-systems may variously, sometimes concordantly sometimes 
discordantly, produce concurrent present tense or subsequent past tense 
utterances. Arkin's statement that "speech emissions may occur in the absence 
of awareness" should be understood to mean that internal processes may 
sometimes operate independently of each oüier giving rise to dispositions to 
concurrent utterances and subsequent apparent memories which are of 
unassociated or discordant content.
It follows that, when Arkin talks of speech emissions occurring in the 
presence of 'awareness' during sleep, he means only that the distinct internal 
processes postulated by his tlieory produce concordant results. He does not mean 
tliat, where there is concordance, suddenly the 'inner light' is switched on 
where all before was darkness. Arkin does not mean that, whereas a person is 
ignorant of the distinct internal processes which explain the production of 
dispositions to concurrent and retrospective psychological expressions in tlie 
case that they produce discordant results, that person is yet party to the joint 
operations of tiiese processes in cases where they produce concordant utterances.
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6. Even supposing that an association between a person's utterances in sleep and 
his dream narratives upon subsequent awakening would establish that he 
remembered thoughts, images, sensations, intentions, feelings and so on from 
sleep, the empirical evidence does not confirm the Received Opinion in  the 
special case of sleeptalking.
Although questioning and prodding is remarkably ineffective in producing 
speech showing that a person is aware of something whilst asleep, it turns out 
that episodes of sleeptalking are much more frequent than is ordinarily 
supposed. One way or anotlier, tliere is more evidence about the association or 
disassociation between waking narratives and talking in sleep than is 
commonly appreciated. Perhaps this should not be surprising since few of us 
spend our nights awake and listening out for the grumblings of others. This 
marks sleeptalking out as a more widespread and normal phenomenon within 
sleep than sleepwalking, night terrors, and lucid dreaming. H iat said, 
however, it would appear that Arkin's (1979) efforts to induce and contiol the 
incidence of sleeptalking, have proved to be a very disappointing, especially in 
contrast with the successful applications of methods for learning to lucid dream 
reported by Garfield (1975) and La Berge (1985).
The discovery that sleeptalking is a w idespread and not unusual 
phenomenon is not, in itself, a point in favour of the hypothesis that, in at least 
some kinds of cases, our awakening narratives are memories of what happened 
during sleep. Whether the Received Opinion is justified, even in the special 
case of sleeptalking, depends upon whether we can identify what is expressed 
during sleep with what appears to be remembered upon awakening. Our present 
concern is not to establish whether there are sometimes associations between 
sleeptalking and awakening impression that might, considered in isolation, be 
interpreted as cases of remembering. Our concern is twofold. Firstly, is it
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generally true that tliere are associations between sleeptalking and waking 
narrative tliat could bear such an interpretation? Secondly, even if tliere were 
many such associations, would the fact that there are also a significant number 
of disassociations between sleeptalking and awakening narratives, provide a 
good theoretical reason for resisting an interpretation of tlie associations as 
memories of mental activity during sleep?
As already noted, the physiological peculiarity of sleeptalking episodes, 
in addition to their obvious behavioural peculiarity, gives scientists a reason to 
distinguish the phenomenon of sleeptalking from tlie 'normal' course of sleep. 
Thoughts, images, intentions, feelings, etc. inferred from episodes of 
sleeptalking are not well categorised as 'dreams', where 'dreaming' is supposed 
to be, to borrow Dement's (1967) phrase, "the characteristic mental activity of 
the organism during sleep". A further reason scientists find to distinguish the 
phenom ena comes from  the laboratory observation tha t (adm itting 
considerable individual variation on this point) episodes of sleeptalking 
generally do not interrupt tliose physiologically distinctive periods of sleep. 
Stage REM, which scientists have attempted to associate wiüi fuller more 
vivid awakening narratives or 'dream reports'. Comparing the results of nine 
relevant studies, Arkin (1979) concluded that most sleeptalking occurs in 
association with NREM sleep.
What is tlie degree of concordance between a person's utterances during 
sleep and the content of his apparent memory, if any, if immediately awoken? 
In a series of experiments addressing this question, Arkin and his colleagues 
adopted a five-level scale of association, ranging from one or more common 
phrase, to some similarity of subject matter, to 'talking' or 'saying' or 'asking', 
to no discernible concord and, finally, to no apparent memory of anything. The 
results varied according to the physiological stage of sleep. Concordance was
121
Scientific Studies: 'Actions' During Sleep
greater for REM sleep than for NREM sleep. Taking all three degrees of 
concordance together, the total result gave about 43% concordance.
Do these results support the Received Opinion about tlie special case of 
sleeptalking? I can see that someone might want to say that even this degree of 
concordance needs some explanation, and that is provided by the memory 
hypothesis. But, equally, the 57% complete absence of any discernible 
similarity between sleep talking and awakening narratives demands an 
explanation too, and the m emory hypothesis leaves this completely 
mysterious. The issue should not be viewed as if there were two rival 
explanations squabbling over just how much or how little concordance is to coimt 
between them. The conclusion that the Received Opinion is a bad tlieory may 
be defended by pointing out that scientists, faced w ith the complexity of 
empirical evidence, are forced to distinguish phenom ena and employ 
explanatory models which render tlie Received Opinion obsolete. I submit tliat 
this is the conclusion to be drawn from tlie Arkin's proposed "conceptual scheme 
for the formulation of sleep utterance and related phenomena".
7. Arkin attributes mental processes in sleep, not to the person who sleeps and 
awakes to tell a dream, but to distinct sub-agents operating w ithin him, in  
order to account for the significant discordance between utterances during sleep 
and subsequent dream narratives.
Arkin advances a Disassociationist Theory of Sleep Mentation. "Its basic 
assumption is that unity in personal cognition is precarious and unstable" 
[p.531]. The postulation of "a hierarchy of cognitive subsystems themselves 
mutually autonomous and concurrently interactive to varying degrees" [p.531] is 
intended to provide a framework for explaining the varying degrees of
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association and disassociation between 'verbal emission' and 'sleep mentation 
report'.
Arldn accepts both the inference from an utterance exhibiting a degree of 
'linguistic organisation' to awareness of cognitive processes in sleep and the 
inference from 'memory' to awareness of cognitive processes. In cases of 
disassociation between utterance and apparent memory he infers that two 
disassociated cognitive processes operating simultaneously have distinct access 
routes to the Overt Utterance System via the editorsliip of the Executive Ego. 
In cases of association he infers that tlie Executive Ego has access to the results 
of a single information-processing sub-system both during sleep and on 
awakening. 'Awareness', as Arkin uses the term here, is a question of 
computational access between the hypothetical Executive Ego (roughly 
equivalent to Control in Dennett's (1978) model of consciousness) and otlier 
functionaries within the cognitive hierarchy. The function of the Ego is to 
retrieve and edit, subject to constraints of self-image, tlie output of distinct but 
variously inter-active sub-systems.
The price of identifying the Sleeptalker witli the Executive Ego would be 
to say that he is sometimes simultaneously aware of two entirely disassociated 
streams of thought. This would amount to a very major upset in our ordinary 
notion of awareness. (Try thinking 'Blue cheese is best' and 'Bacon is better’ at 
the very same time!) Hiis is not obviously a price worth paying in order to 
m aintain the conclusion that, in cases of association, the Sleeptalker 
remembers upon awakening what he was aware of during sleep. The clearer 
course is to maintain the distinction between the Sleeptalker and the sub­
agents which are postulated to explain tlie production of his behaviour. On 
this interpretation of Arkin's conceptual scheme for the articulation of theories 
about sleep mentation, neither the inferences from utterance in sleep to
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awareness nor from apparent memory on awakening to awareness during sleep 
take the Sleeper as subject. He is not aware of the thoughts uttered. He does 
not remember the thoughts apparently remembered.
8. Within Arkin’s theoretical framework, the hypothesis that the sleeptalker 
subsequently ’remembers’ cognitive processes which explain the production of 
utterances of which he was 'simultaneously unaware' may be understood 
metaphorically to imply an analogy between (a) the internal processes which 
produce an association or concordance between his nan-conscious utterance during 
sleep and subsequent merely apparent memory upon awakening and (b) the 
internal processes which normally explain explain cases in which a person 
genuinely remembers his past intentionally expressed soliloquies.
Although many utterances in sleep are monosyllabic or incoherent, others 
exhibit varying degrees of w hat Arkin (1979) calls 'linguistic organisation'. 
'Linguistic organisation' refers, in effect, to those aspects of the person's speech 
which would, considered in isolation, lead us to judge tliat die speaker was 
awake, lucid and aware of what he was saying. Sleeptalking not uncommonly 
exhibits such 'linguistic organisation' when it resembles a soliloquy expressing 
intentionally or accidentally a person's on going stream of thoughts or when it 
resembles one side of a telephone conversation, as if the sleeper were 
responding to an imaginary interlocutor.
In the normal case, a person whose speech exhibits a high degree of 
linguistic organisation is someone variously aware of his own behaviour and 
the events happening around him. It would normally be reasonable to infer 
from a person's words alone that he had certain beliefs and intentions which he 
expressed, or whicli motivated his utterance, or whicli caused his unintentional 
verbal emissions. But our habits of reasoning, established and reinforced in
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everyday circumstances can lead us into error where we neglect to notice that 
relevant background facts tacitly presupposed in  the normal context are 
missing. It may be natural for us to infer from a person's words that he was 
under the impression that he was holding a conversation, that he thought this 
or intended that. But in the case that a person was asleep what it is natural to 
say may not be reasonable. The 'justification' of our saying that a sleeptalker is 
aware of such-and-such may rest upon nothing more than Üie fact that it would 
he reasonable to say that he was aware of such-and-such if he were to utter 
these words in normal circumstances, in which circumstances we would judge 
him to be awake.
Mr. McGoo holds a slipper to his ear. He is under the mistaken impression 
that he is conversing on the telephone. There is no phone and no conversation. 
But even McGoo, barring the odd Freudian slip, is aware of the words he utters. 
It is only on tliis assumption that the fact that McGoo's words have a similar 
appearance of one side of a telephone conversation supports tlie inference that 
McGoo is under the mistaken impression that he is talking to someone. Even 
where an utterance exhibits a high degree of 'linguistic organisation', if the 
speaker's contemporary unresponsiveness and his subsequent lack of 'memory' 
show that he was unaware of the words he utters, even under a false 
description such as 'words spoken on tlie telephone', then there is no reason to 
suppose that he was yet aware of a stream of thoughts accidentally expressed 
or indicated by his non-conscious utterance. To say, solely on the grounds of 
what happens during sleep, that a sleeptalker expressed beliefs and intentions 
is merely to judge that the utterance has a degree of 'linguistic organisation' 
which if we did not know that he was asleep would lead us to infer that he was 
expressing those beliefs and intentions. The fact remains that, from what we
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know of the sleeptalker's dispositions to concurrent behaviour alone, and 
notwithstanding his physiological arousal, he is unaware of anytliing.
A person need not always be aware of the words he utters for us to infer tliat 
he has certain tlioughts and intentions. It is perfectly possible that a person 
rnay accidentally give voice to his tlioughts or vent his emotions without being 
in the least aware that he has done so. What support can be given by a person's 
'memory' that he was aware of a stream of thoughts without thereby showing 
that he was aware of his overt utterance? Arkin suggests that an 'association' 
or 'concordance' between a person's non-conscious utterances and the manifest 
content of his waking 'memory' is reason to say that the person was 'aware' of 
beliefs and intentions accidentally expressed. Normally, such an association 
would be good reason to suppose that the person was aware of his utterance, 
even though he may have forgotten that he spoke his tlioughts out loud.
As I understand him, Arkin does not mean to imply that associations 
between waking report and nocturnal utterances show that the sleeptalker was, 
despite his lack of dispositions to concurrent behaviour, aware of his 
utterances. To imply this would be to re-discover Arkin's original problem 
about categorising sleeptalking as a phenomenon within sleep rather than as a 
momentary arousal. However, the implication cannot very easily be blocked 
off. For it is difficult to see what reason we have to suppose that, where an 
association between nocturnal utterance and waking 'memory' does not show 
that he remembers his utterance under some description, it nonetheless shows 
that he remembers something else, namely, his 'inner thoughts'. Perhaps it 
could be argued that the evidence of memory shows that tlie sleeptalker was, 
after all, aware of his words; but that he was aware of them only under a false 
description (e.g. "words spoken to someone on the telephone") and not aware of 
them as words spoken at the time he was, in fact, asleep. I'm not sure about
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this. So I'm prepared to give the benefit of doubt to tlie supposition that 
associations between sleeptalking and waking impression could show tliat a 
person remembers thoughts non-intentionally expressed without compromising 
the assumption that he was asleep. The point I wish to argue is that Arkin is 
not concerned to establish this inference, that his scientific concern is not to 
establish whether, in cases where there is an association between sleeptalking 
and waking report, the Received Opinion is true.
Arkin's claim that, in cases of an association between nocturnal utterance 
and waking report, tlie sleeptalker 'remembers' thoughts and intentions from 
sleep may be taken metaphorically to mean merely that the subject would have 
remembered thoughts and intentions in other circumstances, circumstances in 
which he remembers his overt utterance under a description locating them 
during sleep and was, in further respects, aware of his environment and 
behaviour. Arkin's scientific concerns are with internal processes and their 
interactions which explain the presence or absence of such associations. His 
hypothesis that thought and intentions are 'rem em bered' is, strictly 
speaking,the hypothesis that there is an analogy betw een the internal 
processes explaining the association between sleeptalking and subsequent 
impressions and the internal processes explaining paradigm  cases of 
remembering thoughts and intentions previously expressed. It is not essential to 
Arkin's hypothesis that anything be genuinely remembered. Arkin's scientific 
hypothesis could be true or false independently of the trutli or falsity of tlie 
hypothesis that, at least in cases of associations between sleeptalking and 
waking narratives, the Received Opinion is true.
The scientific hypothesis that the sleeptalker subsequently 'remembers' 
may be understood to imply that tiie 'association' between non-conscious 
utterance and apparent memory on awakening is to be non-accidentally
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explained in terms of physiological processes similar to those which explain 
cases in which a person genuinely remembers his past soliloquies. There is some 
point in expressing this scientific hypothesis about the causes of our apparent 
memories in terms of 'memory' in order to distinguish it from the rival 
hypothesis that the apparent memories are 'confabulations'. But it is 
important to see that the dispute behind these rival scientific hypotheses is 
not a dispute about whetlier or not the sleeptalker's memories are genuine. 
They are not. The scientific dispute is about alternative explanations of 
apparent memories, whether or not anytliing is genuinely remembered.
W hat is distinctive about the hypothesis of unwitting 'confabulation', 
within Arkin's theoretical framework, is that it explains a person's apparent 
memories in terms of their function in maintaining a person's conception of 
himself. The 'confabulation' hypothesis postulates an internal mechanism, 
conveniently characterised in anthropological terms, which functions to 
achieve this end, and which may sometimes 'over-ride' the processes which 
normally function to ensure reliable memories about w hat previously 
happened. (One may suppose that, for most of us, most of the time, genuine 
memories, suitably edited, are consistent w ith the requirements of self­
conception but that, sometimes, perhaps often in tlie case of recently awoken 
subjects, editing slides into invention.) The scientific hypothesis of 
'confabulation' does not im ply that the person did som ething 'in his 
unconsciousness', as if it were behind his own back. Eitlier of tlie rival scientific 
explanations, 'remembering' or 'confabulation', may be true witliout it being the 
case that the sleeptalker does anything other than appear to remember 
thoughts and intentions that appeared to have been previously expressed 
witliout simultaneous awareness of the event.
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9. The fact that the phenomena of ’sleeptalking' and waking 'memories' are 
not easily explained as the products of a coherent mental life, does not imply 
that a person's mental life during sleep is of a very strange kind; it shows that 
the explanation of his strange behaviour should be given in terms of non- 
conscious internal mechanisms operative within him rather than in terms of a 
supposed mental life during sleep.
When Ben Gunn grumbles and mutters about cheeses, let us suppose tiiat he has 
cheeses on his mind, notwithstanding that he is unaware of events going on 
around him or even of the fact that he is talking to himself. A silent train of 
thoughts may cause a person to emit unconscious utterances as if he were 
expressing or commenting upon his thoughts. Even so, by offering Ben a little 
piece of Stilton, we should expect him to tell us that that was on his mind. For 
a person who has recently been thinking certain thoughts is usually able to tell 
us w hat these thoughts were about, at least if suitably motivated and 
prompted. And if he cannot remember these things, or appears to remember 
quite another subject matter, some further or alternative explanation is 
required.
Sometimes experimental expectations are realised. Suppose, in the first 
case, that Ben Gunn, aroused by our little piece of Stilton, tells us that it had 
just crossed his mind that British blue cheese is the best blue cheese. He 
expresses surprise tliat we should have 'guessed' his thoughts, for he has no 
memory of having uttered the words we recently heard. In these circumstances, 
we would conclude that Ben's previous utterances were the expression of 
thoughts about cheeses which he now remembers. (Let us suppose tliat we can 
reconcile Ben's remembering something w ith the supposition tliat he was 
'unconscious' by inferring that he remembers his thoughtful expression only 
under a false description, 'silent soliloquy' or 'words screamed wliilst rimning
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from the mad Cheese Eater of Nod'.) Alternative explanations of tlie apparent 
association could be tested. For example, the hypothesis that Ben is highly 
suggestible and unwittingly confabulated his 'memory' about Stilton is invited 
by our hastily designed experimental technique of offering him a little bit 
cheese. But in the absence of further evidence alternatives to tlie hypothesis 
tliat Ben remembers his thoughts about cheese have little recommendation. So 
far, so good. On the assum ption that Ben's 'automatic' utterances and 
subsequent impression are regularly associated in this manner, we may safely 
infer that Ben remembers thoughts he expressed without being aware tliat he 
was expressing them.
Experimental expectations are sometimes dashed. Suppose, in a second 
case, Ben Gunn sincerely professes to remember nothing of cheese. We know that 
he does not readily forget his recent doings. And our little piece of Stilton was 
as good a prompt as we can imagine. The behaviour of Gunn is admittedly 
strange. It defies a satisfactory interpretation in terms of his beliefs and 
intentions. In some respects it is as if Ben's utterances were tlie expression of 
beliefs and intentions, in other respects not.
Should we insist that the psychological facts about Ben's thoughts are 
hidden from view and await to be discovered? I think not. The illusion that 
there are 'deep' psychological facts behind Ben's strange behaviour stems from 
the perfectly legitimate desire to discover the inner causes of his behaviour 
and from tlie fact that we inevitably formulate our general questions about the 
physiological production of behaviour in psychological terms. We want to 
know, for example, whether tlie processes which explain Ben's psychologically 
incoherent behaviour are more like the processes which explain the behaviour 
of someone who forgets what he intentionally said or more like the processes 
which explain the production of utterances exhibiting no degree of linguistic
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organisation (i.e. incoherent and disjointed babble). We express this question by 
asking, "Do Ben's utterances as if of cheese non-consciously express thoughts 
about cheese which he has forgotten or are they meaningless products of a 
tem porary autom atism ? ". Presum ably, if we knew more about the 
physiological story - if we knew more about brains and the effects on brams of 
years of solitude and too much fermented coconut milk - we would find more 
precise questions to put to Mother Nature. And then it would not bother or 
surprise us if the evidence gave no decisive answer to our original question.
Ben's behaviour is psychologically unexplained. There are hidden facts to 
be discovered which will explain his behaviour. But these hidden facts will 
give a physiological not a psychological explanation. The terms in which tliat 
explanation will be forthcoming are likely to be very different from tlie terms 
in which we ordinary South Sea voyagers presently voice our puzzlement about 
the strange behaviour of Ben Gunn. The psychological question about whether 
or not Ben really thought about cheeses has its answer. The facts are in view. 
The answer is no. This <mswer leaves us puzzled. But neither that, nor our 
unwillingness to admit that Ben Gunn, in the grip of one of liis automatic 
seizures, is less than 'one of us', should mislead us into supposing that the 
psycliological question is open to be addressed by the brain sciences.
Experimental expectations are sometimes dashed in the most surprising 
ways. Suppose, in a third case, that Ben Gunn shows no interest in our little 
piece of Stilton but speaks earnestly of bacon. Again, we have reason to doubt 
that his utterance as if of thoughts about cheeses is a non-conscious verbal 
reaction to thoughts about cheeses which he has forgotten. But now we have a 
further puzzle, in addition to tlie explanation of his recent talk of cheeses. 
W hat is to explain Gun's present talk of hams? The evidence of his recent 
behaviour points very clearly to the conclusion that he merely appears to
131
Scientific Studies: 'Actions' During Sleep
remember thoughts about bacon. We hypothesize that Ben confabulated some 
story about bacon. But why on earth should Ben confabulate a story about 
hams? We might say that this is "an autonomic updating of the subject's self­
conception resulting from the sudden re-engagement of his perceptual and 
kinesthetic processing systems". But, admittedly, this is not so much an 
explanation as a manner of saying what we already know, namely, that Ben 
was temporally unaware of his surroundings and behaviour and that he 
subsequently appeared to remember having thoughts which he did not have.
Our new puzzle about Ben Gunn is tliis: on the one hand it is as if Ben 
thought about cheeses except that he unaccountably forgot and, on the otlier, it 
is as if Ben remembers thinking about hams, except Üiat he didn't tiiink about 
hams. In some respects it is as if Ben expressed thoughts about cheeses and in 
some respects it is as if he remembered thoughts about hams. We have our 
answer to tiie question whether Ben non-consciously expressed cheese-tlioughts 
or whether he remembered bacon-thoughts. Ben did neither of these tilings. 
Still the puzzlmg phenomena calls out for an explanation.
10, The conclusion that 'sleeptalking’ and 'telling a dream' cannot be explained 
as the product of a coherent mental life, is consistent with the use of intentional 
terms to characterise hypotheses about the physiological mechanisms which 
produce these behaviours.
I have proposed that the explanation of Ben's non-conscious utterances and 
apparent memories should be sought in discovery of physiological processes 
which produce this behaviour rather than in discovery of 'hidden facts' about 
Ben's mental life. How is this overtly Rylean position to be reconciled with 
tiie activities of cognitive psychologists like Arkin who formulate hypotiieses 
about the internal mechanisms governing behaviour and characterise these
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mechanisms in unashamedly intentional terms? Two conciliatory approaches 
come to mind. The first proposes that the use of intentional characterisations of 
neurobiological types is entirely metaphorical. The second approach to 
reconciliation sees no clear distinction between the literal' use of intentional 
terms in everyday rationalisations of human action and the 'metaphorical' use 
of intentional terms in the biological sciences. Instead, it proposes tliat the 
subject of the intentional characterisations of neurobiological types is not the 
subject whose behaviour is explained by the interactions of those types witliin 
him .
Robert Louis Stevenson (1925) drew an analogy between his creative talent 
for story telling and the rem arkable creative talent, sometimes more 
impressive than his own, evident in the production of his dreams. He 
attributed the creativity of his dreams to the work of 'little people' working 
through the night beyond his consciousness or will. The legitimacy of such 
humuncular explanations in cognitive science has been defended by Demiett 
(1975). According to Dennett, a clear distinction between personal and sub­
personal levels of intentional explanation is crucial to tlie justification of the 
use of mental terms in constructing hypotheses about the brain processes which 
produce behaviour. I am not entirely persuaded by Dennett that the 
characterisation of inner mechanism in psychological terms should be regarded 
as anything other than a m etaphor expressing the hypothesis that the 
physiological process is of a kind frequently associated w ith the nominal 
psychological phenomenon. However, I am persuaded tliat Dennett is correct to 
insist tliat, where inner processes are diaracterised in mental terms, tlie subject 
of tliese cognitive hypotheses should be distinguished from tlie personal subject 
of psychology.
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Let us suppose that we have observed at lengtli Ben Giuin's periodic states 
of perceptual detachment associated with non-conscious utterances of varying 
degrees of linguistic organisation, and have repeatedly aroused and questioned 
Ben about his recent tlioughts. Among those occasions when Ben's utterances 
exhibit a fair degree of linguistic organisation we find that (i) sometimes there 
is an association between Ben's non-conscious utterances and his apparent 
memories, (ii) sometimes Ben appears to remember nothing, and (iii) 
sometimes, fairly often in fact, Ben's lengthy non-conscious utterances are 
succeeded by an equally full apparent memory bearing not the faintest 
resemblance in its manifest content.
In this third case, it is as if someone had thoughts about cheese and 
someone else had thoughts about bacon, and neitlier of tliem was Ben. The 
Cheese Hiinker simultaneously passed his thoughts on to the Publishing 
Department but failed to get a copy of liis thoughts lodged with the Libraricin. 
The Ham Thinker was refused immediate publication but stored a copy with 
the Librarian who supplied it to tlie Editor for publication at a later date. We 
have a story which attempts to explains how Ben's behaviour was brought 
about by an organisation of sub-agents within his body. But tliat story does not 
tell us that Ben intended or was aware of any of tlie internal events which 
produced his behaviour. Indeed, while part of tlie story attempts to explains 
how these sub-agents brought about Ben's doing something (his intentional 
attempt to relate what he recently thought) anotlier part of it attempts to 
explain behaviour (his non-conscious utterance) of which Ben was not even 
aware.
We could extend our story to cover cases of type (ii) when Ben appears to 
remember nothing by supposing that nothing got lodged in the Library and to 
cover cases of type (i) when there is an association between Ben's non-conscious
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utterances and his apparent memories by supposing that the Cheese Thinker 
both publishes and lodges a copy in the Library. Rival stories might also be 
told. For example, that the Bacon Thinker didn't work at the same time as tlie 
Cheese Thinker but tlie Editor mistook his recent output for a library copy. But 
however attractive or illuminating we find any of these heady tales they 
should not mislead us into thinking that Ben intentionally expressed thoughts 
about cheeses or that he genuinely remembers thoughts about bacon or tlioughts 
about cheese.
'Ben thought about cheeses', however 'natural' a manner of speaking, 
should be taken harmlessly to imply only tliat Ben Gunn non-consciously uttered 
certain words tliat in some other circumstances would have been explained by 
his having cheeses on his mind. Similarly, 'Ben remembered cheeses' or 'Ben 
remembered hams' should be understood to imply only tliat in some other 
circumstances Ben's apparent memories would have been explained by his 
having thought about cheeses or hams and not forgotten w hat he thought. 
These behavioural similarities, independent of the environm ental and 
behavioural context which would determine tlieir psychological content, very 
obviously invite an explanation in terms of common internal processes. The 
ultimate concern of scientists like Arkin is to construct and test hypotiieses 
about similarities and distinctions among the internal processes governing 
behaviour.
11. The phenomenon of Night Terrors has an entirely distinctive physiology 
witliin sleep, and scientist have so far been unable to establish whether the 
episode follows upon mental anxieties initiated within the preceding period of 
physiologically 'normal' sleep.
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Research has not established any characteristic behavioural or physiological 
correlates of ordinary anxiety dreams or nightmares. There is, however, a quite 
extraordinary behavioural and physiological sleep disorder, seen mainly 
among young children, which has captured tlie interest of scientists. Night 
Terrors are distinguished from the more familiar Stage REM anxiety dream in 
that they occur only exceptionally outwiih Stage 3 and Stage 4 sleep and are 
evident in an arousal interrupting the normal behavioural and physiological 
character of NREM sleep:
"The severe Stage 4 night tenor consists of perhaps tlie greatest heart rate 
acceleration possible in man (in a typical severe ar ousal heart rate accelerated 
from 64 to 152 bpm within 15 to 30 sec) witli screams of enormous intensity, 
cursing, motility, increases in respiratory rate and especially amplitude, and a 
sharp increase in skin conductance..." [Kalin, Fisher & Edwards (1979)]
Given the magnitude of the interruption of sleep it is perhaps surprising tliat 
subjects of a night terrors readily return to sleep very soon afterwards. 
Broughton & Gastaut (1965) reported little response among subjects to 
laboratory questioning immediately following the terror. They argued that 
because of this amnesia it is impossible to establish that the disturbing 
thoughts within NREM sleep produce the arousal response, and speculated 
that such 'memories' as may be elicited are merely rationalisations caused by 
physiological changes occurring during arousal. Hiis speculation might be 
supposed to be supported by the fact tliat tliere is no known physiological 
feature which heralds the onset of these attacks. But, equally, tlie fact that 
there appears to be no purely physiological explanation of the occurrence of 
night-terrors tells against the speculation that tliere is no psychological cause. 
For we must have our explanation one way or another. In order to avoid this 
vacuum  of explanation, Kahn, Fisher and Edward (1979) attem pted to
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distinguish between 'pre-arousal' and 'post-arousal' mental content, arguing 
that some of the reported content may be genuine memory of tlioughts leading to 
the awakening terror.
In an editorial comment, Arkin posed tlie problem:
"The question is: which comes fust? Does ongoing mentation play a role 
in triggering the night-teiTor arousal episode? Or does tiie latter emerge from a 
'physiological vacuum' following which emergence the intense automatic arousal 
becomes tlie primary instigator of the concomitant tenifyiiig mentation? If tlie 
latter were true, tlien tlie occasions and content of night-tenor episodes would 
provide no psychological infonnation about prior sleep mentation, but ratlier, 
reflect primarily the arousal episode proper." [Arkin (1979b) p.543]
Arkin suggested that careful monitoring of pre-arousal heart rate might 
indicate some physiological cause of tlie terror, and also validate mentation 
reports as if of pre-awakening anxiety as genuine psychological explanations. 
Arkin, like oilier scientists, writes here as if giving a valid psychological 
explanation and remembering were one and the same thing. Tlie 'failure' to 
distinguish the two issues reflects the fact that, as I see it, tlie trutli or falsity 
of the Received Opinion is not the real concern of theorists about cognitive 
processes during sleep.
In reply to Arkin's editorial comments, Fisher makes clear that the 
inference to cognitive processes prior to arousal will have to rest upon inferences 
from w hat a person says and does, unsupported by correlations w ith 
physiological variables:
"Although it would fit in with my preconceived notions and prejudices tliat 
a group of night-teiTor-arousal subjects, as Arkin suggests, might experience 
iion-retrievable mentation in association witli which tlie heart beats faster, I do 
not find tlie evidence he marshalled in favour of tliis contention very persuasive
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and find myself rather uncomfortably stuck with tlie concept of tlie prearousal 
state as a 'physiological vacuum'." [Fisher (1979) p.547]
It does not look as if the hypothesis that people generally remember what 
they appear to remember following a night-terror arousal is very secure. The 
most that Kahn, Fisher & Edwards (1979) were prepared to argue was tliat 
there is an uncertain mixture of memory of pre-arousal tlioughts togetlier with 
a proportion of reports of post-arousal responses. This was more to say that 
they were dissatisfied w ith evidence for the hypothesis pu t forward by 
Broughton & Gastaut (1965) that all reports of pre-arousal thoughts and fears 
should be regarded as confabulations, than to say what exactly is remembered 
from NREM sleep prior to night-terror arousals. And if we were to further 
consider what 'mentation' is supposed to precede the arousal, it is likely that 
difficult questions would arise about why such mental phenomenon should be 
inferred to explain a single effect witliout explanation of absence of its usual 
causes and effects.
12. Correlations between pre-arranged 'signals' during sleep and awakening 
reports of 'lucid dreams' could show that, in  some extraordinary cases, a person 
remembers what he thought, did and imagined during sleep.
In Chapter Two ("The Unimagined and Unimaginable"), I argued that, since a 
narrative of a dream  typically has the intrinsic appearance of remembering 
events seen and deeds done, we require evidence extrinsic to the awakening 
narrative to justify the hypothesis that a person is remembering events and 
actions imagined during sleep. It took no argument to show that, in the 
ordinary case, there is quite insufficient evidence apart from a person's 
awakening impressions to support the hypothesis that he imagines adventures 
whilst he sleeps. In the present section, I consider the unusual case of lucid
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dream narratives. Here a person appears to remember, not events seen and 
deeds done, but fictitious adventures entertained in the knowledge tliat he is 
safely tucked up in bed. In such cases, is there any reason to doubt a person's 
word about what he imagined during sleep? And, supposing that, given tlie 
general unreliability of awakening impressions, evidence is required, is not 
appropriate evidence provided by recent scientific studies which demonstrate 
an association between the content of awakening narratives and 'signals' made 
during sleep?
In recent years, there has been a gradual acceptance that narratives of 
'lucid dreams' are more common than traditionally supposed. LaBerge (1985) 
reports tliat lucid dream narratives can be readily elicited from certain subjects, 
particularly if awoken during StageREM sleep. Its seems that sudi narratives 
are in many respects similar to typical StageREM dream  narratives. They 
relate vivid, emotionally charged adventures. LaBerge distinguishes between 
narratives of lucid dreams proper and the 'Blinking' reports associated with 
awakenings from NREM sleep. On LaBerge's account, a lucid dreamer appears 
to remembers thoughts such as 'I'm safe in bed', 'This time I will not run from 
the masked figure but confront him and find out who he is', 'Ah! Now is tlie 
time to wobble my pupils. Up-down, up-down!'. It is a characteristic feature of 
reports of lucid dreams that a distinction can be drawn between the T who is 
aware of the fact that he is asleep and is capable of deciding to wobble his eyes 
and the T who is simultaneously represented as a character in tlie dream­
world of tigers, masked figures or whatever. A lucid dreamer appears to 
remember, in addition to tlie thoughts and actions of a person asleep in bed, tlie 
tlioughts and actions of a character who believes himself to be pursed by 
masked men, to be flying to tlie moon, to be squaring the circle, or whatever.
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It seems to me that, on LaBerge's account of the phenomenon, the characters 
and events of a lucid dream are imaginary or fictitious. I am tempted to say 
that the T of the dream does not really believe himself to be pursued by a 
masked man. Either the T of the dream does not exist or he is the man asleep. 
A fictitious character has only fictions beliefs. A man asleep, in the normal 
case, has no thoughts about w hat is going on around him  and, in the 
extraordinary case of lucid dreaming, is aware of the fact that 'it is only a 
dream'. But LaBerge himself is at pains to stress the vividness of lucid dreams 
and their (potential) importance for us. And so he encourages tlie temptation to 
retort, "In my dream I really did believe myself to be confronted by a masked 
man". There is not really (?) a conflict here. Just another example of the 
futility, pointed out by Austin, of attempting to clarify philosophical issues by 
stressing the word 'really'.
Various experiments have attempted to induce behaviour during sleep. 
Most of tliese experiments are designed to test hypotiieses about information 
processing during sleep and are unconcerned witli questions about a person's 
awareness of his responses or about whether these responses have any 
communicative intent. A few studies referred to by LaBerge have sought to 
interpret experimentally-induced behaviour as a response to conscious mental 
activity. One study conditioned button-pushing responses to 'mental images' 
whilst awake. But observations of subsequent button-pushing during StageREM 
sleep were far from persuasive that the subject was entertaining images. They 
are unpersuasive, at least, where the subject has no apparent recollection of his 
nocturnal behaviour. Such 'signals' are all too easily dismissed as automatic 
reflexes, very likely resulting from physiological changes similar to those 
going on when a person visualises something when awake, but not implying the 
occurrence of some additional psychological fact about imagination during
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sleep. However, LaBerge's own work appears to demonstrate tlie possibility, 
not merely of inducing behaviour (eye-movements) previously intended to 
indicate dreaming, but of establishing a correspondence between sucli behaviour 
and what die subject subsequently appears to remember upon awakening.
LaBerge reports experiments in which tlie subject and experimenter agreed 
upon distinctive patterns of eye-movements ("Up-down, up-down!") which 
were coded to allow the subject to indicate both the occurrence and content of his 
lucid dreams. LaBerge reports the discovery of correlations between such coded 
signals (e.g. "I'm flying") and the content of lucid dreams related upon 
subsequent awakening. And he reports that signals of the occurrence and content 
of lucid dreams also bear association with the occurrence and duration of 
StageREM sleep and other physiological markers of dream ing. Such 
correspondence, LaBerge is confident, cannot be regarded as merely the by­
product of unconscious bio chemical processes occurring during sleep.
There is plenty of room for doubt and puzzlement about what experiments on 
'signalling' from sleep have so far shown. LaBerge takes his experiments to 
demonstrate that sometimes a person is aware of the fact that he is asleep in 
bed, w hilst at the same time entertaining im aginations of the most 
extraordinary vividness, often identifying himself as a character embroiled in 
events and actions which appear, as LaBerge would have it, 'more real that 
waking life'. I have a rather mean suspicion tliat attempts to replicate some of 
tlie results (which LaBerge presents with a grating enthusiasm and confidence) 
will prove problematic. In the meantime, I am content to give LaBerge tlie 
benefit of the doubt and merely point out that tlie scientific interest of his work 
does not stand or fall with his assumption that lucid dreams are 'experiences' 
remembered from sleep.
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The results of LaBerge's research suggest that tlie phenomenon of lucid 
dream ing is a special case in ttiat only here does psycho-physiological 
research into StageREM sleep retain any confident claim to have established 
content-specific associations between what happens during sleep and what 
appears to be remembered upon awakening. Furthermore, the employment of 
pre-sleep intentions to modify both observable behaviour in sleep and waking 
narrative looks like a means of demonstrating tliat behavioural or peripheral 
correlations are mediated by a common underlying cause. The demonstration 
tliat narratives of lucid dreams have a content-determining causation in sleep 
has an intrinsic scientific interest whether or not it is supposed tliat tlie lucid 
dreamer represented or entertained the content of his dream during sleep and 
remembered this 'experience' upon awakening. Correlative studies of 
'signalling' during sleep, like psycho-physiological studies of dreaming in 
general, are perhaps better designed to test the hypothesis that awakening 
narratives have an causation akin to waking perception or imagination than to 
confirm the hypothesis that awakening narratives are genuine memories of 
events perceived or imagined. But this point is not crucial to my case against 
tlie Received Opinion. I do not see any clear reason why scientific studies could 
not show that lucid dream narratives are memories of imaginings from sleep. 
The point crucial to my case is that there is no good reason why confirmation in 
the special case of lucid dream reports, of the hypoüiesis that episodes are 
remembered from sleep, should be thought to support a general defence of the 
Received Opinion.
LaBerge's discussion of lucid dreaming seems to presuppose that botli tlie 
lucid and the non-lucid dreamer stand in some quasi-perceptual relationship to 
images presented to him during sleep. The difference, on LaBerge's account, is 
tliat the lucid dreamer recognises that these presentations are merely images
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whereas the ordinary dream er is duped into supposing that the world 
corresponds to his auditory, tactile and visual impressions. LaBerge does not 
allow that the lucid dreamer escapes deception because tlie images passing 
before his mind's eye lack the vividness of ordinary dreams. He does not 
suggest tliat the lucid dreamer differs in being sober enough to recognise the 
improbability or impossibility of w hat he imagines. Presumably LaBerge 
supposes that there are otlier grounds upon which tlie lucid dreamer recognises 
that he is lying in bed asleep. But he does not spell tliem out.
Shaffer (1984) supposed that dreams cannot be reduced to hallucinations or 
vivid imaginings, nor any of the mental phenomena which occur in waking life. 
He considered it possible, nonetheless, that some waking phenomena, in 
particular 'occurrent thoughts', may be enjoyed during sleep, cuid that such 
thoughts may be simultaneous with and directed towards our dreams. It seems 
to me tliat here Shaffer, despite having distinguished between dreaming and 
imagining, and despite having no professed sympathy for an 'inner picture' 
account of imagination, has fallen into thinking of dream ing as a quasi- 
perceptual relationship between an T (which, in the special case of lucid 
dreaming, is simultaneously aware of the fact that he is lying in bed) and some 
'unique state of consciousness' enjoyed during sleep.
Shaffer and LaBerge commonly suppose that lucid dreaming is having 
thoughts and intentions about something else, the dream, of which the dreamer 
is simultaneously aware. Both suppose that non-lucid dreaming is simply 
awareness of a dream  minus the accompanying second-order tlioughts and 
intentions which sometime intrude upon a dreamer to make him 'lucid'. The 
disagreement between Shaffer and LaBerge is only about the nature of the 
object of consciousness. LaBerge seems content to suppose dreams to be tactile.
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auditory and visual impression. Shaffer insists tliat dreams are a special kind 
of mentation exclusive to sleep.
In Chapter Two ("The Unimagined and Unimaginable") I argued that, if 
we adopt a model of consciousness as a kind of inner picture-show of sensory 
impressions, tiien memory, however perfect, of what we thought, intended and 
imagined cannot sufficiently account for our knowledge of the events and 
characters of our dreams. But my conclusion was not to agree with Shaffer that 
dreaming must be some irreducible 'state of consciousness'. My conclusion was 
that dreaming is not a state of consciousness at all! The argument of Chapter 
Two did not show a priori tliat dreams are not imaginary episodes. It showed 
only tliat dreams cannot be reduced to items of introspection. In allowing that 
scientific studies of lucid dreaming might show that, in some special cases, 
dreams are episodes remembered from sleep, I suppose tliat a person's memory 
of w hat he imagined can properly be accounted knowledge of past events 
witliout supposing that imagination is a kind of 'inner-perception'.
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PART TWO
SCIENTIFIC STUDIES OF SLEEPING AND WAKING
CHAPTER FOUR 
’PERCEPTIONS’ DURING SLEEP 
(Correlative Studies in the Physiology and Neurobiology of
Sleep)
1. The hypothesis that StageREM sleep is a period of 'perceptual activity' 
should be taken metaphorically to express tlie Causal Hypothesis that, at 
some more or less central level, there is a sim ilarity betw een the bodily 
functions underlying waking perception or imagination and the acquisition of a 
disposition to tell a dream.
In Chapter One I argued that there is insufficient reason to infer from tlie fact 
that upon awakening a person appears to remember events seen and deeds done 
tliat, during sleep, he seemed to see or tried to do tliese tilings. In Chapter Two, 
I argued that the introspective model of imagination and other 'items of 
consciousness' cannot account for our apparent knowledge of the characters, 
objects and events of a dream. The ability to tell a dream cannot be reduced to 
memory of thoughts and intentions directed towards images. Even if a person 
telling a dream did coincidentally remember thoughts and images from sleep, 
the ostensible content of a typical dream narrative is too unlike a series of mere 
tlioughts and images to bear identification. My conclusion from Part One 
(What Appears To Be Remembered) was not merely tliat there is no general 
account of what dreaming consists in, as if tlie fact tliat we do not remember
145
Scientific Studies: 'Perceptions' During Sleep
illusory perceptions, thoughts or images shows tliat we do remember sometliing 
else, some irreducible mental activity. My conclusion was that when we 
'remember dreams' we generally remember nothing of what happened during 
sleep.
In the previous Chapter (Chapter Three "'Actions' During Sleep") I 
allowed that the scientific study of sleep might have shown that in some 
special cases (e.g. sleepwalking, sleeptalking, night terrors, prearranged 
'signalling' from sleep) a person remembers actions or events from sleep. But tlie 
evidence turned out to show that even in the cases of sleeptalking and lucid 
dreaming, where there is some association between the story a person tells upon 
awakening and w hat he was observed to do or say during sleep, the 
disassociations are sufficient to render doubtful the hypothesis that a person 
was expressing during sleep tlioughts and intentions about what he seemed to 
perceived or what he imagined. This conclusion was not an objection to the 
endeavours of researdiers in the field. For, I argued, tlie trutli or falsity of the 
Received Opinion is inessential either to 'cognition' inferred according to 
Arkin's information processing model of sleeptalking or to 'imagination' 
inferred according to LaBerge's physiological model of lucid dreaming.
In this Chapter, I pursue the theme of the previous. I argue that scientific 
work on sleep and dreams is consistent with the conclusion that a person telling 
a dream is typically not remembering mental acts, events, states or processes 
from sleep. I argue that neitlier evidence of physiological activity peripheral 
to the central nervous system (e.g. eye movements, muscular twitches, penes 
erections, etc.) interpreted as 'covert behaviour' during sleep, nor evidence of 
neurological activity of the forebrain interpreted as critical responses to 
internally generated 'stimuli' supports the Received Opinion. This does not 
imply any failure of scientific work. For tlie point of experimental research is
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not to justify the Received Opinion. Of course, I do hope to persuade anyone 
who remains confident (despite the objections presented in Chapters One and 
Two) that experimental methods will yet justify tiie Received Opinion, that 
the actual results fail to measure up to his expectations; and I make an effort to 
clarify the sort of psycho-physiological correlations that the would-be 
defender of the Received Opinion (unimpressed by the arguments of Chapters 
One and Two) might hope to find. But my aim thereby is not to suggest that the 
scientific hypotliesis that dreaming is a 'perceptual activity' is doubtful. My 
aim in this chapter is to show that the scientific talk of dreaming as an 
'experience' akin to perception or vivid imagination has a significance quite 
appart from the trutli or falsity of tlie Received Opinion.
The scientific hypothesis that StageREM sleep is a period of 'perceptual 
activity' should not be confused witli the hypothesis that a person's awakening 
narrative is a memory of what during sleep he perceived or seemed to perceive. 
On my account, it is reasonable for scientists to suppose tliat, at some level of 
'centrality', there is a similarity between the causal explanation of telling a 
dream  and of reporting events witnessed. The scientific hypotliesis that 
StageREM is a period of 'perceptual activity' should be understood 
metaphorically to assert such a causal analogy. Admittedly, scientists often 
talk as if the dem onstration that the physiology of StageREM sleep is 
remarkably akin to the physiology underlying waking perception shows more 
than just that. They often talk as if, in addition, it shows that the person's 
awakening 'report' of a dream was, after all, 'correct'. This is to confuse the 
experim ental plausibility  of the Causal Hypothesis (that a person's 
awakening narrative as if of events witnessed is produced by mechanisms of a 
kind which typically produce memories of events witnessed) with contentious
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philosophical claims about the reference of first person psychological 
sentences.
In the 1960s the hypothesis that StageREM sleep is a period of perceptual 
activity centred round the Scanning Hypothesis (that the eye movements of the 
sleeper indicate that he supposes himself to be looking around at events he 
remembers as a dream upon awakening) whereas in the 1980s the hypothesis 
came out as an anthropomorphic characterisation of the Activation-Synthesis 
stimulation of the cerebral cortext (that the forebrain is making the best 
interpretation it can of stimuli autonomously generated in the brain-stem). I 
argue that the scanning hypothesis should not be regarded as equivilent to tlie 
Received Opinion. If it were equivilent, then the failure of psycho­
physiologists to replicate and enlarge upon the content-relative correlations 
which gave rise to the scanning hypotliesis in the early 1960s should be taken 
to cast furtlier doubt upon tlie truth of the Received Opinion. I also argue that 
the successor to the scanning hypothesis, the activation-syntliesis hypothesis, 
should also be distinguished from the hypothesis that, in telling a dream, a 
person remembers what he seemed to see and tried to do during sleep. The 
activation-syntliesis hypothesis is a colourful means of expressing an analogy 
between the neural excitation of the forebrain awake and asleep which is 
supposed to explain the 'formal' rather than content-specific character of tlie 
narratives we are disposed to tell if awoken from StageREM sleep ratlier tlian 
from NREM sleep. A person asleep or awake does not engage in the critical 
tasks attributed to his forebrain. The hypotliesis that the motor responses of 
the forebrain are inliibited by a somatic paralysis of the limbs and larynx is not 
the hypothesis that a person is frustrated by sleep from doing w hat he 
supposes himself to do.
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2. Physiological activity peripheral to the central nervous system interpreted 
as 'covert behaviour' during sleep could not show that dreams are perceptions or 
vivid imaginings remembered from sleep.
Sometimes scientists discussing the significance of their studies of eye 
movements, heart beats, galvanomic skin responses, penes erections, twitches in 
the limbs, vibrations in the vocal chords, and so on talk as if their results might 
show not merely that there are interesting similarities between the peripheral 
physiology of waking and sleeping but that, despite superficial 'outward 
appearances', a person seems to see or vividly imagines during sleep the 
episodes he subsequently recounts as a dream. For a while, in tiie 1960s, it was 
tiiought tliat content-specific correlations had been discovered between eye- 
movements during sleep and awakening narratives. For example, horizontal 
eye-movements were associated with a dream of watching a tennis match, 
vertical jerking movements corresponded to the number of steps climbed in a 
dream. Interpreted on the assumption that a person is in the grip of an 
hallucination, it was supposed that the eye movements were covert actions of 
'looking around' or 'following the events of a dream’ [Roffwarg, Dement, Muzio 
& Fisher (1962)].
In Chapter One, I demanded evidence either that there is sometliing a 
person perceived, albeit under a false description, or that there is something a 
person does, according to which it may be inferred tliat he has some false belief 
about his environment. The suggestion reconsidered in here is that the 
appropriate evidence is somehow 'hidden' from observers imequipped with tlie 
appropriate scientific instruments and tecliniques. Tlie difficulty I found witli 
this suggestion in Chapter One remains. The problem was not merely one of 
doing the scientific work and discovering 'covert behaviour' or 'internal 
stimuli' comparable to the physiological or neurophysiological activities
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which typically intervene between perceiving events and remembering them. 
The problem was also a problem about showing that the person asleep was 
aware of any such tiny images on his retina, twitches in his limbs, and so on. 
The suggestion that special equipment is required to observe the appropriate 
stimuli or behaviour immediately calls in question the hypothesis that tlie 
dreamer perceived or intended the 'internal stimuli' and 'covert behaviour' 
identified by scientific investigations.
I argued in Chapter One that a person's apparent memories upon awakening 
do not show that during sleep he was aware of movements of his eyes, twitches 
in his limbs, or neurons firing in his brain stem. For associations observed by 
scientists between tiny muscular contractions, pulsating nerve fibres or sudi like 
during sleep and a person's waking narrative of a dream m ust be balanced 
against the disassociations between what a person appears to remember and 
what passed in the night. I argued that, even if it were commonplace for a 
person asleep to exliibit partial movements which, considered in themselves, 
might be interpreted as attempts to 'act out' the intentions of his dream, a 
wider view of his behaviour and responses readily contradicts the hypothesis 
that he was trying to respond to illusory objects. If, for example, a person moves 
his eyes back and fore and later appears to remember having watched a game 
of tennis, there is some reason to suppose tliat he remembers seeing or seeming to 
see a rally of ground strokes. But the weight of evidence is always relative to 
the context of our investigations. The discovery that the person had his eyes 
closed hits the scales like a fudge douglinut on Monday morning. The reasons for 
concluding that he was unaware of the movements of his eyes easily out­
balance tliose which suggest that the movements were intentional actions. Of 
course, the association between eye-movements and waking narratives remains. 
It demands explanation. Tliere is, one might reasonably suppose, an interesting
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causal connection between tlie eye-movements and the subsequent impression of 
memory. But the causal explanation will not confirm tliat a person appears to 
remember a cross-court rally because, during sleep, he seemed to see a cross-court 
rally, no matter what the lateral movements of his eyes, the twitchings of his 
muscles, the electrical activity of his brain, etc.
According to Dennett (1976) what outraged people most about Malcolm's 
(1959) essay on Dreaming was the claim tliat psycho-physiological work on 
dreaming is irrelevant to the ordinary concept of dreaming. In particular, 
Malcolm argued tliat physiological investigations of sleep 'cannot' confirm or 
disconfirm the hypotliesis that a person perceives, tliinks, imagines, intends 
anything whilst asleep. In effect, I agree witli Malcolm that, given what we 
ordinarily know about sleeping and waking, physiological evidence cannot 
surprise us witli the discovery that dreams are illusory perceptions or vivid 
imaginings. My argument, however, is not that physiological evidence is 
irrelevant, bu t that it is supplem entary to and m ust be weighed against 
evidence of 'external' behaviour and environment.
Taking the scanning hypothesis seriously, as a statement of the Received 
Opinion, the negative results clearly outweighed the positive. Further 
explanation is required to say why the eyes of a person who believes himself to 
be watching a tennis match should follow patterns not determined by light 
waves striking his retinas. Further explanation is required of why a person 
does not do and say tlie things we might expect of one hallucinated. Further 
explanation is required of why a person frustrated in action does not realise 
that he is. Attempts at such explanation have never amounted to more than 
vague speculations about the partial inliibition of the normal 'channels' of 
kinetlietic-awareness and motor-control. And the form of tliese 'explanations' 
is to assign partial awareness and control, not to tlie person but to some part of
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him, Ms forebrain, which is the deluded and frustrated victim, not of external 
forces, but of the (mis)behaviour of other parts of Ms body, of Ms brainstem, 
and his motor and optical systems.
If research into the ’scanning hypothesis' had been fundam entally 
concerned to justify (or falsify) the inference from 'covert behaviour' to false 
perceptual beliefs and frustrated desires one must be puzzled why it took 
scientist so long to see that their results did not justify that inference. Eitlier 
one must suppose that tlie scientist's who found the scanning hypothesis 
appealing were guilty of selective vision, double standards and ad hoc 
discrimination. Or, much more pleasantly and plausibly, one should recognise 
that the truth or falsity of the Received Opinion was never seriously at issue in 
tlieir research. Being a pleasant and plausible sort of chap, I am inclined to 
think that scientists were not so very seriously in error. Finding even a few 
content-specific psycho-physiological correlations w as an inspiring 
achievement. As long as the 'scanning hypothesis' suggested experiments 
which might replicate their successes, the scientists had reason to hold on to it. 
But that does not mean that their research implied tlie trutli of the Received 
Opinion. It does not mean that the goal of this research was tlie justification of 
the Received Opimon.
3. A similarity between the peripheral physiological activity ('covert 
behaviour*) underlying waking perception and the acquisition of the 
disposition to tell a dream might suggest an extended use for the term 
'perception' in the absence of dispositions to concurrent speech and behaviour, a 
convenient modification of the ordinary notion of perception.
I see two alternative interpretations of tiie evidence offered in support of the 
scanning hypothesis in the 1960s. The retrospective view taken by today's
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leaders in the experimental field, e.g. Hobson (1986), is that occasional 
instances of correlations between eye movements during sleep and waking 
reports are tlie marginal effects, usually inhibited, of central brain functions 
common between StageREM sleep and waking perception. This view perhaps 
fails to reflect the ambitions of the scientists who advanced the scanning 
hypotliesis during the 1960s. These scientist wrote as if tlie experimental 
methods at their disposal could of themselves decide an issue about whetlier or 
not StageREM sleep is a period of 'perceptual activity'. Daniel Dennett (1976) 
argued that evidence of 'covert behaviour' offered in support of the scanning 
hypothesis has a theoretical role over and above its role in supporting the 
assumption that there is a similarity between the central brain functions 
underlying dreaming and perception. In this section, I endorse, albeit with some 
reservations, Dennett's account of the ambitions of the psycho-physiologists of 
the 1960s. hi the section following, I argue that, by the standards of proof tlie 
scientists set themselves to distinguish StageREM from NREM sleep, it turned 
out tliat StageREM sleep is not a period of 'perceptual activity' during sleep. 
By tlie time Dennett published his account of what issues about dreaming might 
be decided by scientific investigation, the scientists had already abandoned 
the attempt to establish that tlie acquisition of a disposition to tell a dream 
has a peripheral physiology akin to waking perception or imagination.
In Chapter One I approved Squires’ (1973) claim tliat, even if the 
registration of stimulus had a subsequent effect on a person's narrative as if of 
events witnessed mediated by mechanisms similar to those which explain a 
witnesses memory for what he saw and did, it would not follow that, after all, 
the person was aware of the stimulus during sleep when it was registered. 
Daniel Dennett (1976) implicitly agreed with Squires that, in the absence of 
concurrent dispositions to speech and behaviour during sleep, the mediation of a
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'subliminally' registered stimulus by central brain processes typical of waking 
perception would not confirm that a person was aware of something at tlie time 
the stimulus was registered. W hat Dennett suggested was Üiat there is a 
question about whether dreaming is an 'experience' which cannot be answered 
in terms of theories about information processing within the central nervous 
system, and that this question may be seen, in part, as a question about the 
peripheral physiology or 'covert behaviour' underlying the acquisition of tlie 
disposition to tell a dream if awoken.
Dennett argued that some, seemingly important, questions about dreaming 
would remain unanswered even supposing tliat our disposition to tell a dream 
were produced by the central processes akin to those producing a witness' 
ability to say what happened. He argued that a Representational Tlieory of 
belief and memory of the kind envisaged by Fodor would not decide between tlie 
hypothesis of an hallucination of memory upon awakening caused by 
subliminally activated brain processes in sleep and the hypothesis of an 
hallucination in sleep remembered upon awakening:
"Suppose at noon Jones, who is wide awake, suffers some event in her brain 
tliat has a delayed effect: at 12:15 she will 'recall' having seen a ghost at noon. 
Suppose her recollection is as vivid as you like, but suppose her actual 
behaviour at noon (and up until recollection at 12:15) showed no trace of horror, 
surprise, or cognizance of any tiling untoward. Had she shown any signs at noon 
of being under the impression that something bizarre was happening, we would 
be strongly inclined to say tliat she had had a hallucination then, was 
experiencing it tiien, even though she did not recount it to us fifteen minutes 
later. But since she did not react in any such telling way at noon, but proceeded 
about her business, we are strongly inclined to say the hallucination occuiTed 
later, at 12:15, and was a hallucination of recollection of sometliing she never
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experienced although tlie cause of the hallucination occuiTed at noon" [BS. 
p. 146].
Dennett suggested that the research of the kind carried out by psycho­
physiologists like Dement, Foulkes and Rechtstaffen into the peripheral 
physiology of sleep directly addressed an issue tliat cannot be comfortably 
framed within information processing theories.
However, Dennett also saw that the physiological evidence is far from 
convincing:
"Since the events responsible for [Jones'] later capacity to recall did not 
contribute to her behaviour-controlling state at tlie time, they did not enter her 
experience then, whatever tlieir later repercussions. But then when we apply tliis 
distinguishing principle to dreams, we find it quite likely that most dieams are 
not experiences. Whemas niglihnares accompanied by moans, cries, cowering and 
sweaty palms would be experiences, bad dreams dreamed in repose (tliough 
remembered in agony) would not be, unless, contrary to smface appearances, 
their entry into memory is accomplished by engagements of tlie whole 
behaviour-controlling system sufficiently normal to distinguish tliere cases 
shaiply from our imaginary delayed hallucination.
If it turns out tliat sleep, or at least that portion of sleep during which 
dreaming occurs, is a state of more or less peripheral paralysis or inactivity; if it 
turns out that most of tlie functional areas tliat are critical to tiie governance of 
out wide awake activity are in operation, tlien tliere will be good reason for 
drawing tlie lines round experience so tliat dreams are mcluded. If not, tliere will 
be good reason to deny tliat dreams are experiences." [p.l46]
Here, Dennett seems to suggest that there is an intrinsic interest in the success or 
failure of a model of covert perceptual behaviour during sleep. The interest "of 
the peripheral physiology such as the 'scanning' movements is not merely to
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point tiie way towards content-specific correlations which might, in some 
future culmination of the labours of cognitive science, be systematically 
explained at a 'deeper' level in the brain. The interest, according to Dennett, is 
that w hat is decidable here and now by the physiologists will prejudice 
whetlier the labours of future cognitive scientists, generation upon generation of 
them all, might ever show that dreaming, the acquisition of a disposition to 
tell a dream, is 'experienced'.
I take Dennett's suggestion to be, firstly, that tliere is an issue about the 
peripheral physiology of sleep, independent of questions about the content of 
central brain processes and, secondly, that this issue promises to capture more of 
what is expressed by tlie Received Opinion than speculations about information 
processing in tlie central nervous system. Dennett's tiiought seems to have been 
that the distinction between central and peripheral processes parallels a 
distinction between representation and experience. Dennett's claim is not 
exactly that the issue here is whether the Received Opinion is true; but rather, 
that here is a (somewhat) promising scientific suhstitute for our commonplace 
conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten 
upon awakening, a conviction which can seem too important to our conception of 
ourselves to be readily given up but cannot be empirically justified. Dennett's 
idea was that covert behaviour during sleep should be adequate compensation 
for the loss of the rich inner world of Cartesian introspection. Empirical trutlis, 
however humble, are preferable to gratuitous mythology, at least when one's 
preferences are philosophical, rather than of the cuddly-bunny sort.
Dennett's account of the significance of psycho-physiological sleep 
research finds some support in an interesting paper, "Perception in Sleep" (1965) 
by William Dement, the most influential psycho-physiologist of his time. 
Dement noted tiiat it is a peculiar feature of tiie hypothesis of perception
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during sleep that a person cannot simultaneously express his awareness of 
events. What evidence is there that a person's subsequent narrative as if of 
events perceived is a report of experience he was at the time unable to express? 
Dement did not assume that a causal connection between what went on in sleep 
and what a person is subsequently inclined to say is sufficient reason to say tliat 
a person remembers what went on. He discussed tiie case of the sleeping motiier 
who awakes to tlie muted cries of her baby all but audible to tlie waking ear 
against the background noises of tlie city at night:
"She awakens with a question ratlier tlian a certainty, and only after awakening 
does she identify the reason. What intervened between tlie stimulus and tlie 
awakening certainly has the behavioural qualifications of perception, but we 
prefer to speak of tlie process in terms of discrimination and habituation." 
[Dement 1965 p.249]
Dement distinguished between those responses which require explanation in 
terms of discrimination and habituation and those which are to be explained in 
terms of perception.
Dement accepted tliat the incapacity of a person to give a contemporary 
report sets tlie burden of proof against the hypothesis of 'perception' during 
sleep, even where some stimulus acting on a person during sleep has an effect 
upon his subsequent waking narrative. What Dement argued was that there 
might be a justification for extending the notion of 'perception' to StageREM 
sleep. He argued that a justification of tlie use of the term 'perception' in tiie 
absence of a capacity to concurrent speech may be given by demonstrating, 
firstly, that there is a m ultiplicity of physiological variables in sleep 
correlated w ith the disposition to give a subsequent waking report and, 
secondly, that these physiological variables are features characteristic of a
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person's waking perceptual engagement witli his environment, in particular the 
'scanning' movements.
Dement supposed that recent psycho-physiological discoveries could 
support an extension of the notion of 'perception' to StageREM sleep. In 
particular, he argued tliat the 'scanning' movements found in StageREM sleep 
but not in NREM sleep provide sufficient reason to distinguish responses to 
external stimuli presented during StageREM as 'perception'. In doing so Dement 
deliberately excluded evidence of the effects of external stimuli upon NREM 
sleep as evidence of perception. In these cases, the fact that a person's report is 
caused by an object in his sensible environment, albeit according to central 
mechanisms operative in cases of remembering w hat one has perceived, is 
insufficient reason to infer that the object was perceived.
In some respects it looks as if Daniel Dennett was playing philosophical 
underlabourer to W illiam Dement's physiological m odification of the 
commonplace notion of 'experience'. [There must be a good Dennett-Dement 
tongue twister in the offing here!] But the underlabouring role Dennett adopts 
is not simply to reconcile the teachings of scientists to tlie lay public, nor even to 
professional philosophers. His concern is as much to keep the scientists clear 
about what their own experiments do and do not show, to prevent them from 
'rediscovering' tlie philosophical blunders of previous generations. Philosophy 
has progressed, Dennett reckons, and its progress is relevant to clear thinking in 
the sciences. When scientists reflect upon the the philosophical implications 
of their work, tliey are forced to re-invent philosophical wheels. And when 
scientists re-invent a philosophical wheel it is, Dennett laments, typically 
square [B.S. p. 126].
Dualist assumptions, it must be said, are commonly expressed witliln tlie 
psycho-physiological literature. There is a strong flavour of epiphenomenal
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parallelism in Dementis (1965) argument tliat StageREM sleep is a period of 
'perceptual activity'. He spoke as if something else, the introspectable tints 
and twinges of 'the dream experience', are somehow purchased along witli tlie 
physiological conclusion about StageREM sleep. He did not mean to identify 
dream ing with a central neurophysiological state characteristic of the 
acquisition of the disposition to tell a dream which parallels tlie peripheral 
physiology. (Am I really so surprised that psycho-physiologists working in 
the 1960s showed so little enthusiasm  for the identity theory eagerly 
expounded by philosophers on their behalf?) Dreaming, according to Dement, 
is something else, a 'state of awareness' isomorphic to the physiological and 
neurological phenomena of StageREM sleep.
Daniel Dennett was well aware of the propensity among scientists to 
confuse empirical theory w ith homely 'introspectable' truths. He was 
concerned to show that nothing worüi saving from our pre-scientific notion of 
'experience' and its subjects (our dear Selves) is lost by reducing the question 
about whether dreaming is an experience to such open and tecluiical questions, 
as whether or not there is an analogy between the peripheral physiology 
explaining die acquisition of our capacities to tell a dream and report events 
witnessed.
As I see it, even if scientists like Dement had been able to sustain tlie 
analogy between the peripheral physiology of waking perception and that of 
tlie acquisition of a disposition to tell a dream, tliey would not have succeeded 
in showing that a person is, despite appearances, aware of what is going on 
around him albeit under a false description. The scientific hypothesis that 
Stage REM sleep is a period of 'perceptual' activity presupposes that events in 
the sleeper's environment which influence his awakening narrative are not 
perceived or misperceived during sleep. Wliere an association between an event
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in the sleeper's environment and his awakening narrative indicates tliat the 
event had a subliminal effect on him, the issue between the rival scientific 
hypotheses is over the characterisation of the physiological response to 
something of which the person was admittedly unaware, a characterisation 
which may be attempted at various more or less 'central' or 'peripheral' levels. 
Similarly, where internally generated activity during sleep operates to 
produce a disposition to tell a dream  in the same m anner as externally 
generated activity produces a witnesses' capacity to say w hat happened, it 
does not follow that dreaming is perceiving.
4. Physiological activity peripheral to the central nervous system interpreted 
as ’covert behaviour' during sleep fails to distinguish StageREM sleep from 
NREM sleep as a period of 'perceptual activity'.
It is sometimes supposed that scientists have shown to tlieir own satisfaction 
tliat dreaming is an experience akin to waking perception occurring during 
StageREM sleep. Foulkes (1985) points out that this popular misconception has 
long survived the bitter disappointments which scotched the ambitions of 
psycho-physiologists between tlie late 1950s and early 1970s. The would-be 
defender of the Received Opinion had better be cautious before he insist that 
scientific observations of eye-movements, heart beats, galvanomic skin 
responses, penile erections, twitches in the limbs, vocal chords, inner ear or such 
like could decide the issue for or against him. For, by the standard the psycho­
physiologists set themselves to show, by reference to the eye movements and 
other 'covert behaviour', that StageREM sleep is and NREM sleep is not a 
period of 'perceptual activity', it turned out that much of the evidence runs 
counter to the hypothesis that dream narratives elicited from StageREM sleep 
are perceptual 'reports'. Even if the analogy between peripheral physiology
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asleep and awake were, as Dennett suggested, a worthwhile philosophical 
consolation for the loss of the Received Opinion, the prize is not one that 
science can so readily furnish as was once supposed. At least since the mid 1970s 
it has been generally recognised by researchers that the peripheral analogy 
between the acquisition of the disposition to tell a dream  and waking 
perception could not be sustained. The 'scanning hypotliesis' has disappeared, 
almost witliout trace, in recent work on dreaming. Even supposing that there 
are central processes common between dreaming and waking perception, we 
cannot be confident that the peripheral physiology of sleep qualifies dreaming 
as an 'experience', in Dennett's extended sense of tlie term.
Scientists who sought to establish by reference to the physiological 
peculiarities of StageREM sleep that dreaming is an experience akin to 
perception implied that failure to confirm, replicate and elaborate upon tlie 
'scanning' movements would show that dream narratives are not genuine reports 
but are, rather, illusions of memory or confabulations. It was widely argued by 
researchers in the early 1960s that dream narratives elicited from NREM sleep 
are not 'valid' reports. By 'memory illusion' and 'confabulation' scientists 
m eant that the causes of NREM narratives were different from those 
underlying normal cases of perceptual memory, perhaps akin to processes 
underlying phenomena like deja vu, or the unwitting confabulations of victims 
of amnesia due to chronic alcoholism.
William Dement (1965) took very seriously issues about the reliability and 
confirmation of the subject's awakening impression as if of having perceived 
sometliing.
"What really botliers most people about hallucinations and especially dreams, 
is tiie lack of any certainty that they really occurred as claimed. It seems equally
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possible that descriptions of hallucinatory experiences are tiie artifacts of self- 
delusion and confabulation." [p.254]
In the early 1960s researchers were confident that there was sufficient 
similarity between the physiology of waking perception and that of StageREM 
sleep to justify the conclusion that dreaming is a perceptual activity occurring 
during StageREM sleep. It was supposed witli equal confidence tliat, in tlie 
absence of such scientific discoveries the subject's awakening conviction of past 
awareness stands in doubt:
" . . .  tlie authenticity of NREM reports as reports of experience taking place 
in sleep will most likely remain in doubt until preawakening physiological 
landmark can be correlated witli tlie content of subsequently elicited reports in the 
manner tliat Roffwarg, et al.(1962) have associated preawakening eye-movements 
with visual imagery reported by Ss following REM period awakening." [Foulkes 
& Rechtstaffen 1964 p.1003]
"If an experience really is occumng during NREM sleep tliat is identical witli 
a dream experience, why are tliere no scanning movements, no heait rate 
accelerations, no increase in spontaneous neuronal discharges? In addition, tliis 
lack of change or fluctuation in the physiological variables also means tliat tliere 
aie no temporal landmarks to relate to tlie subjective reports. Accordingly, it 
cannot be established that NREM experience definitely occurs during sleep ratlier 
tlian being confabulated or elaborated at the moment of arousal." [Dement 1959
p.262]
I take the debate about tlie physiological distinction between StageREM 
and NREM sleep to illuminate just what researchers implied when tliey 
supposed StageREM to be a period of 'perceptual activity'. Uie widely argued 
hypothesis that waking narratives from StageREM sleep are but narratives
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from NREM sleep are not reliable indicators of perceptions in sleep, shows 
what was at stake. Further, I take the failure of researchers to consolidate the 
supposedly unique association between the gross physiological markers of 
StageREM and waking narratives of 'dreams' to cast doubt on the hypothesis 
that StageREM is distinctively a period of 'perceptual activity'. The failure 
to replicate the kinds of remarkable content-relative correlations which gave 
rise to the 'scanning hypotliesis' in tlie first place, and the failure to find any 
other satisfactory phasic indicator of 'dreaming' w ithin distinct periods of 
sleep, underm ined many of tlie assumptions which, in the minds of the 
researchers of the 1960s, made it plausible to argue that StageREM was a 
period of perceptual activity. By the standards they set themselves to explain 
away narratives elicited from NREM sleep as illusions and confabulations of 
memory, it now looks as if narratives elicited from StageREM should also be 
accounted as 'illusions' and 'confabulations'.
The difficulties which beset scientists attempting to develop a 'covert 
behaviour' model of perception during StageREM sleep were on two fronts. 
Firstly, they relied initially upon a fairly intuitive m odel of what the 
peripheral physiology of waking perception or imagination is like. This 
seemed to be all very well as far as tlie eye-movements were concerned. It was a 
fairly safe assumption that a person's eyes follow the objects he sees or seems to 
see. But the range of such an intuitive model of tlie covert behaviour of waking 
perception is very limited. It was soon found that other elements of tliis 
intuitive model failed to correlate w ith waking narratives. For example, 
penile erections are a regular part of the Stage REM cycle, one of a 'cluster' of 
physiological peculiarities, but these erections show not the slightest 
correlation with erotic content in awakening narratives. This result was 
widely noted in studies in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Psycho-physiologists
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took from it the consolation that the result was a cruel blow to Freudian 
theorists who sought confirmation of the master's model of dreaming as a 
disguise for unfulfilled desires usually of a sexual character. LaBerge (1986), 
despite reviving some hope of content-specific correlations in cases of Lucid 
Dreams, also found no correlation of this type. The first sort of problem was 
finding evidence beyond the scanning movements to support the application of 
the intuitive model of covert perceptual behaviour to StageREM sleep, even 
supposing that this model was valid for waking perception, thought and 
imagination.
The second side to the problems besetting the 'covert behaviour’ model of 
perceptions during sleep was that the notion that waking perception or drought 
or imagination has a distinctive kind of underlying physiology at a peripheral 
level was pretty much an article of faith. That such 'covert behaviour' should 
ever enable us to 'read the mind' of someone engaged in silent thought - say by 
measuring the vibrations in their vocal chords - was a speculation wliich had 
attracted many empirical psychologists since James. The trouble was that in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the physiology of sleep, especially die 
'scanning movements', seemed like the chance psycho-physiologist had been 
w aiting for to dem onstrate 'covert behaviour' of any psychological 
sophistication. Researchers into StageREM sleep did not have an empirically 
confirmed model of 'covert behaviour' underlying waking perception, thought 
or imagination to measure dreaming against. Rather, sleep researchers of the 
1960s found themselves in the vanguard of research supposed to demonstrate 
the validity of such models. Thus, discoveries in the 1960s about zvaking 
psychological phenomena, such as the fact that people vividly imagining a 
game of tennis or climbing a stair do not exhibit the kind of eye movements
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which gave rise to the 'scanning hypothesis', cast doubt on the psycho- 
physiological enterprise which, for a brief moment, had seemed so promising.
Psycho-physiological research which attempts to give 'covert behaviour' a 
psychological content occupies an awkward position within psychology. It sits 
uncomfortably between behaviourism, introspectionism and cognitive science. 
Strict behaviourism never looked remotely close to specifying behavioural 
criteria for propositional attitudes. But strict behaviourists could complain 
that psycho-physiological work looked more fruitful only because it let 
introspectionism  creep back in disguised as the 'verbal report’. Most 
psychologists working today suppose that content-specific psycho-physical 
correlations might be found, if at all, only at the neurophysiological level in 
central level brain processes interpreted according to some very sophisticated 
kind of symbol-m anipulating computer program . M ost contemporary 
psychologists would find it neither alarming nor newsworthy that psycho­
physiologists working on sleep and dreaming failed to sustain and develop a 
content-specific model of covert behaviour.
When I first had a look at the psycho-physiological literature on 
dreaming, I made the mistake of supposing that the scientists were seriously 
addressing the issues that concerned Wittgenstein and Malcolm about whetlier 
narratives of dreams are memories of episodes known by a person during sleep. 
What struck me was that even on the assumption, endorsed by philosophers 
like Curley (1975) and Dunlop (1977), that the psycho-physiologists had tlie 
methodology to justify the Received Opinion, a closer examination of the 
literature revealed that the empirical results were by no means all on one side. 
There are serious grounds for doubting that the psycho-physiological 
characterisation of StageREM sleep as a period of perceptual activity is 
justified. Even if philosophers like Curley and Dunlop were correct in tliinking
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tiiat psycho-physiology could justify a conception of dreaming sufficient to 
support Descartes' Sceptical Argument, tliese philosophers have no grounds for 
complacency. The scientific failure to sustain and replicate the discovery of 
systematic content-specific correlations between the physiology of sleep and 
waking narratives, together with the difficulties which have beset scientific 
attem pts to develop in any detail the physiological analogy between 
StageREM sleep and waking perception should give these philosophers motive 
to question what account is to be given of the ordinary concept of dreaming 
should it turn out that the Received Opinion is in fact false.
Dennett's (1976) suggestion was Üiat an extended analogy between the 
peripheral physiology of waking and sleeping might serve as a scientific 
substitute for the traditional belief that dreaming is an 'experience' akin to 
perception. Dennett deliberately attempted to blur the distinction between 
justification of and revision of the Received Opinion, suggesting that 
experimental work might legitimise 'tlie best' of pre-scientific beliefs about 
the mental. This is a strategy w ith which I have a large measure of 
sympathy. But since I am more certain than Dennett admitted to be that 
experimental research into 'covert behaviour' has failed to find anytliing that 
might substitute for tlie inner light of consciousness, I cannot join him  in 
commending a teclinical analogy between the peripheral physiology of waking 
and sleeping as a persuasive redefinition of the ordinary concept of experience.
Researchers initially set themselves standards by which they meant to 
show (by the interpretation of peripheral physiology as 'covert behaviour') 
that NREM sleep was a perceptual void. It turned out that StageREM sleep 
itself failed  the test of a 'perceptual activity' during sleep set by tliese 
standards of proof. Researchers, unable to elaborate tlie psycho-physiological 
distinction between StageREM and NREM sleep in tiie manner they originally
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hoped in tlie 1960s, should in consistency have concluded that StageREM sleep, 
like NREM sleep, is a perceptual void. This conclusion was avoided by 
admitting that evidence of 'covert behaviour' is, after all, powerless to decide 
whether or not dream ing is an 'experience' akin to perception or vivid 
imagination. The lesson learned by researchers by tiie mid 1970s was tliat if 
StageREM sleep is a period of 'perceptual activity', it must be demonstrated by 
neurological investigations into more central brain functions.
5. An imperfect analogy between dreaming and waking perception within the 
margins of 'covert behaviour' might yet be supposed to indicate a close analogy 
at a more central level of brain function.
The 'scanning hypothesis' should not be regarded as a statement of the 
Received Opinion in the context of scientific research. It is better seen as a 
statement of a general analogy between the peripheral physiology underlying 
dream ing and the peripheral physiology supposed to underlie waking 
perception or imagination. But tliis view of its significance is not entirely 
satisfactory eitlier, for it was already evident to researchers in the 1960s Ürat 
the analogy is far from perfect at the peripheral level. The scanning 
hypothesis is best seen, at least in retrospect, as compatible with the discovery 
that the similarities between the peripheral physiology of waking and 
sleeping are severely limited, and that 'covert behaviour' can seldom be 
identified in association with tlie content of what a person is able to say about 
what he dreamt or perceived or imagined.
The experimental results offered in support of tlie scanning hypothesis 
were, it was always admitted, isolated. The same few examples keep cropping 
up in discussions of scanning hypoüiesis throughout the 1960s, indicative of the 
problem researchers had in replicating positive results. But even a few content-
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specific correlations interpreted according to the 'covert behaviour' model are 
remarkable. They call out for an explanation. An imperfect analogy between 
dreaming and perception at the peripheral level might be supposed to be 
explicable in terms of a closer similarity at some more central level of brain 
function. I think that the best view of the significance of the 'scanning 
hypothesis' in retrospect is to see it as the hypotliesis that occasional instances 
of correlations between awakening narratives and peripheral physiology 
interpreted as 'covert behaviour' during sleep are tlie marginal effects of a 
similarity of central brain function between dreaming and perception.
Correspondingly, the scientific hypotliesis that dreaming is an 'experience' 
akin to perception should be understood as a metaphorical manner of expressing 
sudi a central analogy and not, as I take Dennett (1976) to have suggested, an 
analogy at the peripheral level of 'covert behaviour'. If, as I further take 
Dennett to have suggested, a central analogy mapped out according to some 
tlieory of Internal Representations, offers no substitute for homely notions about 
our 'inner selves' who scan such representations, then so much tlie worse for 
anyone, including the scientist, who confuses claims about the structure and 
functions of brain process during sleep which cause us to awake with a story to 
tell ('dreaming') witli claims about a person's 'introspective' knowledge of 
episodes occurring during sleep. The scientist's notion of the 'dream experience' 
is properly understood as a theoretically inferred brain process, the occurrence 
and nature of which we are ordinarily quite imaware. It is, in fact, not an 
experience at all, but an unobserved process supposed to explain our dispositions 
to tell stories as if of events witnessed upon awakening.
The interpretation of the scanning hypothesis I prefer is not merely a post 
hoc modification of the ostensible claim of scientists in the 1960s to have 
established that dreaming is an 'experience' akin to perception. It goes some
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way towards clarifying the notion of 'the dream  experience' which was 
fundamental to their research goals. The problem which most concerned 
psycho-physiologists at the time when Üie scanning hypothesis evolved was to 
establish whether peripheral physiological distinctions between StageREM 
sleep and NREM sleep indicate the existence of an underlying distinction 
between processes in the central nervous system. The hypothesis that 
narratives elicited from StageREM sleep are 'reports' was, in effect, the 
hypothesis that StageREM narratives are caused by a homogeneous central 
process ('dreaming') occurring during sleep. Differences in observable 
physiological phenomenon between StageREM and NREM sleep were taken to 
support an inference to differences not directly observable by the experimental 
methods available. The hypothesis that dreaming is an 'experience' akin to 
perception or imagination is the hypothesis that this is the same kind of 
process as that underling waking perception or imagination. Observable 
similarities between StageREM and waking physiology were supposed to 
suggest a common underlying cause.
Rechtstaffen (1967), Stoyva & Kamyia (1968) and Goodenough (1978) each 
offered a defence of the notion of a dream 'experience' with explicit reference to 
Malcolm's (1959) philosophical objections. The defence arrived at by these 
scientists bears both comparison and contrast w ith the defence of the 
hypothesis that dreaming is an experience akin to perception or imagination 
offered by Putnam (1962a) and Fodor & Chihara (1967).
These philosphers regarded dreaming as a theoretical entity inferred from 
its behavioural symptoms ('telling a dream') and supposed to have further 
causes and effects typical of processes underlying waking perception or 
imagination. Some of these causes and effects (e.g. somatic stimuli, 
sleeptalking or other overt behaviour, scanning movements or oüier covert
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behaviour) might be evident at the observable margins of the brain. These 
causes and effects are open to direct experimental test. But 'dreaming' may also 
be supposed to share causal properties with the central processes underlying 
waking perception which are inhibited from dem onstrating the 'normal' 
marginal effect of perceptions (e.g. running away from tigers perceived) by 
discrepancies between the more or less peripheral physiology of sleep (e.g. 
somatic paralysis of the limbs). Putnam (1962a) gave no indication of how 
central brain processes might be functionally identified in a context where it is 
supposed that Üiey do not have their normal observable causes and effects in 
relation to environmental stimuli and behaviour. I understand that Putnam has 
long since abandoned the hope tliat computer models of brain function might 
enable future scientists to identify mental tokens in the brain in the absence of 
their normal context. But this Great Hope remains central to Fodor's work and 
is, on his view, fundamental to the aspirations of scientific psychology.
In some respects, the psycho-physiological literature on sleep and 
dreaming reflects a conception of 'dreaming' as a central brain process having a 
mental content in virtue of its physical structure or normal causal role. 
Rechtstaffen (1967), in his influential paper on the methodology of psycho- 
physiological sleep research, argued that the main justification for the 
postulation of 'experience' in sleep was its 'predictive productivity' in leading 
experimenters to discover new correlations between a variety of physiological 
phenomena in sleep and narratives told upon awakening, A similar point is 
made by Fodor & Chihara (1967), supposedly in criticism of Malcolm. 
Malcolm's account of the concept of dreaming is said to make it look entirely 
fortuitous that scientists were led to tlie discovery of physiological correlates 
of dream narratives. Stoyva & Kamyia (1968) outlined a methodology of 
'converging operations' which is widely cited and approved in the psycho-
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physiological literature. It takes 'dreaming' to be defined by a network of 
probable connections, rather than as supposed by Malcolm (1959) and by Dement 
& Kleitman (1956) to be defined by a logical connection witli a single criterion, 
either the waking narrative (Malcolm) or the physiological index of Stage One 
EEC in conjunction with REMs (Dement & Kleitman). The change in the 
scientist's own conception of their metliodology again bears comparison witli 
tlie shifting weight of philosophical opinion.
However, it would be a mistake to suppose that there was an intimate 
meeting of minds between reflective experimental scientists and contemporary 
materialist philosophers. It is clear that Rechtstaffen (1967) and Dement 
(1965) (1967) distinguished between the central brain processes supposed to 
cause our awakening narratives of dreams and the 'dream experience' proper. 
Rechstaffen seems to suppose (incoherently to my mind) that the criterion of 
'predictive productivity' justifies the hypothesis that dreaming is a 'private' 
experience and not merely a theoretical entity supposed to have certain 
independently observable causes and effects. Hartman (1972) is explicit that 
dreaming (and other phenomena of consciousness) cannot be studied directly by 
science. (Rather, he suggests, correlations between the physiology of 
StageREM sleep and our retrospective reports of concurrent experiences provde a 
unique 'window' on the biology of StageREM sleep, as if the experience of 
dreaming were an epiphenomena which is revealed to be a disguised form of 
knowledge of 'what is really going on', i.e. bio-chemical processes in tlie brain!) 
Dement is perfectly unembarrassed about his dualism. He supposes that 
physiology may justify the hypothesis that dreaming is em 'experience' akin to 
perception. Yet he also supposes that dreaming is a mental process distinct 
from its physiological or neurological symptoms. The only point I can see to 
this distinction is to im port the idea that we have introspective and
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retrospective knowledge of something ('the dream') which ultimately needs no 
scientific justification after all!
Dennett (1976) saw very well the discrepancy betw een the stark 
theoretical notion of dreaming offered by Putnam or by Fodor & Chihara and 
the dualist notions of introspection unwisely imported into the discussion 
sections of psycho-physiological papers. It was this recognition that made him 
argue tliat considerations about the peripheral physiology of StageREM sleep 
m ight support a notion of 'experience' which would compensate for the 
elimination of dualist mythology from rigorous brain science. In the following 
section, I wish to examine the leading contemporary attempt to demonstrate an 
analogy between StageREM sleep and waking perception, an analogy supposed 
to be content-specific only (if at all) at a level which we have not yet Üie 
metliodology to discriminate. I argue that Hobson & McCarley's 'activation- 
synthesis' model of StageREM sleep clearly demonstrates the incoherent 
identification of a person with his component parts which Dennett, in tlie 
tradition of Ryle and Malcolm, finds so objectionable.
6. Anthropom orphic m odels of the forebrain m isinterpreting internally 
generated stim uli fail to support the Received O pinion that dreams are 
experiences akin to perception remembered from sleep.
In Chapter One I argued, following MacDonald (1953), tliat memories of 
illusory objects are memories of real objects perceived under a false description. 
If it is not shown that something was genuinely perceived, according to which 
an illusory object can be given a spatial and temporal identity, it is not shown 
tliat one remembers an illusory object rather than that one merely appears to 
remember an object. I argued tliat, if special scientific equipment is required to 
identify an object in the retina or brain, we have no reason to suppose tliat it
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was identified witliout such equipment by someone who was asleep. I argued in 
Chapter One, that a causal connection between an event in the sleeper's sensible 
environment and his subsequent narrative does not in itself show that he 
perceived the event, even if it is mediated by mechanisms similar to those 
underlying paradigm cases of perceptions remembered and even if it is the kind 
of thing tliat a person would normally be able to identify by its touch, smell, 
sound and simultaneously report. This leaves open the scientific question about 
whetlier the mechanisms registering and mediating the effect of an event in the 
sleeper's environment are worth distinguishing as 'perceptual' mechanisms. 
But it does not leave open to scientific investigation whether there is some 
object external or internal wliich a person perceives during sleep and remembers 
upon awakening to tell a dream.
In Chapter One, I further considered whether tlie search for an object 
perceived might be side-stepped by producing evidence that a person did or 
intended to do things which are rationalised by attributing to him false 
perceptual beliefs, subsequently remembered. I argued that, even supposing it 
were usual that sometliing in a person's nocturnal behaviour 'corresponds' to the 
actions of his dream, the evidence remains on balance tliat, in a typical case of 
telling a dream, a person was unaware of his behaviour during sleep and does 
not remember doing or trying to do anything. For this, and for oüier reasons 
advanced in tlie present Chapter, it follows that physiological evidence of eye 
movements and other 'covert behaviour' during sleep fails to support the 
attribution of false perceptual beliefs corresponding to the dream told upon 
awakening. Failure to identify behaviour during sleep as actions remembered 
upon awakening, returns us to the problem of finding some object which is 
perceived during sleep under a false description. Dement clearly spotted the 
problem :
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"There can be little question that dreams count as hallucinations. Accordingly, 
if hallucinations are to regarded as perceptual phenomena . . . tiien it follows 
that dreams must also be accorded that status. But perceptions of what?" 
[Dement 1965 p.253]
The hypothesis that StageREM sleep is a period of 'perceptual activity' has 
survived the 'scanning hypothesis' and is best represented by the equally 
controversial Activation Synthesis model, originally advanced by Hobson & 
McCarley (1977). According to these scientists, w hat is perceived during 
StageREM sleep is a discharge of neurons in the brain-stem, which is registered 
by the forebrain as if  it were the effect of a person's perceptual engagement 
witli his sensible environment.
Sometimes tlie scientists speak as if a pattern of electro-chemical impulses 
or 'stimuli' in the brain were the object of perception rather than a 
neurophysiological activity characteristically mediating between the objects 
of perception (alarm-clocks, water-sprays, flashlights, perfumes, and so on, 
that we can hear, touch, see and smell) and the behavioural responses 
characteristic of someone who perceives or misperceives such objects. This 
confusion is compounded by occasional lapses into antliropomorphic talk of the 
forebrain 'interpreting' or 'perceiving' impulses from the brain-stem. The 
tendency of scientists to speak in this manner should not be taken to give 
independent credibility to the claim of philosophical materialism that every 
type of first person psychological sentence - if it is true of anything - is true of 
some type of neurophysiological state which is the typical cause of the 
utterance of sentences of that type. I do not suppose that scientists who talk as 
if impulses in the brain-stem were the objects of perception would seriously 
claim to have explained a person's familiar capacity to identify or misidentify
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alarm-clocks and the like in terms of an alleged capacity to identify or 
misidentify electro-chemical impulses by their ('inner'-)sensible qualities.
Hobson (1985) (1989) is perfectly clear that systematic content-specific 
correlations between types of dream narrative and types of brain process are not 
within the scope of present day science. The isomorphism postulated by the 
Activation-Syntliesis theory is supposed to hold statistically between 'formal' 
features of dream  narratives and relatively gross characteristics of brain 
function in StageREM sleep. The theory does not attempt to explain why X 
dreamt p at time t. The most striking 'formal' features of narratives elicited 
from StageREM are the predominance of visual imagery and the unexceptional 
occurrence of bizarre and impossible events. These are the features the 
Activation-Synthesis theory is primarily designed to explain. Hobson (1989) 
laments that even after 30 years of laboratory sleep-research the formal 
aspects of dreaming remain ill-defined and unquantified. But he gives an 
example of the more detailed kind of formal feature that the Activation- 
Synthesis hypotliesis may be elaborated to explain;
"A single example may help make tiie point: it is necessaiy and sufficient (for 
the isoinorphist) to know that all well-remembered dream reports describe colom* 
and tliat the common supposition that dreaming is colourless (the 'black and 
white' tlieory) is an inconect inference related definitively and exclusively to tlie 
problems of recall (an after-the-fact memory defect). This means that no state- 
specific change in higher-order visual processing need be invoked - or sought - in 
developing a physiological state correlate for dieammg; ratlier a state dependent 
change in memory is to be postulated - and its neuronal coirelate sought in 
experimental animal studies" [p.305].
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The Activation-Syntliesis hypothesis, then, does not postulate type-type 
correlations betw een brain processes occurring during sleep and the 
propositional content of dreams dreamt.
Hobson (1989) takes the view that "dreaming is properly considered 
delusional because subjects have no insight regarding the true nature of the 
state in which they have these unusual sensory experiences" [p.287]. There is a 
certain ambiguity in this statement. On tlie one hand, it may be taken as an 
endorsement of the Received Opinion tliat dreaming is a sensory experience 
occurring during sleep. On tlie other, it may be taken to mean tliat, despite our 
confident claims to remember what happened during sleep, we commonly have 
no knowledge of tlie genesis of our apparent memories upon awakening. (No 
wonder, since 'the true nature' of our state is only now revealed by the hottest 
discoveries of Harvard neuroscience!) Like Dement and Rechtshaffen before 
liim, Hobson supposes himself to be obliged to affirm our 'faith' in the 'reports' 
of his human subjects:
"One philosophical problem with a strong impact upon the isoinorphist 
agenda is the unconfirmable nature of all subjective experiences. And tliis is 
compounded by tlie difficulty of access to die mind in sleep . . .
It may be wordi underlining diis problem of subjectivity which is ultimately 
irreduceable - even under die instrumental conditions of the sleep laboratory. 
The scientist interested in mind thus has no choice odier diaii to accept die 
reports of his experimental subjects as honest, accurate and truly retrospective - 
all three dubious, fallible and unprovable assumptions" [299]
Hobson comes close to recognising that the authority we commonly attribute to a 
person's narrative of a dream is, as Malcolm (1959) urged, just not grounded upon 
the kind of assumption tliat could be confirmed or disconfirmed by scientific 
investigation. Yet he is unable to break witli the idea tliat an assumption
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about tiie reliability of 'subjective reports' is essential to a scientific tlieory of 
dreaming.
This failure to distinguish clearly between, firstly, tiie recognition (prior to 
and independent of scientific investigations) that the content of a dream is 
nothing other than the content of a story a person is able to tell without 
inference or invention upon awakening and, secondly, the Causal Hypotliesis 
(central to scientific sleep research) that such narratives are produced in a 
similar manner to perceptual reports, has an unfortunate consequence. It makes 
it look as if the anthropomorphic model of the forebrain 'misinterpreting' 
stimuli generated in the brain-stem is an articulation of the Received Opinion 
about dream ing rather than a useful means of characterising scientific 
discoveries (largely derived from animal studies) about the broader features of 
brain functioning during StageREM sleep.
Squires (1989) noted some of the explanatory loopholes which the 
Activation-Syntliesis needs to fill in if it is to avoid some of the charges which 
Hobson levelled against Freud tlieory of the psychic motivation of dreams. 
Squires writes:
" . . .  it is natural to talk of tlie brain in personal terms. McCaiiey and 
Hobson, for example, say it inteiprets internal signals as if they are real, 
synthesizes tlie dream by comparing different bits of information, makes 'tlie 
best of a bad job', and similar things. So we are apt to suppose tliat people 
must exhibit judgement in sleep. Now tiie legitimacy and utility of 
homuncularising parts of the brain are matters of debate. But I tliink Professor 
Hobson sees the postulation of superpersonal agents here as a peril to which 
Freudian theory succumbed (e.g. witli tlie dieam censor). Yet if tlie forebraiii is 
identified with the person we have fresh problems. Are we to suppose tliat the 
dozy uncritical sleeper McCarley and Hobson can only compare to someone in
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the grip of delusions and serious mental disorders is simultaneously doing a 
brilliant job in adverse conditions, making a coherent story from meagrely 
structured and chaotically abundant elements?" [p.315]
Malcolm (1977) attacked any kind of information processing theory on the 
ground that it presupposes an anthropomorphisation of brain activity. A reply 
to Malcolm, which Hobson would no doubt appreciate, is given by Wilkes 
(1979):
"Scientists might once again complain of being misunderstood. 
Antliropomoiphization is perfectly legitimate when what is at issue is a model 
of the macro-level account of brain function; how tliis model is to be realized, 
and what the micro-level account will look like, is anotlier matter entirely. . . . 
The diversity of memory manifestations should also be admitted; but tlie 
neurophysiologist should insist tliat he can be asked to explain what is common 
[in thefr physiological basis] when and only when a physicist is requked to give 
tlie molecular account that picks out all and only copies of [Malcolm's book]."
I hope I am not m isunderstanding the scientists. I hope, rather, that I am 
clarifying, just as Wilkes means to do, the distinction between what concerns 
scientists and what we are ordinarily say about tiie 'inner activities' of tlie 
mind. I am willing enough to allow that antliropomorphic models of brain 
processes have a heuristic role in guiding research towards future knowledge of 
the micro-level complexities which will explain. But I agree [Oh, No! Not 
again!] with Squires (1973) (1989) that a distinction should be drawn between 
information processing in the brain and a person's exercising judgement. The 
interactions of the brain-stem, forebrain and oculo-motor systems described in 
ever-increasing detail by the neurobiologists, alternatively on a Synaptic and 
on a Systems model [see Hobson (1989) pp.294-295], should be regarded not as
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mental activities of a person asleep but only as cerebral processes which 
explain the mental capacities he exhibits upon awakening to tell a dream.
7. The hypothesis that dreams are 'illusory perceptions' occurring during sleep 
no more explains the fact that our narratives of dreams are, in general, false 
than does the hypothesis that dreams are 'perceptions' occurring during sleep 
explain the fact that in some rare cases our dream narratives are true.
Malcolm (1959) claimed that it is a necessary condition for a sentence used to 
tell a dream tliat it cannot be truly asserted as an historical report; or, in other 
words, that '1 dreamt that p" implies 'not-p'. Malcolm qualified himself by 
allowing that sentences used in telling dreams may coincidentally be true 
descriptions of events which happened whilst he was asleep, provided that 
the description does not contradict or qualify the supposition tliat he was 
asleep. For example. Nightcap awakes with the impression tliat Catliy was 
m urdered on the heath. And Lo! the morning paper tells that the gruesome 
deed was done. All is as Nightcap appears to remember except, of course, that 
she saw notliing, for she was in bed and fast asleep.
Imaginably, our awakening impressions could regularly correspond to facts 
that one could have perceived (had one been awake, in the right place, paying 
attention, etc.). However, in tliis world, coincidences between dream narratives 
and events that went on in the world outwith the bedroom, whilst often 
remarked upon, are rare enough to be regarded as completely accidental. (We 
often hear a politician boast of predictions which have come true, but amidst 
the many hundreds and thousands of predictions he made whicli have not come 
true, we should account his 'success' a mere fluke.) Such coincidences as there 
are do not demand a special explanation. We are under no pressure to say by 
what other means it was tliat Nightcap came to know what people generally
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know only by remembering what they have perceived. This is just as well,/o7‘ 
what explanation could we give?
In what follows, I mean to suggest that attempts to explain the lack of 
coincidence between our dreams and what happened during tlie night in terms of 
perceptual error is m isguided in similar ways to attem pts to explain 
coincidences between our dreams and what happened in terms of genuine 
perceptions during sleep. Such attempts 'explain' the observation that it is as 
if the dreamer had perceived (or misperceived) what was going on with the 
hypothesis that some other sentient being (internal or external, material or 
immaterial) does the job for him whist he is asleep. Wliether such hypotheses 
explain much is a doubt 1 am willing to set aside. But the supposition that such 
hypotheses explain whatever they explain by showing that a person seemed to 
see or vividly imagined something during sleep is, I am certain, false.
According to Frazer, the Victorian antliropologist, some societies have 
taken dream  narratives to have the same consequences in waking life as 
memories of what a person has witnessed:
"For example ... A whole Bororo village has been tlirown into panic and 
neai'ly deserted because someone dreamed tliat he saw enemies stealthily 
approaching it " [from The Golden Bough, quoted by Ahnansi & Beguin (1989) 
p.177].
The villagers were, we are to believe, quite clear that the warning-cry came 
from someone who had been sound asleep in his hammock, and not open-eyed in 
tlie look-out post. Clearly an explanation is required. But what explanation 
could possibly be given? According to Frazer, the exodus was not premised on a 
faith in visiting deities or powers of precognition. Rather, tlie dreamer was 
taken to be 'remembering what he perceived when sleep':
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"The soul of the sleeper is supposed to wander away from the body and 
actually visit places, to see the persons, and to perform tlie acts of which he 
dreams" [Almansi & Beguin (1989) p.l77j.
Of course, this is no explanation at all, even supposing, as Frazer's Indians 
mistakingly do, that an explanation is required. We do not so readily believe 
in body-less egos that nonetheless do and see the sorts of things that waking 
human beings do and see. We do not puzzle how one wanders afar wliile a leg 
swings gently from a hammock nor how in sleep one gazes around with eyes 
closed. No postulations about disembodied spectators, sixth-sense, telepathic 
messages or precognition would be taken to explain tlie reliability of a 
dreamer^s predictions, even supposing that they were reliable.
The problem with the tribespeople's 'explanation' is not simply that it 
postulates the existence of an immaterial spirit with all tlie bodily capacities 
(and more) of a human being. Die problem is also that, even if the story about 
what this ghostly body did and saw were true, and even if tliis story were to 
explain how the tribesman waking from his hammock was able to tell of tlie 
enemies' approach, it would not show tliat tlie tribesman remembers what he 
saw and did in the forest. Someone saw sometliing, in virtue of which someone 
else, the tribesman, was able to say what had happened (perhaps even what is 
looked like, down to the last observable detail, as if he had a picture-image to 
refer to). But tlie tribesman did not see or do anytliing whilst asleep and no one 
remembers what happened in the forest.
Fodor's Auntie wants to tell us a fairy story. Like most of Auntie's stories, it 
is a warning that good children don't play games with Mental Representations. 
Just when tlie children are getting on so very well together in tlie playroom by 
pretending to be friends with Little People inside each other's heads, Aimtie
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likes to remind her favourite nephew that tlie only real friends he'll ever have 
are the other children themselves!
Imagine that Frazer, a true Victorian, took it upon himself to enlighten the 
tribespeople. He tactfully suggests that the sentinel's 'memory' is everywhere 
confounded by disconfirming evidence. Admitting tliat their look-out often 
miscounts his fingers, some of the villagers go back to check how many enemies 
are against them, in preparation for a counter-attack. They find none. Perhaps 
they conclude that the enemy has retreated. D ie Witch Doctor has a 
repertoire of more or less ad hoc explanations designed to save tlie hypothesis 
tliat the dreamer perceived the enemy approaching, Wlien hard pressed by 
Frazer's arguments, he resorts to saying that, in this particular case, the 
dreamer had misperceived what was going on in tlie bushes. There were plenty 
of wild fowl rooting about that morning, and eyeless souls may as well be 
allowed to misperceive tilings on some occasions as see them on others.
Suppose Frazer persuades the Witch Doctor that there are no regular 
correlations between dreams and what happened in tiie forest. Tliis being so, 
tiie Witch Doctor decides, there must be some explanation of why our apparent 
memories are so unreliable. Why, he asks himself, are our souls so deluded 
during sleep? Does tiie effort of body-less wandering make souls peculiarly 
susceptible to error, like someone intoxicated w ith Wullo Juice? Frazer 
struggles to dissuade him from this absurd fantasy. Could it be, the Witch 
Doctor asks, that the soul does not get abroad, but is trapped within an internal 
picture show, fabricated, more or less accidentally, from copies of past waking 
perceptions? Diis is good, thinks Frazer, convinced of anotlier triumph of 
Christian science over primitive superstition. The Witch Doctor has found a 
theme. Next he decides that the Soul is not really bodyless at all but has a 
kind of corporeal existence within the cranium complete with its own sensors
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and signalling devises. Die Witch Doctor calls his discovery tlie Mind-Brain. 
Having come this far he cannot return to the mythologies of the tribe. He 
follows Frazer back to civilisation. There the Royal Society awards him  a 
grant to unlock the secrets of the Mind-Brain. But do not suppose (Children!) 
that the Witch Doctor of this fairy tale has entirely turned his back on the 
land and people of his birth. After all, does he not continue to share with them 
a belief in an ego, albeit trapped in the cerebral cortex, which is as 
marvellously getting tilings wrong about the world as the tribesman's soul was 
supposed to be getting things right?
The children are awfully excited by the Witch Doctor's idea of a 
marvellously mistciken midget hard-wired in the skull. But the fun must stop 
somewhere. Auntie's stories always have a moral. "The Witch Doctor failed 
to observe tlie distinction between the mistaken midget and the sleeping 
tribesman!", she pedantically informs the children. "What does it matter?", 
someone sighs. (After all, an explanation is an explanation is an .... ) "Yes, 
Children! Have your explanations if you will. But what is the Witch Doctor's 
explanation? Is it that the tribesman remembers what he seemed to see and 
tried to do during sleep? No, it is no t!... "
Auntie does go on a bit. What else can she do? The children are fed up of 
Reminders and w ant to get on w ith their games. "Let's play Mental 
Representations", cries Nephew, "all my other toys are broken!" The children 
rush off in a merry crowd leaving Aunty alone to contemplate her tedious 
distinctions.
8. W hether dreams are 'experienced' is a question about the nature of tlie 
Composition Process by which the disposition to tell a dream if awoken is
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acquired, and not about the additional existence of some m ysterious 
Presentation Process.
Dennett (1976) suggested several ways in which the question "Are dreams 
experiences?" might be turned into a question open to scientific investigation. 
He motivated the search for an analysis of the question by arguing that our 
capacity to say what we dreamt - indeed, our general capacity to 'introspect' 
what we immediately perceive, think, imagine, intend and so on - might, for 
all we know, be explained by the 'Pickwickian' Hypothesis that such 
inform ation is sublim inally' or non-consciously registered and only 
subsequently accessed as if it had been experienced. Dennett supposed that an 
information processing theorist might respond to the Pickwickian challenge by 
boldly stipulating tliat to 'experience' is just to store information for subsequent 
access (to'lay down a memory-trace'). This stipulation, in effect, eliminates 
the distinction between conscious and unconscious registration which Dennett 
acknowledges to be implicit in our ordinary concept of mind, as is shown by the 
astonishm ent w ith  which Malcolm's conclusions about dream ing were 
popularily received.
Dennett does not see any easy means to eliminate the admittedly vague and 
perplexing distinction w hich generates the Pickwickian Hypothesis. 
Cognitive scientist are forced to distinguish between 'normal' and 'abnormal' 
entry into short-term storage. (To make this point, Dennett employs the 
fantasy of a demonic scientist planting 'memory traces' in the brain.) Diis 
distinction, I take Dennett to suggest, is only superficially 'statistical' and, in 
effect, tacitly re-introduces tlie kind of contrast we ordinarily suppose there to 
be between consciously and non-consciously registered stimuli. The task of 
clarifying tlie scientific import of the concept (or concepts) of experience cannot 
be ignored in laying the pliilosophical foundations for cognitive science.
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Dennett distinguished between two elements of a theory of dreaming, 
between the composition process and the presentation process. He supposed 
that the composition process is an essential element of any theory of dreaming 
but doubted the importance of the presentation process. He saw it as an 
advantage of the proposed identification of 'experience' witli 'laying down a 
memory trace' according to some information processing theory tliat it reveals 
the presentation process (the 'inner theatre') to be theoretically superfluous. 
With the departue of the presentation process, Dennett thought, goes the 
scientifically embarrassing need to find an 'inner self or ego seated somewhere 
in tlie brain busily scanning tlie representations and computational processes 
postulated to explain a persons behaviour. The question about whether 
dreaming is an experience should, Dennett argued, be regarded as a question 
about tlie nature of the composition processes.
Dennett's distinction between the composition and presentation process is 
analogous to Freud's distinction between the Latent and Manifest dream. 
Commentators upon Freud have sometimes remarked upon tlie theoretical 
extravagance of distinguisliing two repression processes, the dream-work 
which transforms latent thoughts into tlie symbolic representations of the 
manifest dream  and the censorship of memory which makes dreams so 
remakably forgettable in virtue of tlieir disturbing symbolic content. Malcolm 
(1959) notes that psycho-analysts readily identify the manifest dream with 
the dream told upon awakening, merging the explanatory roles of dreamwork 
and memory. It is the postulation of potentially disturbing tliought-processes 
and their pre-consciousness transformation which explains the observable 
phenomena, the dream told. The manifest dream is tlieoretically idle.
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9. Demonstration that the Composition Process occurs at a pace comparible 
with witnessing or imagining the story told would not show that it was 
’experienced'.
We have already considered Dennett's proposal tliat whetlier or not dreaming 
is an 'experience' may be decided according to whether the peripheral 
physiology associated with the acquisition of a disposition to tell a dream is 
similar to that underlying waking perception or imagination. Another 
suggestion considered by Dennett as a technical substitute for popular notions of 
experience is the hypothesis that dreams are composed w ith a pace 
comparable to waking perception or imagination.
The question here is not whether it is essential to tlie ordinary concept of 
dreaming that dreams are composed during sleep or that they are composed in 
an order or at a pace similar to waking perception or experience. Let us suppose, 
for tiie time being, that it is both essential to the concept and true that the 
disposition to tell a dream is acquired during sleep with the pace and order 
similar to the pace and order with which a witness aquires his capacity to 
report the events he perceived or seemed to perceive. This supposition is re­
examined in next chapter (Chapter Five - "Dreaming W ithout Experience"). 
Dennett's own view, as I read him (reading Dennett one always has one's eyes 
fixed in between the lines), is tiiat the hypothesis that dreaming has a certain 
order, pace and duration fails to substitute for our conviction that dreaming is 
an 'experience' akin to perception or imagination. Diis view is, I think, correct. 
The distinction between our conviction tliat dreams are dreamt during sleep 
with an order and pace analogous to waking perception and the Received 
Opinion that dreams are episodes known to tiie dreamer as he dreams them is 
not made clear by Putnam  (1962a). Dennett is correct to point out that 
something, seemingly important to our ordinary notions about dreaming (indeed
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about our knowledge of ourselves generally), is missed out by the kind of 
functionalist justification of our conviction that dreams occur during sleep 
offered by Putnam. Putnam seems to reduce our conviction that dreaming is an 
experience to tlie notion tiiat dreaming is a process . Dreaming may be a process, 
the process by which a person acquires the capacity to tell a dream if awoken, 
without it following that one has any knowledge of that process or of any 
events that result from it during sleep.
In their seminal paper on dreaming. Dement & Klietman (1957) argued tliat 
laboratory observations of associations betw een external stim uli and 
awakening narratives, together w ith associations between the duration of 
StageREM period and length of narrative, serve to settle an old dispute, hotly 
debated among 19th centuary psychologists interested in dreams, about 
whetlier dreams occur instantaneously or with great rapidity. Dement & 
Kleitman concluded that a dream is dreamt at roughly the same pace as it 
would takes someone to witness or imagine tlie events dreamt.
It is a plausible inference from the effect of events in the sleeper's 
environment on his awakening narrative that tlie composition process occurs, at 
least in part, during sleep and that the results are simultaneously registered in 
a mechanism producing our 'memory' upon awakening. But the use of external 
stimuli to 'mark' the occurrence of the composition process fails to give a 
temporal location to seeming to see, imagining or any form of 'presentation' 
before the mind. Squires (1973) points out that tlie discovery that the cause of a 
perceptual illusion occupies the space apparently occupied by the illusory 
object does not show that, after all, the illusory object has a genuine spatial 
location. Similarily, he argued, the discovery tliat an apparent memory of 
events occurring during sleep is caused by events occurring during sleep does not 
show that the events we appear to remember have, after all, a genuine
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tem poral location. Scientific evidence may very well show that the 
composition of dreams occurs during sleep, at a pace and in an order analogous to 
walking perception but it does not show that we were, despite outward 
appearances to the contrary, aware of sometliing happening to us whilst we 
slept.
Association between the lengüi of dream narrative and preceding period of 
StageREM sleep might suggest that it takes about as long for a dream to be 
composed as it would take for one to witness or to imagine a similar adventure. 
It might be taken to suggest further that the brain processes by wliidi a person 
acquires the capacity to tell a dream  are similar to those which produce 
waking fantasies. But it does not follow that the process of composition is, to 
use Freud’s phrase, 'gone through' by the dreamer as he sleeps.
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PART THREE 
THE DISPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS
CHAPTER FIVE 
DREAMING WITHOUT EXPERIENCE
1. Our narratives of dreams could survive the discovery that dreams are not 
remembered from sleep on the assumption that dreams are w hat a person 
appears to remember upon awakening where he is not remembering events from 
waking life.
In this chapter and tlie next, I mean to question the implications of the 
conclusion that the Received Opinion is false. The conclusion I draw from the 
empirical fact tliat, in telling dreams, a person does not generally remember 
anything of which he was aware whilst asleep is that a dream is best regarded 
as the content of a certain kind of fictitious story a person is able to tell without 
invention or inference, as if he were remembering events witnessed and deeds 
done (no matter how incredible or unimaginable), where he is not remembering 
waking episodes and whether or not he is remembering something of what 
happened during sleep.
By taking seriously the argument that the Received Opinion is empirically 
false, we arrive at a meeting point with Malcolm's (1959) argument that the 
Received Opinion cannot possibly be true. From here one may take Malcolm's 
view tliat tlie Received Opinion is not fundamental to the ordinary talk of 
dreaming. Alternatively, one may take Squires' (1973) view that it should not 
be. Whichever view is taken, there is a common interest in articulating an
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analysis of the concept of dreaming which does not imply that the Received 
Opinion is true, yet retains, as far as possible, the empirical substance of talk 
about 'remembering dreams'.
Malcolm's conclusion was that tlie concept of dreaming is not a theoretical 
concept referring to something which explains our awakening impressions; it is 
an analytic tru th  that dreams are w hat we appear to remember upon 
awakening where we are not remembering. Squires, as I read him, concluded 
that dreaming is a bad theoretical concept; that, strictly speaking, Üiere are no 
dreams; and that if talk of 'remembering dreams' is to reasonably survive the 
discovery that the Received Opinion is false, it should be purged of its 
empirical assumptions. This chapter examines the attempt to fleece ordinary 
talk of dreaming of any empirical implications.
The conclusion I draw  is that, the denial that dreaming is a theoretical 
concept is an over-reaction to the discovery that the Received Opinion is false. 
To take a person's awakening impression as the sole criterion' of dreaming 
would be to abandon some of the empirical implications of talk about dreaming 
which could reasonably survive the discovery tlrat in 'telling a dream' a person 
does not remember anything about what happened during sleep. In my view, 
our conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten 
upon awakening is a theoretical assumption open to scientific investigation. 
But it is a theoretical assumption distinguishable from the Received Opinion.
2, According to the Reductive Analysis the inference from what a person says 
upon awakening to what he dreamt is unconditional upon any assumptions about 
what happened during sleep, bu t this is an over-reaction to the discovery that 
in telling a dream we do not remember what happened during sleep.
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In this chapter, I argue that only where certain theoretical assumptions are 
made about the causal explanation of our waking capacities to tell dreams can 
definite sense be given to the idea that a dream is dreamt at a particular time 
within a period of sleep. I regard Malcolm's proposition that sentences of tiie 
form 'X is dreaming p' or 'X dream t p at time t' have no definite sense in 
ordinary use as a revisionary conclusion which would be reached only if it were 
discovered tliat events occurring during sleep do not determine a content-specific 
disposition to tell a story upon awakening. Only where it is assumed tliat there 
is a normal manner of awakening and that this manner of awakening has no 
particular effects upon the dreams a person will tell, if prom pted and 
attentive, can a dream be identified, as we ordinarily suppose, according to the 
dreamer and time dreamt without specifying a peculiar manner of awakening 
necessary for him  to tell that dream rather than another.
I agree witli Malcolm tliat notliing in our ordinary lives shows that we 
make any assumption about the causal explanation of 'telling a dream'. Our 
everyday practice does not distinguish talk about dreaming during sleep from a 
merely metaphorical description of the fact that we awake witli the capacity 
to tell a story which we did not have before. Phrases purporting to locate 
dreams at particular times within a period of sleep could, as Putnam (1962a) 
allowed, be mere figures of speech incorporating 'dead theories' devoid of any 
implication open to reasonable investigation. 1 disagree with Malcolm in 
believing contemporary scientific investigations to be relevant to what we 
ordinarily say about dreaming. 1 agree with Putnam (1962a) (1962b) tliat were 
it discovered that the dreams we tell are largely determined by what happens 
as we wake up, tlie significance of our ordinary talk of dreaming would cliange, 
even though our habits of speech might remain the same. There would be a 
transition from what is at present viable theory to metaphorical idiom. Were
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it found that there is no cluster of generalisations enabling us to predict what 
dream a person would tell if awoken, then we would have discovered reasons to 
regard the connection between dreams and awakening narratives as analytic 
(unreviseable by empirical observations), and to regard talk of dreams being 
dreamt during sleep as a mere figure of speech.
Where I disagree w ith Putnam  is over his supposition that scientific 
investigations are relevant to ordinary talk of dreaming because both scientific 
investigations and ordinary talk imply tlie Received Opinion. On my account, 
the common bond between ordinary talk and scientific research is established 
by tiie hypothesis tliat dreaming is the acquisition during sleep of an ability to 
tell a particular story as if of events witnessed upon awakening without 
invention or inference which is not a memory of waking life. There is no 
implication tliat tlie dream told refers to events occurring during sleep or that 
the content of the dream was in any sense represented or experienced by tlie 
sleeper prior to awakening.
3. Should it turn out that our common assumptions about the causal explanation 
of Telling a dream* are false, the Reductive Analysis may yet prove to be the 
best interpretation of the concept of dreaming, but this conclusion, unlike the 
conclusion that the Received Opinion is false, depends upon the results of 
scientific investigation.
In this chapter and the next, 1 attempt to show that the conclusion that the 
Received Opinion is false does not lead directly to the reduction of dreaming 
and remembering dreams to merely appearing to remember episodes upon 
awakening. Ultimately, 1 have some doubt whetlier that conclusion can be 
averted. But the only possible salvation I can see lies in tlie Dispositional 
Analysis of dreaming and remembering defended here.
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In preferring the Dispositional Analysis over the Reductive Analysis, I 
assume, perhaps unreasonably, an optimistic view of the prospect that 
experimental work on sleep will enable us to chart the acquisition, retention 
and loss of the capacity to tell a particular dream. This optimistic assumption 
has the point of making clearer by disagreement with Malcolm that scientific 
investigations into sleep are relevant to dreaming. The previous chapter 
(Chapter Four 'Perception During Sleep') has already discussed some of tlie 
reasons for questioning the grounds for optimism about the scientific 
justification of the assum ption that the disposition to tell a dream  of a 
particular content is acquired and retained during sleep.
The argum ent of this chapter and tlie next is that dreaming could be 
identified w ith a general disposition to tell a certain story if awoken in a 
'normal' manner (and prom pted, etc.) and should be where there is any 
reasonable hope that such a disposition might be discovered. 1 do not 
recommend the Dispositional Analysis on the grounds tliat it implies a well- 
confirmed or even empirically plausible hypothesis. The fact that tlie 
Received Opinion is clearly false is sufficient reason to disassociate ordinary 
talk about dreaming from that opinion. But the fact that the Dispositional 
Hypotliesis (tliat the dreams we tell are determined by events occurring during 
sleep and not by contingencies of awakening) is uncertain or even doubtful is not 
sufficient reason to disassociate it from ordinary talk about dreaming where to 
do so would be to render ordinary talk about dreams being dreamt during sleep 
and remembered upon awakening into empirically empty metaphor.
In tlie Conclusion, 1 consider that, perhaps, reasonable hope of predicting 
from observations of sleep what story a person would tell if awoken has now 
been exhausted and that either Malcolm's conclusion tliat dreaming is not a 
theoretical concept or Squires' conclusion that it is a bad theoretical concept is.
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in tlie end, correct. The failure of psycho-physiological research to establish 
content-specific indexes of dreaming points to the conclusion that dreams are not 
dreamt during sleep and remembered upon awakening. If, as seems likely, we 
were to go on speaking about 'remembering dreams' regardless of tlie empirical 
results, there would be reason to suppose, as Malcolm had it, that talk of 
remembering dreams is just a manner of describing, without explanation, tlie 
fact that we awake with the capacity to tell without invention or inference a 
fictitious story as if of events witnessed which we did not have before falling 
asleep. But that is a conclusion 1 think we should resist so long as we can 
envisage any program  of experiments which might tend to show that the 
disposition to tell a particular dream is acquired and retained during sleep.
4. The Dispositional Analysis may be regarded as an elaboration of the 
Reductive Analysis, adding to it the minimum assumptions required to give 
empirical substance to our commonplace conviction that dreams are dreamt 
during sleep and remembered or forgotten upon awakening.
In this chapter, 1 argue that some modification of the identification of a dream 
with the content of an awakening narrative which is not a memory of waking 
life is mandatory if the Reductive Analysis is to furnish a plausible analysis of 
the ordinary concept of dreaming. Some modifications can be made to allow for 
a distinction between a person's awakening impression of a dream and tlie facts 
about the dream itself without importing theoretical assumptions about what 
went on during sleep. We ordinarily allow that a person's actual account of a 
dream might be corrected by what he would have said in 'better' waking 
circumstances. A rough but concrete account can be given of these circumstances 
avoiding either an emply stipulation that the dreamer have 'whatever it 
takes' to judge die matter and without presupposing empirical details about
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what goes on in sleep. But we also allow that a person's account of a dream 
dream t earlier in the night may be corrected according to what response he 
would have given if he had been awoken at tliat earlier time. The time witliin 
a period of sleep at which a person acquires a capacity to tell a particular story 
if awoken is relevant to the identity of the dream  told w hen he actually 
awakes. This identification cannot be made without regard to empirical facts 
about what went on during sleep. I attempt to demarcate the border at which 
elaboration of the Reductive Analysis transforms it into the Dispositional 
Analysis.
The Reductive Analysis (which is, allowing a few liberties of 
interpretation, the analysis of the ordinary concept defended by Malcolm) can 
make room for the possibility of an untold dream  or a dream  incorrectly 
narrated. A person's actual awakening narrative may be corrected by what he 
would have said in some waking circumstances C 'better' for telling dreams. 
However, tlie Reductive Analysis provides no means of identifying 'the best' 
circumstances for telling a dream he has had or is having where a person is yet 
asleep. There could be a range of equally good possible waking circumstances C 
(circumstances where a person is promptly asked, attentive, enthusiastic, not 
distracted) each of which would, if realised, determine a different awakening 
narrative. Only where an actual waking context is presupposed (i.e. where 
'dreaming' is used in w hat Malcolm called its 'primary' sense), can a 'best' 
account of a person's dreams be determined according to w hat the dreamer 
would have said if prompted, co-operative, not distracted, etc. in possible 
circumstances identical with or nearest to his actual manner of awakening.
1 draw  the distinction betw een the Reductive Analysis and the 
Dispositional Analysis at the point where it is implied that a dream may be 
identified according to what a person would say if awoken at time t witliout
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specifying (e.g. by pointing to his actual awakening circumstances) the manner 
of awakening witli which possible circumstances C are identical or nearest to. 1 
defend die conclusion that a speculative assumption that there is a 'normal' 
manner of awakening, such that the specific content of dream told is determined 
by processes occurring during sleep, is implicit in ordinary talk about dreaming, 
at least in that part of it which distinguishes between dreams according to die 
time they were dreamt widiin a period of sleep.
The Dispositional Analysis is dius presented as an elaboration upon the 
Reductive Analysis. It retains die idea that what a person dreamt is ,the story 
as if of events witnessed which he able to tell without invention or inference in 
certain waking circumstances where he is not remembering anything from 
waking life. It retains die idea diat the story told is not a description of what 
happened  (w hat seem ed to happen, w hat was im agined, thought, 
'represented' or 'experienced') during sleep. But it imports die assumption that 
die content of a person's waiting narrative of a dream is causally determined by 
processes occurring during sleep prior to awakening. It draws a contrast, which 
cannot be made by the Reductive Analysis, between telling a dream and 
artifacts of die process of awakening, between dreams dreamt during sleep and 
illusions of dreams explained by the contingencies of awakening.
Tlie Reductive Analysis does not allow diat a person's narrative might 
ever be confirmed or disconfirmed according to whether it agrees with 
observations of sleep. In agreement, the Dispositional Analysis does not 
introduce any notion that scientific investigations might arrive at an account of 
w hat a person dream t at a certain time which might confirm or disconfirni 
what he would have said if awoken at that time (and prompted, etc.) Tlie 
Dispositional Analysis does, however, introduce the notion that questions 
about the temporal identity of dreams within a period of sleep have an
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empirical substance; scientific investigations could in principle confirm or 
disconfirm speculations about whether a dream told upon awakening was 
dreamed earlier in the night or immediately prior to awakening. If it were 
settled tliat die dream referred to were dreamt at some time earlier in die 
night, scientific investigations might correct the account given by die dreamer 
when he actually wakes up at a later time. But the ground for diis correction ;
would be nodiing other than grounds for a hypothesis about what die dreamer j
would have said if he had been awoken earlier. !
Moreover, the authority of a person's actual awakening account could !
always be preserved (given diat he is attentive, etc.) by stipulating that the i
dream told might have been dreamt only immediately prior to awakening. For 
the Dispositional Analysis does not allow that scientific investigations could j
confirm or disconfirm a person's account of a dream dreamt immediately prior to 
awakening; investigations could only confirm or disconfirm the additional 
hypothesis diat the disposition to tell that dream was acquired at an earlier 
moment in sleep.
The Dispositional Analysis does, in departure from the Reductive 
Analysis, introduce a notion of how scientific investigation could show that our 
narratives of dreams are erroneous. Scientific investigations might show that 
we are generally mistaken in assuming that dreams are dreamt during sleep. It 
might be shown, in some particular cases, diat the 'dream' told is an artifact of 
arousal. An element of the dream is explained by a peculiarity of awakening 
such as, for example, Maury's 'guillotine' dream discussed by Freud and others 
or in the 'lost goat' dream reported by Dennett (1976)). Or research, such as 
that reported by Hall (1981), m ight confirm Globot's hypothesis that the 
contents of our awakening narratives are quite generally explained by events 
occurring as we awakeas attempted to do.
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Our everyday identification of the contents of a dream with the story a 
person tells upon awakening might survive the confirmation of Globot's 
hypothesis. Tlie 'language game' of telling a dream described by Wittgenstein 
m the Investigations, need not be taken to imply that dreams are dreamt during 
sleep and remembered or forgotten upon awakening. This 'core' of the ordinary 
concept of dreaming might be accounted for by the Reductive Analysis, if we 
were to regard our conviction that something is remembered as merely die 
recognition that telling a dream is 'like' remembering events witnessed (except 
that nothing is remembered!). But by implying an empirical assumption about 
die causal explanation of our capacity to tell fictitious stories upon awakening 
w ithout inference or invention, the Dispositional Analysis allows that 
something is remembered, even tiiough it is nothing like die ostensible referents 
of the story told.
5. The Reductive Analysis, that dreams are what one appears to remember 
upon awakening where one is not remembering anything from waking life, 
allows that a person's actual judgem ent about his dreams may sometimes be 
corrected according to what he would have appeared to remember in  some other 
waking circumstances, C, good for telling dreams.
The identification of the content of a person's dreams witii what he appears to 
remember upon awakening (no matter how bizarre or impossible) where he is 
not remembering anything from waking life does not imply that the story a 
person sincerely tells can never be mistaken. It implies only, as Malcolm (1959) 
insisted, that a description of a dream can never be judged to be correct or 
mistaken according to its correspondence with some state of affairs logically 
independent of what the dreamer is sincerely inclined to say. It is possible diat 
the story he sincerely tells may be corrected by reference to what he would
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have said in circumstances 'better' for telling a dream, provided that the notion 
of circumstances good for telling a dream is not explained in terms of 'tracking' 
some independently identifiable state of affairs.
In everyday practice, we are seldom perturbed by questions about what 
makes some awakening conditions better for telling a dream  than others. 
Normally preference is given to an account given immediately upon awakening 
over one given later in the day. But it is readily allowed tliat a person may 
add to his original story details he did not at first express and that he may 
later notice features that initially escaped his attention. Exceptionally a 
person may even correct his story, but only slightly and where there is some 
explanation of his earlier words being carelessly expressed, a slip of tlie tongue 
or semantic misunderstanding. It is remarkable that people who ordinarily 
suppose themselves to dream infrequently or not at all turn out to have many 
and detailed dreams to tell when they adopt the practice of keeping a dream- 
diary upon awakening or when, as in sleep laboratory experiments, they are 
regularly woken up and questioned during the night. But our surprise is at the 
scale of this phenomenon ratlier than at the suggestion that tliere are dreams 
which we are unaware of in tlie normal course of waking. We readily allow 
that a person may be distracted from his dreams in some waking circumstances 
(e.g. busy week-day mornings when he must rush to work) that he would have 
noticed in otlier waking circumstances (e.g. a day off when he has no urgent 
business to attend to).
The Reductive Analysis requires some modification if it is to allow for a 
distinction between a dream and tlie content of an actual waking narrative as if 
of events remembered. Otherwise it cannot account for tlie possibility of untold 
dreams, of dreams which are not the content of an actual awakening narrative. 
What explanation could there be of why a person did not tell a dream he had?
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Of course a person may not have occasion or inclination to express himself. He 
may be reticent or even dishonest in his confessions. He may censor, invent or 
twist a tale to suit his public image. More interestingly, a person may not tell a 
dream because he is unaware of it, he is unable to express his dream because he 
has no impression of it.
How could a person be unaware of his dream where, as the Reductive 
Analysis maintains, tlie existence and content of a dream is logically dependent 
upon his awakening impression of it? How might a person be mistaken in his 
judgem ent about the occurrence and content of his dream  other than by 
mistaking a memory of waking life for the impression of his dreams? What 
explanation could there be other tlian by reason tliat Üiere was no dream to 
tell? The Reductive Analysis can allow tliat a person's account of his dreams 
may be corrected only by reference to what he would have said in 'better' 
circumstances, waking circumstances that are of kind C, known a priori to be 
good for telling dreams. There are facts about dreams which are facts about 
what a person would have appeared to remember in such-and-such waking 
circumstances other than circumstances in which he actually awoke.
6. Circumstances C good for telling dreams are analogous to circumstances known 
from common experience to be generally good for remembering events recently 
witnessed (i.e. where immediately questioned or otherwise prompted, where 
trying hard to remember events recent experiences, where not distracted).
In everyday experience, what is good for bringing to mind without invention or 
inference vivid impressions of past experiences, regardless of whether these 
thmgs happened, is 'trying to remember' what recently happened. According to 
the Reductive Aialysis, waking circumstances good for telling dreams are those 
in which a person intentionally tries hard to say without invention or inference
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what he recently perceived, thought, imagined, etc. no matter how improbable 
or impossible.
The proposition that a person will best judge upon his dreams if, witliin tlie 
context of awakening, he confidently tries to remember w hat happened or 
seemed to him to be happening during sleep, is not an admission that we do or 
should believe in the Received Opinion. We are familiar enough with tlie 
idea that practical results are often achieved by 'going through the motions' of 
belief, by playing an 'inner game' of self-deception or by 'suspending disbelief. 
These phenomenon are not happily described and are not well-understood, but 
are commonplace enough for us to allow that a person could 'try hard' to 
remember recent experiences where his over-reaching purpose is merely to 
appear to remember events which were not experienced in waking life, without 
regard to whether these events were experienced during sleep. The 'success' of a 
person's efforts in attending to his dreams by trying hard to remember recent 
events, discounting what is remembered from waking life, is not measured by 
correspondence of its results with observations of sleep. 'Success' may simply be 
to have gone through the familiar motions of trying to recollect (e.g. saying to 
oneself "Let me see, what was just going through my mind?", closing one's eyes, 
screwing up one's face, saying "Shh!" to a distracting question) without regard 
to independent evidence or even to the intrinsic improbability or impossibility 
of the events one appears to remember.
7. The analogy betw een circumstances C good for telling dreams and 
circumstances know n from common experience to be generally good for 
remembering events recently witnessed is not explained or justified by the 
Causal Hypothesis that the internal processes producing narratives of dreams 
are akin to those underlying perceptual memory.
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It is tempting to suppose that the analogy evident in what we ordinarily say 
between what is good for telling a dream and what is good for remembering 
recent events is explained or justified by our assuming that dreaming is an 
internal process akin to a process underlying waking perception or imagination 
and that dreams are remembered or forgotten according to tlie operation of 
internal processes (e.g. storage of a memory trace) akin to those mediating 
between events perceived or imagined and subsequent reports of them. It would 
follow that distinctions could be drawn among the internal causes of 'telling a 
dream' between factors which produce frequent dreams, factors which increase 
one's ability to tell dreams one has had and factors which merely produce 
frequent and volumous narratives as if of dreams had.
Malcolm recognised that distinctions thus drawn might be applied in tlie 
light of scientific investigations to correct or modify our ordinary judgments 
about what circumstances are good for telling dreams. He argued that such 
corrections or modifications w ould amount to a change in our concept of 
dreaming, not the application of an assumption implicit in everyday language. 
1 agree with Malcolm that what 1 call the Causal Hypothesis, asserting that 
narratives of dreams are produced by internal processes akin to those 
underlying a witness' ability to report events perceived, need not be implied by 
our ordinary practice of correcting a person's account of a dream according to 
what he would have said in circumstances known from common experience to be 
generally good for remembering events witnessed. That sud i circumstances are 
good for telling dreams is Icnown a priori and is not explained by any 
independent evidence that, in these circumstances, w aking narratives 
correspond to dreams. The fact that the analogy holds w ith circumstances 
commonly known to be generally good for remembering recent events does not
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dictate that the analogy extend to unfamiliar circumstances such as the 
internal processes we suppose to explain perceptual memory.
Suppose that in some future time, a pharmaceutical company advertises a 
drug 'Dreamex' which, taken as a nightcap, produces frequent and voluminous 
impressions of recent adventures upon awakening. The drug  is widely 
prescribed by Psychoanalysts. The Dreamex company makes a killing. The 
Reductive Analysis does not prejudice what we should say of 'dreams' told by 
someone taking Dreamex which he would not otherwise have told. It does not 
dictate whether person's narratives should be corrected according to what he 
would have said if he had or hadn 't been taking Dreamex. It does not 
distinguish the implications between saying that tliis drug improves a person's 
ability to tell dreams he has had, or produces more dreams during sleep, or 
produces 'illusions of dreams' upon awakening.
The Dreamex company's rivals are envious of its success. They suspect that 
tlie company has been selling drugs patented by them under a different label. 
The Dreamex company stands accused of fraudulently claiming variously tliat 
"Dreamex makes you dream more dreams", tliat "Dreamex helps you remember 
your dreams", and that "Dreamex is the perfect alternative for people who do 
not dream but can afford an Analyst". The Trading Standards Board discovers 
that the product marketed as 'Dreamex' is not consistent in its contents. 
Sometimes the little brown capsules contain a drug otherwise known as 
'Memorex', other times tliey contain 'Hallucinex' or, w hen that is in short 
supply, they contain a tliird product 'Nostalgex'. Each of these three drugs has 
the common effect, taken as a nightcap, of regularly producing vivid 
impressions of recent adventures when one awakens. But when taken during the 
day each of these drugs has a distinctive effect. Memorex improves one's
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memory of recent episodes, Hallucinex produces vivid images of current 
adventures and Nostalgex produces vivid illusions of experiences recently past.
Should we say tliat Memorex improves one's ability to tell dreams one has 
had, Hallucinex produces more dreams and Nostalgex produces awakening 
illusions of having dreamt? Could the Dreamex company justify its 
advertisement claims by combining all three drugs in their capsules, just to 
make sure you are either more aware of your dreams, have more dreams to tell 
or, failing which, still liave a story to tell your Analyst? The analogy between 
circumstances C good for telling a dream and circumstances known from common 
experience to be generally good for remembering events witnessed does not 
determine any answers to these questions. The discovery that Dreamex is 
variously either Memorex, Hallucinex or Nostalgex might suggest a convenient 
use for a distinction between 'remembering' more dreams, 'dreaming' more 
dreams and 'having illusions of remembering dream'. But Obese distinctions 
make explicit nothing in our ordinary concept of dreaming. They simply find an 
expedient vocabulary for distinguishing hypotheses about the causal 
production of frequent and voluminous awakening narratives of the kind we 
ordinarily identify as narratives of dreams.
According to Malcolm, it could not be discovered that we are widely 
mistaken about our everyday competence in telling dreams. If it were 
discovered that the brain processes which produce narratives of dreams are 
dissimilar to tlie waking brain processes conducive to remembering what one 
recently saw and did  (that, for example, they are akin to the processes 
activated by Nostalgex) it would not be shown that the usual circumstances of 
telling a dream are defective. It might be found tliat taking Memorex effects a 
change in tlie usual production of awakening narratives, producing them 
according to processes which are normally good for remembering events recently
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witnessed in waking life. But it need not follow that our everyday narratives 
of dreams, where we are sincere, attentive, etc. should be corrected by reference 
to what we would have said if we had been taking Memorex.
It might be suggested that we ordinarily assume that everyday narratives 
of dream s are usually competent because we assume that the everyday 
circumstances of awakening which produce narratives of dreams are akin to 
those which would produce memories of events recently witnessed had we been 
recently awake and open-eyed. The Causal Hypothesis about the internal 
generation of telling a dream is both plausible and widely believed. But it does 
not follow that such an assumption explains our usual acceptance of a person's 
awaking narrative as a true description of his dreams. Ratlier, the analogy 
between what is good for telling a dream and what is good for remembering 
events recently w itnessed only describes our practice of sometimes 
distinguishing between what a person is able to say when actually awoken and 
what he might have been able to say at the time if, for example, he had not 
been distracted. There is no reason to suppose that the limited analogy evident 
in the ordinary context of telling a dream represents a rule which binds us to 
correct our narratives of dreams in ways unforeseen in tliat context.
In the Investigations [p. 184], Wittgenstein raised the question whether it 
follows from the fact that an individual has an especially poor memory for 
recent events that his narratives of dreams should be treated witli suspicion. I 
take Wittgenstein's point to have been, not that this question cannot be given a 
sensible answer, but tliat our ordinary talk about dreams does not disclose a rule 
or principle (e.g. "whatever is good for remembering events is good for 
remembering dreams") which dictates an answer. Ordinary talk may, by and 
large, bear out an analogy between what is commonly known to be good for
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remembering events witnessed, but tlie extent to which such an analogy should 
be applied is not pre-determined by what we ordinarily do or say.
8. Which among the possible judgements a person m ight give ’if  awoken in  
circumstances of kind C  is uniquely ’the best’ account of his dreams camiot be 
decided by analogy w ith remembering recent events, for we have no analogous 
conception of how the facts may be judged independently of w hat a person 
appears to rem ember.
It is not stipulated in advance that scientific discoveries about what is good for 
remembering recent events establish necessarily what is good for remembering 
dreams. But neitlier is it an empirical question whether internal processes good 
for remembering events witnessed are, as a matter of fact, good for telling 
dreams. That a person's account of his dreams may sometimes be corrected by 
reference to what he would have said in circumstances C commonly known to be 
generally good for rem embering recently witnessed events (e.g. being 
immediately questioned or otherwise prompted, trying hard to remember recent 
experiences, not being distracted) is known a priori. It was not established by 
common observation of correspondence between our awakening narratives and 
other evidence about our dreams; and it is not confirmed or disconfirmed by 
scientific investigations. By contrast it is an empirical question what exact 
conditions are good for bringing about a correspondence between a witnesses' 
report and the events he saw.
Should tlie analogy between what is generally good for remembering recent 
events and what is good for telling a dream extend to take accormt of scientific 
discoveries about what is good for remembering events? It is a mistake, as I see 
it, to suppose that this is an empirical question which might survive the 
discovery that the Received Opinion is false. The reason is not located by
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Malcolm's (1959) argument that we have no conception of what evidence could 
confirm or disconfirm a person's narrative of perceptions, tlioughts, images, etc. 
enjoyed whilst asleep. Malcolm came closer to the mark in his conclusion 
(whatever his reasons for it) that it is a peculiarity of dream s that 
observations of sleep cannot outstrip a dreamer's best waking judgement. But 
the error I have in mind is one that could survive the conclusion that dreams 
cannot transcend a subject's best waking judgements. It is to suppose tliat we 
have some conception of how a person's 'best' narrative of a dream might be 
judged to correspond to something which explains why it is it is his best 
judgment.
The relevant notion of 'good' circumstances for telling a dream  is 
importantly disanalogous to the notion of 'good' circumstances for remembering 
events witnessed. What is 'good' for telling a dream cannot be explained by 
reference to the nature of something ('the dream') occurring during sleep to 
which a person's awakening narrative may be judged to correspond with more or 
less accuracy. A person's actual account of a dream (or failure to narrative a 
dream) may be criticised by the observation that his waking circumstances 
were in some respects defective (e.g. he was late for work when he awoke and 
took no time to reflect upon his dreams). But a set of strictures according to 
which a person’s judgment about his dreams may be faulted is very different 
from a recipe for finding out what a person dreamt independently of an actual 
waking context within which those strictures may be applied.
According to the Reductive Analysis, it is not an empirical hypotliesis that 
circumstances C are good for telling dreams. It is not assumed tliat in such 
circumstances a person's apparent memory is a reliable indicator of the 
existence and character of something (the dream) which some possible 
investigation could confirm or disconfirm. By contrast, it is an empirical matter
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what circumstances are good for remembering recent events. Most of our 
knowledge of what circumstances are generally good for remembering recent 
events (e.g. where a person is prompted to say what seemed to him to have 
happened, where he is co-operative, conscientious, undistracted, sincere, 
eloquent) comes from everyday experience, tried and tested from generation to 
generation. It is possible, however, that science will discover with much 
greater precision what exactly produces a correspondence between what one 
appears to remember and what happened. It might be supposed tliat Memorex 
(one of the various products marketed under the 'Dreamex' label) was 
originally designed, in light of discoveries about the neuro-chemistry of 
individuals with extraordinarily good memory, to produce impressions of recent 
events which corresponded with great regularity to what a person recently 
perceived or seemed to perceive.
We could choose to apply this knowledge to stipulate w ith greater 
specificity ('precision' would be a misleading word here) what analogous 
waking circumstances are good for telling dreams. We might allow that a 
person's 'normal' waking narrative of a dream could be corrected according to 
what he would have said if he had taken Memorex. The Reductive Analysis 
need not prohibit an extension of the analogy between what is good for telling 
dreams and what is good for remembering recent events. But the extension of 
the analogy would not be forced upon us by scientific discoveries about tlie 
correspondence of a person’s waking judgement to his dreams. For, in the case of 
telling a dream, we have no conception of evidence according to which it might 
be judged that one apparent memory is better tlian any otlier, independently of 
tlie awakening circumstances which produce it, in virtue of its agreement with 
the testimony or records of other observers.
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The analogy between w hat is good for telling dreams and what is generally 
good for reporting events recently witnessed cannot furnish a useful notion of 
which among possible apparent memories (p or q or r) a person may have in 
circumstances C known from ordinary experience to be generally good for 
remembering recent events (e.g. where prompted, where 'trying hard' to 
remember episodes no matter how fantastic, where not distracted, etc.) is the 
best because it corresponds to the particular dream (p rather than q or r) tliat he 
h ad .
9. The Reductive Analysis camiot explain how a person's narrative might be 
corrected by reference to what he would have said if awoken at some time 
earlier than he was actually awoken.
We readily allow that a person awoken at 4 am may fail to tell a dream p he 
would have told if awoken at 2 am and that if awoken at 8 am he may have a 
different dream q to tell. Among tiie conditions we commonly take to be good for 
telling a dream  p, is that a person should be awoken 'immediately after' 
dreaming p. This would seem to be an unexceptional elaboration of the 
assumption that a person's best judgment about his dreams is tliat given where 
he is immediately questioned or otherwise prompted upon awakening. But tlie 
Reductive Analysis is unable to admit that a person's account of a dream may be 
corrected according to what he would have appeared to remember if awoken at 
some other time. According to the Reductive Analysis, what a person would 
have appeared to remember if awoken at some other time would, if it differed 
markedly in its ostensible content, necessarily be a different dream. The 
Reductive Analysis does not provide for the identification of dreams according 
to the time tliey were dreamt within a period of sleep; dreams dreamt within
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the same period of sleep are distinguishable only by their narrative content 
being of different and unconnected adventures.
The Dispositional Analysis allows that a person awaking at 8am may or 
may not be able to tell a dream dreamt at 4am. What a person dreamt at 4am is 
what he would have said if awoken at 4am in circumstances C good for telling 
dreams (i.e. if prompted, cooperative, sincere, undistracted, etc.). It does not 
allow that a person's narrative in circumstances C of a dream 'interrupted' by 
his awakening could be mistaken. Should the narrative a person gives at 8am 
depart radically from what he would have said if awoken at 4am, it does not 
mean that ttie 8am narrative is mistaken. It means only tliat he has forgotten 
the 4am dream  and is telling, presum ably correctly, another dream  
subsequently dreamt.
The Dispositional Analysis, unlike the Reductive Analysis, counts as 
significant w hat a person would have said if awoken at 4am rather tlian at 
8am. It tliereby gives sense to assertions about what a person is currently 
dreaming prior to his awakening; what a person is dreaming at any given time 
is settled according to what, if any, story he would tell if immediately awoken 
(and prompted, etc.). In order to thus identify a dream according to the time it 
was dream t w ithin a period of sleep, prior to an actual awakening, the 
Dispositional Analysis must import certain assumptions about tlie 'normal' 
process of awakening. A departure is marked, at this point, from the Reductive 
Analysis which admits no empirically testable assumptions about what 
happens during sleep.
10. According to the Reductive Analyses, sentences of the form 'X is dreaming p' 
have no definite meaning for we have no conception of 'the best' possible
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judgem ent about w hat X dreamt except in the context where a person has 
actually awoken or is in  the process of awakening.
The requirement that the circumstances in which a person judges w hat he 
dreamt to be of a kind C analogous to circumstances commonly known to be 
generally good for remembering events recently witnessed is not sufficient to 
determine a unique judgment about his dreams. There may be many possible 
variations within tlie conditions of waking which are causally relevant to the 
production of an apparent memory which do not infringe tliis requirement.
It is possible that, given tlie same prior conditions during sleep, variations 
in the process of awakening may have a significant effect upon what a person 
would appear to remember if awoken'. Waking is, after all, a process which 
can be realised in many different ways, the details of which are largely 
unknown to us. Associations between stimulus occurring during sleep and waking 
narratives are generally supposed to locate the causal explanation of the 
content of a person's narrative in sleep. But it could turn out that the manner in 
which a person is awoken (e.g. water sprayed on his face, alarm bells, vigorous 
shaking) sometimes corresponds to what a person appears to remember. Such 
discoveries would suggest that significant elements of tlie 'dream' a person tells 
are not determined during sleep and depend upon the contingencies of 
awakening. It is possible that what happens during sleep does not generally 
determine a specific set of experiences (rather than a disjunction of alternative 
possible sets of experiences) that a person will appear to remember 'if awoken 
in circumstances C . Unknown details of superficially 'ordinary' awakenings 
may produce apparent memories of entirely different adventures. In which case 
it may be reasonably questioned whetlier tliere is any possible judgment about a 
dream which is uniquely 'the best'.
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Malcolm drew a distinction between the primary and secondary uses of tlie 
verb 'to dream ’ in ordinary practice. He pointed out that our basic use of 
statements of tlie form 'X dreamt p' presupposes tlie circumstances of an actual 
awakening. This presupposition ensures a contextual or demonstrative 
specification of the exact manner of awakening in which dream p and none 
other would be told (if prompted, co-operative, undistracted, etc.). In cases of 
the primary use of 'X dreamt p', dreams are uniquely identified by tlie dreamer 
and the time at which he was awoken whilst allowing tliat a person's actual 
awakening impression may be corrected by reference to what he would appear 
to remember in circumstances C (if he’d been prompted, tried hard to remember 
recent experiences and not been distracted). For it may be stipulated that 'tlie 
best' account of a dream is tliat which the dreamer would give in circumstances 
C identical with or nearest to his actual manner and conditions of awakening. 
This stipulation closes the indeterminacy about what he w ould appear to 
remember according to unspecified contingencies about tlie process of awakening 
left open by the bare requirement that waking conditions good for telling a 
dream be of kind C analogous to those commonly known to be generally good for 
remembering events recently witnessed.
The attempt to close the indeterminacy about what a dreamer would 
appear to remember according to unspecified contingencies of awakening by 
stipulating that his best impression of a dream is that which he would have in 
circumstances C identical with or nearest to his actual manner of awakening, 
fails to uniquely identify a dream according to the dreamer and time dreamt, 
except in the context where a person has already awoken or is in the process of 
awakening. The Reductive Analysis implies, as I take Malcolm to have meant, 
that 'X dream t p' has no definite truth-value except where the details of an 
actual waking are presupposed. It implies that secondary uses of tlie verb 'to
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dream' fail to refer to tlie content of an apparent memory; thus, for example, 
where one delights in the supposition that Lover Boy sobbing through his 
snores is dream ing of the sweet-heart who yesterday dum ped him, one's 
supposition has no definite meaning. It allows that a person may equally well 
be said, at a time prior to awakening, to be simultaneously dreaming unrelated 
adventures p, q and r, the dream he eventually tells depending upon the manner 
of awakening. The attempt to say further which particular dream is being 
dreamt fails to say anything about what is going on in sleep. At best it may 
succeed in predicting the manner in which the dreamer will be awoken.
The attempt to explain statements about the occurrence of dreams at some 
time prior to awakening as a hypotheses about what a person would appear to 
remember if awoken at that time but not before in the manner in which he zoas 
later actually awoken fails to counter examples generated by tlie possibility of 
dreams explained by the process of awakening ratlier than by events occurring 
during sleep. For example, it is possible that a person be more or less born with 
a chronic disposition to appear to remember p if awoken in a peculiar manner 
W, where W explains the production of apparent memory p whatever the prior 
conditions in sleep. Were a person to actually awake in manner W it would 
follow, according to proposition tliat a dream is dreamt at the time a person 
acquires during sleep a disposition to tell tliat dream if awoken 'in tlie manner 
in which he was actually awoken', that he dreamt p the instant he first fell 
asleep and perhaps that he redreamt the same dream everytime he fell asleep 
since tlien.
Tlie Dispositional Analysis departs from the Reductive Analysis precisely 
in that it imports into our talk about dreams occurring during sleep the 
assumption that there is a 'normal' manner of awakening such that what a 
person would say 'if awoken' (and prompted, etc.) could, in principle, be from
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events occurring during sleep predicted without specifying that a peculiar 
manner of awakening is necessary to produce that narrative rather tlian 
another. It is on this assumption that we identify a person's dream according to 
the time he dreamt it.
11. According to the Reductive Analysis, a person's dream and his best waking 
judgment are not merely conceptually interdependent; there is a sense in  which 
his best waking judgement is logically prior to or determines what he dreamt. 
What makes some circumstances of telling a dream better than otliers is not 
explained by reference to the existence or nature of something ('the dream') to 
which a person's narrative more or less corresponds. Trivially, one might say 
tliat the best judgement is that which corresponds to his dream. But this gives 
no explanation of why one judgement corresponds to a dream  better than 
anotlier. The statement "X told dream  p because he dream t dream p" is 
misleading in its suggestion that dreams explain what makes a person's actual 
waking narrative better or worse than another he would have given (if , . . ). 
One might just as well say "X dreamt dream p because he told dream p"!
The proposition that the m utual entailm ent betw een dream s and 
awakening narratives is not properly regarded as a matter of a natural law, 
may seem to take away any point from saying eitlier that we dream because we 
tell dreams or that we tell dreams because we dream. Talk of dream narratives 
'determining' dreams would seem to mistakenly suppose that where dreams do 
not cause awakening impressions, and the relationsliip is not accidental, then 
awakening impressions must, in some peculiar sense, 'cause' dreams, albeit a 
case of backward causation. Talk of telling a dream being 'prior' to dreaming 
would seem to erroneously perpetuate tlie myth of tlie empirically given, 
insisting that the historical priority of public observables over inferred
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entities accords a privileged epistemological status to narratives of dreams. 
However, recognition that the m utual entailm ent between dreams and 
awakening impression is not conditional upon any tlieoretical assumptions, does 
afford an unobjectionable sense to the slogan "we dream  because we tell 
dreams". It illuminates a kind of priority that is neither causal nor 
epistemological.
According to the Reductive Analysis, the m utual entailm ent between 
dreams and awakening narrative only holds witliin the context of an actual 
awakening, and a person's actual waking narrative has a certain logical 
priority in deciding what he dreamt. The priority of a person's actual waking 
impression is that of a presupposition necessary to fix the identity of the dream 
dreamt by X at time t. It is quite different from the alleged epistemological 
priority that observables have in our inferences to tlieoretical entities, or the 
causal priority that inferred entities have over observable symptoms.
Perhaps it is a short-coming of tlie Dispositional Analysis that tliis notion 
of priority is lost to the bare notion of mutual entailment or conceptual 
interdependence conditional upon the assumption that tliere is a 'normal' 
manner of awakening. However, the price of maintaining that our judgments 
have a priority arising from tlie context of tlie 'primary' use of the verb to 
dream is to regard our commonplace conviction that dreams are dreamt during 
sleep as signifying merely that upon awakening a person is able to tell a story 
(if prompted, etc.) which he was not able to do before he fell asleep. By 
defining the verb 'to dream' within a context of awakening, tlie Reductive 
Analysis is unable to distinguish dreams according to the time they were 
dreamt within the preceding period of sleep, and cannot gives any substance to 
tlie hypotliesis that the 'dreams' we tell are not dreamt during sleep.
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12. The Dispositional Analysis draws an empirically testable contrast between 
our conviction that dreams are dream t (or 'occur’) during sleep and the 
contradictory hypothesis that dreams are 'not dreamt' or are 'dreamt whilst 
waking up'.
The Dispositional Analysis, unlike the Reductive Analysis, does not make it a 
sufficient condition of telling a dream tliat a person have an apparent memory 
which is not a memory of waking life. It excludes from its definition of dreams 
the content of some apparent waking memories which the Reductive Analysis 
would admit. This is because the Reductive Analysis does not require Üiat 
those among our apparent memories which are dreams have a causal 
explanation 'locating' them in sleep rather than during awakening or at no 
particular time at all. According to Malcolm, to say that we 'dream during 
sleep', is merely to say that a person be able to tell upon awakening a fictitious 
story as if of events witnessed which he was not able to do before he fell asleep. 
By contrast, tlie Dispositional Analysis explains the requirement that dreams 
are dreamt during sleep in terms of the hypothesis that 'telling a dream' is tlie 
exercise of a disposition acquired by internal processes operating during sleep 
prior to tlie initiation of awakening. Thus the Dispositional Analysis gives us 
an empirically testable notion of what it is for a dream to 'occur' during sleep 
(rather than sometime else or at no particular time). The hypotliesis that a 
'dream' was not dreamt or was dreamt' during the process of awakening is, 
according to the Dispositional Analysis, a testable contradiction of the 
assumption implicit in ordinary talk that dreams are dreamt during sleep.
Malcolm denied tliat tlie belief that dreams occur 'in physical time' (as he 
puts it) is implied by our everyday practice of telling dreams. He argued that 
we have no ordinary use for statements about events dreamt 'at the same time' 
as events witnessed and that tlie attempt to provide for such a use (e.g. by
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stipulating that dreamt events occur at the same time as the observable causes 
of narratives of dreams) cannot be reconciled with the exclusive authority we 
grant to a person's description of liis dreams. Instead he offered a reductive 
analysis of ihe commonplace manner of speaking of dreams as 'occurring during 
sleep':
"The locution that dreams occur 'in' sleep is used in tliis way: people declare 
on awakening that various incidents took place (past tense) which did not take 
place. We then say that these incidents were dreamt (past tense). This is merely 
how we label the above facts, which imply nothing about tlie occunence of 
dieams in physical time." [p.77].
Ordinary talk which appears to imply more tlian is allowed on this account is 
to be explained away as a merely metaphorical idiom of speech. Malcolm did 
not deny that we entertain a picture of dreaming on analogy witli a series of 
conscious episodes like thoughts, images and sensations. But he denied tliat 
tills picture is more tlian a deeply attractive, sometimes convenient sometimes 
misleading, metaphor. It is misleading to call this picture a 'theory' because 
we do not ordinarily employ it in the manner that models and analogies are 
employed by empirical scientists.
In reply to Malcolm, Putnam suggested that some aspects of our ordinary 
talk about dreams would appear odd to people who believe that 'telling a 
dream' is an artifact of awakening whereas it does not appear at all odd to.us. 
He took tills to show that our ordinary talk implies tliat dreaming is a series of 
episodes occurring at dockable times within a period of sleep:
"Suppose a novelist is writing about two young lovers, separated by six 
thousand miles (which means eight hours time difference) and writes, 'At tlie 
very moment tliat R.A. was having her photograph taken, her distant lover was 
having a dream in which she figured in a culture which accepted tlie
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idea tliat 'memories of dreams' are caused by events tliat happen upon waking up, 
tliis sentence might not 'have a use'. So in this sense, our total 'way of talking' 
is not independent of what 'assumptions' we make, of what we know" [Putnam 
1962a p.318].
In giving an account of the locution 'dreams occur during sleep', Malcolm was 
caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, some account of a temporal distinction 
between dreaming and telling a dream is required if his analysis is to have any 
plausibility as an uncritical description of the ordinary concept. On tlie other; 
even the meanest allowance for location of dreams during sleep Üireatens to let 
in the germ of the Received Opinion.
Malcolm recognised that the distinction we draw  between dream and 
awakening impression is a distinction between past and present events:
"If we abandon the assumption tliat die criterion and tlie something of which 
it is the criterion must be identical, then why cannot a present occunence be tlie 
criterion of a  past occurrence?"
To abandon tlie attempt to account for temporal distinction would be to give up 
any pretence to be uncritically describing, however parsimoniously, our 
ordinary concept of dreaming. However, as Pears (1960) observed, it is doubtful 
that Malcolm can maintain that dream ing has even the vaguest temporal 
location without thereby allowing that dreaming is 'some kind of mental 
process or state' which has causes and effects in relation to sensory stimulation, 
behaviour and other mental phenomenon, and that its temporal location may 
be more exactly identified given a better knowledge of those causal 
interrelations. What Malcolm is unwillingly driven to say is that not only is 
Putnam's description of events dreamt 'at the same time' as events perceived to 
be regarded as merely metaphorical but also tlie commonplace locution 'dreams 
occur during sleep' is, strictly speaking, false. If our talk of the dreaming of
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dreams as something preceding tlie telling of dreams is merely a convenient 
way of 'labelling' what a person can do upon awakening which he could not do 
before he fell asleep, it would seem to follow that the distinction we draw 
between dreaming and telling a dream is no real distinction at all.
Putnam (1962a) did not distinguish between the assumption tliat dreaming 
is a process occurring during sleep and the Received Opinion tliat dreaming is a 
process akin to perceiving, imagining, thinking. The Dispositional Analysis, as 
I defend it, attempts to map out a space between Malcolm's denial that 
dreaming is a process occurring during sleep and the hypotliesis that dreaming 
is a process akin to waking perception or imagination. Dreaming is a process 
occurring during sleep. It is tlie acquisition of a determinate disposition to tell a 
story if awoken. That process is not 'like' perception or imagination in its 
association with dispositions to respond to a sensible environment. It need not 
be similar in its physiology or neurophysiology. To have a temporal location in 
sleep, dreaming need not even have a temporal structure (an order or pace of 
acquisition of tlie disposition to tell a dream) similar to waking perception or 
imagination.
The Dispositional Analysis distinguishes between the time and place at 
which the events within a dream  occur (e.g. ancient Egypt in the reign of 
Ramases II) which is decided exclusively according to the dream er’s 
awakening narrative and the time and place at which the dream is dreamt 
(e.g. at 2 am on the sofa). The time at which a dream occurs or is dreamt within 
sleep is defined as the instant at which a person acquires the disposition to tell 
that dream if immediately awoken in a normal manner (such that peculiarities 
of the manner of awakening do not explain liis apparent memory) and in 
circumstances C. The Dispositional Analysis shows how dreaming can be given 
a location within sleep testable by scientific investigations without allowing
219
The Dispositional Analysis: Dreaming Without Experience
tliat scientific investigations could confirm or contradict tlie dreamer's best 
waking account of the location of the events within the dream dreamt at tliat 
time.
The Dispositional Analysis allows that our commonplace conviction that 
dream s are dream t during sleep is open to empirical confirmation or 
disconfirmation. Globot's Hypothesis (and variations upon it such as Dennett's 
(1976) Cassette Theory which revives Freud's idea that events initiating 
awakening 'trigger' a phantasy previously created during waking life without 
that phantasy being 'gone through' in the instant prior to awakening) are 
significant rivals to the theory of dreaming implicit in ordinary language. I 
understand Globot's Hypothesis that "a dream is an awakening that is just 
beginning" to assert that tlie internal causes of telling a dream  are typically 
events which initiate or are integral to the process of awakening. Strictly 
speaking neither the Reductive nor the Dispositional Analysis allows that 
dreams could be dreamt during the awakening process. Strictly speaking tlie 
hypothesis that there is no 'normal' process of awakening implies that we do 
not dream. But Globot's Hypothesis may usefully be expressed as the 
hypothesis that dreams are 'dreamt' during awakening. A dream p would be 
'dreamt' during awakening were the process of awakening to have a significant 
role in explaining the content of a person’s apparent memory of events p which 
is not a memory of waking life. This discovery would show that 'dreaming' as 
we understand it is not a good theoretical term for, w ithout specifying the 
particular manner of awakening envisaged, we would be unable, in principle, to 
predict from events occurring during sleep what a person would appear to 
remember 'if awoken'.
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14. The Dispositional Analysis distinguishes between (a) the assumption that 
the dreams we tell are causally explained by events occurring during sleep prior 
to awakening and (b) the Causal Hypothesis that the brain processes which 
explain the dreams we tell are analogous to the brain processes which explain 
waking perception.
The Dispositional Analysis allows that the assumption that a dream may be 
identified by the time it was dreamt and tliat all dreams are dream t during 
sleep is deeply entrenched in ordinary thought about dreaming, but draws back 
from attributing such a fundam ental role to the analogy between the 
mechanisms by which we acquire our dispositions to tell dreams during sleep 
and the mechanism underlying waking perception. In particular, the 
Dispositional Analysis distinguishes between the statement that dreams are 
dreamt or occur during sleep and the hypothesis that dreams are dreamt with 
an order and duration analogous to waking experience.
I agree witli Putnam  (1962a) that, were science to confirm Globot's 
Hypothesis, our talk of the events of a dream 'occurring during sleep' could 
survive only as a 'dead theory' or fictional manner of speech. But I depart from 
Putnam in distinguishing between tlie assumption tliat dreams are causally 
explained by events occurring prior to waking and the Causal Hypotliesis that 
our dispositions to tell a dream if awoken in a normal manner (where prompted 
to try to remember recent experiences without distraction) are acquired and 
retained or lost in a manner analogous to that in which a witness acquires, 
retains or loses a disposition to say what he seemed to perceive or tried to do 
(where prompted to try to remember recent experiences without distraction). 
H ie effect of this is to marginalise examples of ordinary talk, like that offered 
by Putnam, which seem to imply the Causal Hypothesis. Occasional talk of 
the events of a dream er's dream  unfolding in parallel w ith the waking
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experiences of another, articulates a hypotliesis additional to our everyday 
talk of dreams occurring during sleep.
There is, however, a very close connection between scientific faith in tlie 
Causal Hypotliesis and my argument that tlie Dispositional Analysis gives a 
better account of tlie ordinary concept tlian the Reductive Analysis, The 
preference I give to tlie Dispositional Analysis is tliat it affords empirical 
substance to our commonplace conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep 
and remembered or forgotten upon awakening. However, the only project of 
empirical research in view which seems capable of charting the acquisition, 
loss and retention of a disposition to tell a particular dream  remains the 
psycho-physiological project centred around the Causal Hypothesis, the 
analogy between dreaming and the internal processes underlying waking 
perception or imagination. Strictly speaking, the Dispositional Hypotliesis 
(i.e. the hypothesis that 'telling a dream ' is the exercise of a disposition 
aquired during sleep) does not imply the Causal Hypothesis (i.e. the 
hypothesis that 'telling a dream' is explained by physiological processes akin 
to those underlying waking perception). But the reason for importing the 
Dispositional Hypothesis into ordinary talk of dream ing is that it is 
presupposed by scientific research dedicated to the Causal Hypotliesis. The 
fact that working scientists assume the Causal Hypothesis is reason to infer 
that we ordinary armchair folk assume tlie Dispositional Hypotliesis!
According to the Dispositional Analysis, our conviction tliat dreams are 
dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten upon awakening is central to 
psycho-physiological sleep research. Firstly, it stands in contradiction to 
Globot's Hypothesis that our apparent memories upon awakening are often (or 
even generally) explained by the peculiarities of the process of awakening. 
Globot's Hypothesis challenges the assumption that dreams are dreamt or occur
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during sleep, that a dream may be uniquely identified by Üie dreamer and time 
at which it was dreamt, such that a theory of dreaming could, in principle, 
licence inferences from observation of sleep to the content of a person's 
dispositions to an apparent memory without specifying a peculiar mode of 
awakening. Secondly, the Dispositional Hypothesis is central to psycho- 
physiological reseeu'ch in that it is presupposed by the Causal Hypotliesis (i.e. 
by the analogy between, on the one hand, the brain processes underlying tlie 
acquisition, retention and loss of a witness' capacity to say what he recently 
saw and did or seemed to see and tried to do and, on the other, the brain 
processes underlying the acquisition, retention and loss of a dream er's 
disposition to tell a dream) around which psycho-physiological research is 
organised.
Confirmation of the Causal Hypothesis would show that the apparitions 
of memory we call 'telling dreams' are generally the exercise of a capacity 
acquired during sleep and not lost. But the Causal Hypothesis is not equivalent 
to the Dispositional Hypothesis for confirmation of the Causal Hypothesis 
would show not merely tliat our awakening capacity to tell a dream is acquired 
during sleep and not lost but, in addition, that our capacity to tell a dream is 
acquired or 'built up' w ith an order and pace analogous to waking experience. 
The belief that the events of a dream are dreamt at a pace and in an order 
analogous to waking experience, whilst commonplace, is not essential to our 
conviction tliat dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten 
upon awakening. It is possible that the Causal Hypothesis may be false 
(suppose it were discovered tliat dreams are dream t 'in a flash') yet our 
conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten 
upon awakening be true.
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Putnam (1975) argued that the implications of what we ordinarily say are 
determined in part by the activities of 'specialists' w ithin our linguistic 
community. It is possible that nothing we ordinarily do shows that we identify 
a dream according to the time a disposition to tell a particular story if awoken 
is acquired during sleep. Yet the efforts made by scientists towards a theory 
enabling them to predict from observations of sleep what a person would say if 
awoken can 'give a use' to w hat we ordinarily say. Tlie kind of division of 
linguistic labour I have in mind allows that what scientists do is relevant to 
decide what is implied by ordinary speech yet restricts those implications to 
the bare minimum required to give a practical use to the expressions of ordinary 
language. The fact that scientific research is centred round the Causal 
Hypothesis is insufficient reason to conclude that the Causal Hypothesis is 
implied by our commonplace conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep. 
The relevence of scientific investigations is granted by the conclusion that 
ordinary talk implies merely the Dispositional Hypotliesis.
15. The conclusion that 'having a dream* is the acquisition of an ability to 'tell 
a dream*, combines the notion that telling a dream is not the exercise of an 
ability to report conscious episodes with an alternative 'explanation' of the 
unique authority we grant to a person's narrative of his dreams.
In Chapter Two, it was argued that the introspective model of thought and 
imagination, even if it were valid, could not account for a person's knowing tlie 
kinds of facts in which a dream ostensibly consists. In telling a dream we do not 
merely appear to remember images, sensations, tliouglits and otlier 'items of 
consciousness'; we appear to remember facts about the dream which have no 
grounding in such conscious tokens, even supposing they were perfectly 
remembered. Consideration of Boardman's (1978) analogy between dreams and
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dramas suggested that our knowledge of dreams would have to be more like a 
dramatist's knowledge of his own representational intentions than like an 
audience's interpretation of the images and voices of a stage-presentation; tlie 
glaring difference remaining, of course, that we have no reason to suppose that 
we busy ourselves during sleep creating fabulous dramas. Malcolm (1959) 
explicitly likened telling a dream  to making up a story in respect of the 
authority we grant to a person's non-inferential, non-observational knowledge 
of tlie content of his dreams.
H unter (1976) offered the model of a 'raconteur' as a corrective to 
assimilation of telling a dream to recalling thoughts and images: an author of a 
story might scribble and draw tlie thoughts and images which accompany his 
composition of a story; but his subsequent ability to say w hat story is thus 
illustrated is quite different from that of a critic trying to interpret the images 
and words. Hunter suggested that 'having a dream' is the acquisition of an 
ability, the successful exercise of which is achieved by telling without 
inference, observation or invention a fictitious story as if of events witnessed 
and deeds done:
"Having an ability is not an experience. I can play chess, explain the 
ontological argument, recite various passages from Hamlet, and so on. I have 
tliese abilities day in, day out, sleeping and waking. I can experience my 
playing chess, but not my ability to play; and similaily I do not experience tlie 
ability to make an interesting suggestion, when suddenly a tliought occurs to 
me. I know what my suggestion is, but not by introspection. To say that I 
know what it is is just to say tliat I can go right from having tlie thought to 
expressing it" [p.l31].
H unter is here clearly influenced by W ittgenstein's argum ent in the 
Investigations that understanding and meaning are better regarded as abilities
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than as 'mental states'. It is, perhaps, more difficult to regard dreaming as 
acquiring an ability than it is to see intending or understanding in this way. But 
once regarded in tliat way, it is relatively easy to see how a person's narrative 
of a dream is admitted to be autlioritative about the ability he possesses. For 
whereas the abilities relevant to ascriptions of intention only partly consist in 
the ability to express one's intentions, the ability relevant to ascriptions of 
dreaming is exliausted by one's capacity to 'tell a dream'.
W right (1984) argued that the lesson to be learned from Kripke's 
presentation of Wittgenstein's argument against a private language is that our 
knowledge of our own past intentions, what I meant by this mental token, cannot 
be reduced to any amount of loiowledge of items in consciousness or knowledge of 
behavioural dispositions. Wright (1985) drew a contrast between 'detectivist' 
and 'constitutive' conceptions of non-inferential self-knowledge:
" . . .  we require a different explanation, dissociated from introspection. So 
far as I can see, tliere is only one possible broad direction for such an explanation 
to take. The authority which our self-ascriptions of meaning, intention and 
decision assume is not based on any kind of cognitive advantage, expertise or 
achievement. Rather it is, as it were, a concession unofficially granted to 
anyone whom one takes seriously as a rational subject. It is, so to speak, tlie 
subject's right to declare what he intends, what he intended, and what satisfies his 
intentions; and his possession of this right consists in tlie confeiral upon such 
declarations, other things being equal, of a constitutive ratlier tlian a descriptive 
role." [p.18?]
The notion of 'default-correctness' is crucial to Wright's account of a person's 
knowledge of his own intentions. Hiis notion is meant to afford an answer to a 
perplexing question arising from the conjunction of the thought tliat having an 
intention is acquiring a range of abilities (rather than having thoughts and
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images passing before one's mind) with the idea that a person can 
authoritatively say what his intentions were. How is a person sometimes able 
to say with complete confidence what abilities he possesses, what capacities 
and dispositions he has acquired?
The answer is, roughly, that what a person says (when prompted, co­
operative, not distracted, etc.) is part of the profile of behaviour which 
attributions of intention and belief serve to rationalise. W hat a person does 
(e.g. handing you the money) is often constitutive of an answer to a question 
about his intentions (e.g. were his intentions in borrowing the money honest?). 
Sometimes, what he is inclined to say about his own intentions determines an 
answer to the question about what he intends in tliis same manner. The Einswer 
to the question "who did you intend by that charicature?" is given by what a 
person is inclined to say without inference or invention, not as an exercise of a 
cognitive ability, but as the exercise of that intention. In some contexts, tlie 
context in which a person's avowal is conceded 'default correctness', what we 
are primarily interested in are aspects of a person's intentions which are best 
shown in his verbal dispositions to say what appears to him to have been his 
intentions.
There is a certain tension between the idea (1) that the introspective model 
is inappropriate for some mental concept M because the application of that 
concept is better regarded as the attribution of a disposition than as the 
detection of an 'inner' event, action, process or state and the idea (2) tliat a 
person has a non-inferential, non-observational knowledge of the application 
of that concept to himself which transcends what can be known on the basis of 
his actions and dispositions to act (other than what he is inclined to say on the 
matter). The problem which seems to Wright most pressing in the case of 
intention, is to meet a question which arises from tlie recognition tliat intending
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is an ability: how can a person possibly have the sort of authority about his 
own intentions we commonly grant him? Hie problem whicli, it seems to me, is 
more pressing in the case of dreaming arises from the recognition that, as 
Malcolm urged, the authority we grant to a person's narrative about the content 
of his dreams is unique. That authority is unconstrained by whether the 
ostensible contents of the narrative are physical events, behaviour or mental 
episodes, it is unconstrained by any presumption that the mental episodes of 
the narrative 'square with' his past beliaviour, or that the mental episodes of 
the dream can be identified in a context of perception and action, or tliat the 
mental episodes of a dream have consequences in waking life apart from 'telling 
a dream'. The problem which seems more pressing in the case of telling a dream 
is to meet the question, how could dreaming be merely acquisition of a verbal 
ab ility?
The (W)right answer to the Wright question seems to be that, in some 
ordinary contexts (the realisation of which is contingent and sometimes open to 
reasonable doubt) a person can have non-inferential, non-observational 
authority about his intentions because the dispositions whicli constitute tlie 
intentions in question are precisely those verbal responses which misleadingly 
look as if a person were reporting 'inner' events and activities. The answer to 
tlie question about dreaming is that dreaming must be the acquisition of an 
ability because, in all contexts where tlie concept is applied, there is nothing 
other than the ability to tell w ithout observation, inference or invention a 
story (where prompted, etc.). These answers commonly urge that a person has 
knowledge of his own mind which is neither observational nor inferential 
because the facts he appears to know cannot be established by anytliing otlier 
than what he is inclined to say without invention upon tlie matter. The trick is 
to see, on the one hand, that questions about intention (not just about sensations.
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images, thoughts, dreams) sometimes arise in a context where what a person is 
inclined to say constitutes the answer and to see, on the other, that questions 
about dreaming (uniquely) always arise in a context where w hat a person is 
inclined to say constitutes the answer.
16, The notion that a person's narrative of a dream always and a person’s 
avowal of intention sometimes constitutes the content of his mind calls in  
question, firstly, the idea that what he intended or dreamt occurred in  the past 
and , secondly, the idea that what he intended or dreamt is properly said to be 
’known' and 'remembered' by him.
The constitutive accounts of avowals of intention and of telling a dream draw 
upon the argument that there is no detectable fact wliich could possibly give us 
tlie knowledge we appear to possess. On the Wittgensteinian assumption that 
our everyday use of terms like 'knowledge' and 'memory' are immune to 
philosophical criticism, the constitutive account should be regarded as an 
entirely negative corrective to the Cartesian attempt to explain first person 
authority by analogy with perception, and should not be regarded as an 
alternative attempt to justify our commonplace talk of 'remembering' dreams 
and intentions. This assumption is hard to accept. My preference for tlie 
Dispositional over the Reductive Analysis reflects tlie desire, warned against 
by Malcolm, to explain our talk of dreams 'occurring during sleep'. I have 
argued in this chapter that an assumption that our ability to authoritatively 
tell a dream has a certain causal history, albeit not a history known by tlie 
dreamer, should be imported into ordinary talk in explanation of what it is for 
telling a dream to count as knowledge of something past. The next chapter 
(Chapter Six "Remembering W ithout Past Experience Or Representation") 
further attempts to meet the dissatisfaction with our everyday talk of dreams
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being 'remembered' or 'forgotten' generated by arguments tiiat the content of a 
dream cannot be identified with anything other than tlie content of a certain 
kind of awakening narrative .
Hunter comments upon the strategic intent of his distinction between 
raconteur and eye-witness, an intent similar to that of Wright's (1985) contrast 
between umpire and spectator:
"We may, as suggested just now, be trading in fictions here, but if so tliey 
aie fictions we aie strongly driven to employ; and if one fantasy distorts our 
vision while another helps us see clearly, it may not matter that it is all a magic 
journey ..." [Hunter (197?) p.l30].
Wright (1991) indicates the kind of dissatisfaction with die Wittgensteinian 
view which motivates my argum ent that the Reductive Analysis is an 
incomplete account of the ordinary concept of dreaming:
" . . .  tlie situation can seem intensely unsatisfying. The philosophical 
consciousness abhors a vacuum. If tlie model of tlie inwaid-lookiiig observation 
statement fails, must there not be something better with which to replace it?
It is precisely this (sort of) craving, I believe that Wittgenstein's emphasis 
upon tlie error of seeking philosophical explanations, and tlie contrast witli what 
he regar ds as tlie proper descriptive method, is meant to engage . . . "  [p. 147] 
Wright suggests that tliis kind of frustration cannot be avoided by "the hybrid 
attempt to marry default correctness of opinions about current intentional states 
with the idea that non-inferential knowledge of past intentional states is a 
m atter of full-blooded recollection . . for the notion of 'full-blooded' 
recollection seems at home only as the retrospective counterpart of an 
epistemology of observation and no candidate for a fully determinate object of 
observation corresponding to our first person past tense utterances can be found. 
The argum ent of the following chapter is tliat craving for a 'full-blooded'
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notion of remembering can be satisfied without importing tlie notion tiiat what 
is remembered was an event, act, process, state or anything else previously 
experienced or represented by subject.
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PART THREE 
THE DISPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS
CHAPTER SIX 
REMEMBERING WITHOUT PAST EXPERIENCE OR 
REPRESENTATION
1. To remember or forget a dream is to retain or lose an ability to tell a dream.
In tlie preceding chapter (Chapter Five - 'Dreaming W ithout Experience'), 1 
argued that tlie authority we accord to a person's account of his own dreams can 
survive the empirical conclusion that the Received Opinion is false if we 
recognise, witli Malcolm (1959), that questions about what a person dreams are 
questions about the stories a person can tell upon awakening where he is not 
remembering events from waking life. But, I argued, the conclusion tliat tlie 
Received Opinion is false does not lead automatically to an endorsement of tlie 
Reductive Analysis. Hie Reductive Analysis identifies the content of a dream 
with the content of a fictitious narrative told without inference or invention 
unconditionally upon any assumption about the causal explanation of 'telling a 
dream'. The Dispositional Analysis departs from the Reductive Analysis by 
taking ordinary talk of dreams being dream t during sleep to imply the 
hypotliesis that the content of our dreams are determined by processes occurring 
during sleep independently of the contingencies of awakening. The 
Dispositional Analysis retains tlie Reductive Analysis' identification of what 
a person dreamt with tlie content of his awakening narrative. But it denies 
that a person telling a dream is authoritative about the time at which he
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dream t the dream  he tells w ithin a period of sleep or even about the 
hypothesis that he dreamt the dream he tells during sleep.
In this chapter, I extend the Dispositional Analysis of dreaming to conclude 
that to remember or forget a dream dreamt during sleep is to retain or lose an 
ability to tell a dream acquired during sleep. I argue that the retention of a 
capacity to tell a dream is a necessary and sufficient condition of remembering 
dreams in the everyday sense of the verb 'to remember'. It is no objection that 
what tlie dream is about was not represented by the dreamer during sleep, or 
that he is unaware of the process by which he acquires the disposition to tell a 
dream.
I argue that scientific work on 'dream  recall' is consistent witli the 
conclusion tliat tlie Received Opinion is false. Scientific talk of dreams being 
remembered could be understood, like scientific talk about StageREM sleep 
being a period of 'perceptual activity', to be a m etaphorical manner of 
expressing the Causal Hypothesis tliat, at some more or less central level, 
there is an analogy between the internal processes underlying perceptual 
memory and telling a dream. I further argue tliat scientific work on dream 
recall is better understood to imply the Dispositional Hypothesis that telling 
a dream is typically the exercise of an ability retained from moment to moment 
within sleep. (Don't be confused by my referring sometimes to the Dispositional 
Hypothesis rather than to the Dispositional Analysis; the D ispositional 
Analysis is just the analysis which takes tlie Dispositional Hypothesis to be 
central to talk about 'remembering dreams'.)
The connection between the Dispositional and Causal Hypotheses is made 
by what I'll call tlie Hybrid Hypothesis, that the internal explanation of our 
retention of Üie ability to tell a dream from moment to moment during sleep is 
analogous to the explanation of a witness' retention of his capacity to say what
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he perceived. The plausibility of the Hybrid Hypothesis shows why it would 
not be unreasonable, given some further motive, to import the Dispositional 
Hypothesis into scientific talk of 'remembering dreams'. The furüier motive 
required for importing the Dispositional Hypothesis is provided by the fact 
tliat this would make the scientific hypothesis that dreams are remembered 
literally true or false according to our everyday notion of memory.
In the last section of Chapter Four ("'Perceptions' During Sleep") I argued 
that the discovery tliat dreams are dreamt with an order and pace analogous to 
waking perception or imagination would not in itself establish that a person is 
aware of anything. However, we can now see a reason why someone might wish 
to imply into ordinary talk about dreaming tlie assumption that our disposition 
to tell a dream is 'built up' in an order corresponding to tlie narrative content of 
tlie dream, albeit that the composition process procédés without tlie dreamer 
being aware of anything. The reason is that this would neatly explain our 
assum ption that the dreams we tell are typically remembered. Dreams 
typically have a narrative structure (p, then q, then r, then s ...). Our 
conviction that the dreams we tell exhibit memory would be justified if it were 
established that had the dreamer been awoken a moment earlier he would 
have had a shorter version of the same dream (p, then q, then r, ...) to tell, and 
if awoken a moment before that he would have had a yet further truncated 
version of the same dream (p, then q ...) to tell, and so on. However, I draw 
short of identifying our conviction that dreams are remembered w ith the 
hypothesis that dreams are synthesized over time in a manner analogous the 
waking perception and imagination. Hie hypotliesis that dreams are 'built up' 
w ith an order and pace akin to waking perception may be regarded as an 
elaboration of the Hybrid Hypothesis which indicates tlie close theoretical 
connection between the Causal and Dispositional Hypotheses.
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I distinguish between what is strictly implied by our conviction that 
dreams are remembered (i.e. the Dispositional Hypothesis) and tlie additional 
empirical assum ption (i.e. the Causal Hypothesis) central to the only 
experimental research which shows any prospect of justifying its truth. The 
Causal Hypothesis does but the Dispositional Hypotliesis does not imply that 
die disposition to tell a dream is acquired with an order and pace akin to 
waking perception or imagination. However, the only reason I can give for 
preferring the Dispositional Analysis over tlie Reductive Analysis is that, 
according to the Dispositional Analysis, our conviction that dreams are 
remembered could yet find empirical justification in research centred around 
tlie Causal Hypothesis.
My reason for not implying the Causal Hypothesis is that I do not regard 
everyday talk about remembering as a form of causal explanation but as a 
historical reference to the continual possession of abilities to say and do things. 
If talk about dreaming were reduced to the Causal Hypothesis, talk about 
dreaming would not imply that dreams are remembered in the everyday sense 
of the verb 'to remember'. For the hypothesis that 'telling a dream' is produced 
by an internal representation or 'memory trace' (which normally explains die 
retention of a person's ability to say what he perceived and imagined when 
awake) establishes tliat a person remembers a dream only on tlie assumption 
that storage of a memory trace explains the retention of a capacity to tell a 
dream, if awoken, etc. Perhaps no other explanation of continous possession of 
an ability is imaginable. But it is not, therefore, a necessary condition of 
'remembering' in the everyday sense of the word tliat retention of an ability be 
explained by storage of an internal representation. We can and do assert facts 
about the acquisition, retention and loss of abilities without knowing or caring 
about the role of physiological processes in producing our behaviour. For
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example, a question about whether a dream told on Monday morning is recalled 
on Tuesday afternoon may ordinarily be answered with some assurance by 
questioning the dreamer at various times. It is a peculiarity of the ability to 
tell a dream that our knowledge of its acquisition, retention and loss during 
sleep is entirely speculative, and that confirmation of our speculations will 
depend upon scientific investigation of the causes of telling a dream.
The analogy asserted by the Causal Hypothesis between the internal 
processes underlying dreaming and waking perception is not equivalent to tlie 
truth of our conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or 
forgotten upon awakening. But the Causal Hypothesis is central to the only 
kind of experimental work which promises any hope of charting the acquisition 
and retention of our dispositions to tell dreams. The Dispositional Analysis 
leaves open the possibility that a justification of our conviction that the 
dreams we tell are typically remembered could be provided even were tlie 
Causal Hypothesis false. Say it were the case that dreams, no matter what 
their narrative lengtli and complexity, are dreamt 'in a flash'. The proposition 
that the dreams we tell are remembered would imply here that the capacity to 
tell a dream  dream t in an instant is typically acquired some time before 
awcilcening and possessed continuously tlirough a period of sleep. It could be 
that every dream we tell is dreamt the moment we fall asleep. This would 
falsify the Causal but not the Dispositional Hypothesis. Wliat would falsify 
tlie Dispositional Hypothesis? The fact that the dreams we tell are typically 
dream t 'in a flash' immediately before we are awoken w ould falsify our 
conviction that dreams are remembered.
We have no practical idea about how the Dispositional Hypothesis might 
be tested apart from the Causal Hypothesis. We have only some idea of the 
sorts of experimental work which might show tliat the dreams we tell exliibit
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memory in virtue of being synthesized over time with an order and pace 
analogous to waking perception and imagination. Unless it were for the 
practical use given for our ordinary conviction that dreams are remembered 
afforded by research centred round the Causal Hypothesis, there would be no 
reason to suppose our talk of remembering dreams had any empirical substance. 
In particular, there would be no reason to object to Malcolm’s contention that the 
verb to 'remember' has a special sense appropriate to dreaming, according to 
which to remember a dream is simply to be able to tell upon awakening a 
fictitious story as if of events witnessed.
A problem about our conviction that dreams are remembered is given by the 
possibility tliat telling a dream might, at least sometimes, be tlie exercise of an 
ability acquired during sleep immediately before awakening. If, as I suppose, 
it is a necessary condition of remembering that the ability be retained it 
follows that a dream  (or fragm ent of a dream) dream t during sleep 
immediately before one awakens to tell it is told without remembering. I argue 
that telling a dream  (or initial fragment of a dream) dream t immediately 
before awakening cannot be accounted a case of remembering. Our commonplace 
conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep should be taken to imply 
tliat telling a dream typically involves the exercise of an ability retained from 
moment to moment within a period of sleep. It is not a necessary condition of 
telling a dream dreamt during sleep that one remember it. Rather every dream, 
or at least the initial fragment of a dream, could have been told without 
remembering. It is consistent with our conviction that dreams are remembered 
that some of the dreams we tell (we know not which) are told without 
recollection.
Dennett (1976) took the phenomenon of telling a dream  to illustrate a 
general point about our conception of ourselves, namely, that it is part of our
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ordinary notion of experience that what a person experiences transcends what 
he is currently able to say about himself. He argued that a storage theory of 
short-term  memory could establish objective criteria for w hat a person 
experienced in the immediate past independently of w hat he was currently 
able say at the time. His wider aim was to canvas the idea (summed up in his 
slogan "introspection is typically retrospection") that 'introspection' should be 
explained scientifically in terms of models of short-term memory. Such 
explanation would give substance to our commonplace supposition tliat what we 
say about our current thoughts, images, sensations and so on is answerable to a 
fact determined prior to the fallible process of public utterance.
Dennett's argument suggests that there is a notion of 'remembering dreams' 
which does not imply that a dream remembered upon awakening is one which 
tlie dreamer could have told if he had been awoken earlier. It suggests that, 
where the determination of the content of a person's dream prior to awakening 
is explained by an information processing model of short-term memory (tlie 
normal process of awakening to tell a dream corresponding to the normal 
processes by which the information represented in short-term  storage is 
accessed), the fact that a dream told was dreamt during sleep is a sufficient 
condition of its being remembered. In resistance to Dennett's suggestion, I argue 
that a causal-cum-representational analysis of remembering dreams does not 
escape the need to distinguish between the everyday notion of memory 
appropriate to retaining an ability to tell a dream and a technical notion of 
storage in short-term 'memory'.
Dennett's proposal that an information processing model of short-term 
memory is appropriate to explain one's 'introspective' ability to say what one 
was tliinking in response to the question "What's going tiirough your mind just 
now ? " does not show tliat we are ordinarily wrong to distinguish between
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responses to such a question and 'memories'. There is a distinction worth 
making which survives Dennett's conclusion that we have no privileged access 
to our own experiences. That is the distinction we ordinarily draw  between 
saying what was going immediately through one's mind and remembering, in 
the usual sense of retaining an ability. Equally, the proposal that telling a 
dream (or fragment of a dream dreamt) immediately before (or 'interrupted' by) 
an awakening is explained according to an information processing model of 
short-term memory does not show that we are correct to call such cases of telling 
a dream 'remembering dreams'. It is a necessary condition of remembering that 
tlie dream (or fragment of the dream) could have been told if the dreamer had 
been awoken earlier.
2. Our awakening conviction that something is remembered is sufficient reason 
for scientists to advance the Causal Hypothesis (that telling a dream is 
produced by internal processes similar to those which explain a witness’ 
ability to remember what he saw).
When a person awakens to tell a dream, he is convinced that he has sometliing 
to remember. It appears botli to him and to an observer questioning him about 
his dreams that he is recalling something or struggling to recall something that 
has been lost. In many (but not all) respects telling a dream has tlie appearance 
of remembering events recently witnessed and deed recently done. Telling a 
dream  has the phenomenal characteristics of an act of episodic memory 
described by Tulving:
"The stiong feeling of the veiidicality of the memory somehow is immediately 
given in tlie recollective experience; it is an integral part of tlie past event now 
remembered, and need not be inferable from other knowledge. The basis of such 
a belief is a deep mysteiy. Since tlie rememberer usually has no way of
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comparing his memory of the event with tlie original, the belief cannot be based 
on the results of a comparison process. Moreover, it is quite possible to 
'remember' as true something that in fact is false . . .
When others tell us that something is wrong, we may be persuaded by 
evidence that speaks to the issue . . [a] discrepancy in our memory belief 
concerning a particular past episode that we clearly remember . . . [but] our 
subjective feeling of veridicality of tlie recollective experience remains unchanged 
even when we intentionally accept tlie verdict of otliers." [Tulving Elements of 
Episodic Memoiy 1987 p.40].
Supposing that the conviction that episodes are remembered from sleep is 
illusory, what justification could be given for the adoption of models of episodic 
memory in tlie scientific study of tliis phenomenon of merely apparent memory? 
A sufficient justification is simply this: that it is reasonable to suppose that 
the proximate causes of our merely apparent memories of events witnessed are 
interestingly similar to the proximate causes of our genuine memories of events 
witnessed, and that it is the business of scientists to investigate the internal 
causes of our awakening impressions as if of events witnessed, whether or not 
anytliing is actually remembered.
Psychologists may address the phenomenon of 'dream  recall' without 
assuming that anytliing is genuinely remembered, without assuming tliat 
telling a dream  demonstrates retention of knowledge previously acquired 
'through experience'. The important question for Hie experimental researcher 
is how the awakening impression as if of events witnessed is produced. His 
hypothesis that a person's awakening narrative of a dream is a 'memory' may 
be understood to imply that it is produced by a mechanism tlie normal function 
of wliich is to retain a person's capacity to say what he previously witnessed.
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and need not be taken to imply that something is, strictly speaking, genuinely 
remembered.
Where a scientist advances the Causal Hypothesis about our awakening 
impressions as if of events witnessed, he may quite properly distinguish among 
circumstances which increase the likelihood of a person telling a dream upon 
awakening between those which determine the likelihood of his having 
dreamt and those which determine the likelihood of him  'remembering'. The 
distinction may be drawn by analogy with variables known either to facilitate 
or inhibit recall in paradigm cases of perceptual memory. A range of paradigm 
cases of remembering, misremembering and forgetting, in which there is a clear 
operational definition of the distinction between failure to remember some 
information and failure to perceive or learn the information, is crucial to the 
development of models of episodic memory. The model thus developed Is 
assumed to represent the operation of an internal mechanism whose normal 
function is to provide the marvellous but peculiarly limited human capacity for 
retention of knowledge. It is not a forgone conclusion that the model of a 
mechanism inferred from paradigm cases of remembering events witnessed can 
be usefully applied to non-paradigm cases where an impression as if of events 
witnessed is produced when nothing was perceived. But it is a promising 
hypothesis that a model of episodic memory may be used to describe and 
predict internal mechanisms producing the potentially illusory impressions 
upon awakening we call 'remembering dreams'.
The scientist's assumption that telling a dream is analogous to remembering 
events w itnessed im plies th a t at some m ore or less peripheral 
neurophysiological level something corresponds to Üie 'learning' or 'perceptual' 
stimulus. Crucially, it is supposed that there is some common process or event 
which may be identified as the laying down of a 'memory trace'. Tlie ability to
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tell a dream upon awakening is to be explained as the 'activation' of such a 
memory trace, and the inability to tell a dream upon awakening is sometimes to 
be explained as a failure to consolidate or activate the trace. The problem of 
finding an experimental definition of 'dream recall failure' may thus be 
regarded as the problem of deciding when to infer the existence of some 
neurophysiological event or process corresponding to the 'laying down of a 
memory trace' on a model assumed to explain the normal production of our 
awakening impressions as if of events witnessed developed in paradigm cases 
where something is remembered, misremembered or forgotten.
When scientists speak of dreams being 'remembered' or 'forgotten', they 
may be understood to mean that some event or process in tiie brain corresponds in 
its functional role, narrowly circumscribed, to the 'memory trace' in a model of 
episodic memory. But to suppose that, where such a model has a useful 
explanatory role, something is remembered would be to confuse the internal 
processes causing the appearance of memory (i.e. the hypothetical 'memory 
trace') witli what could be remembered (i.e. the intentional object of memory). 
The hypothesis of a memory trace does not imply that behind every public 
occasion of perception or learning observed in the laboratory tliere is some inner 
act of perception or learning and that, strictly speaking, this is w hat is 
remembered or forgotten when a person remembers or forgets what he saw or 
learned flashed upon the screen in the laboratory. The suggestion that a brain 
structure has a content defined by the information it normally enables us to 
retain should not mislead us to overlook the possibility that, in some 
'abnormal' circumstances, the same brain structure may be produced witliout 
antecedent perception or learning and may in turn produce a merely apparent 
memory.
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When tlie scientist hears a philosopher question whether dreams are 
genuine memories, he misunderstands this as an hypothesis about the causes of 
'telling a dream'. The scientist misunderstands tlie philosopher's proposition 
that dreams are not genuine memories as the hypothesis that, for example, the 
internal mechanisms wliich normally enable a person to retain knowledge have 
broken down, or that narratives of dreams are produced by the operation of a 
'confabulation' mechanism the function of which is to preserve a person's self­
conception. The philosopher's point, that an internal mechanism which 
normally functions to retain knowledge, may function in its normal way and yet 
produce a 'memory act' which is not the demonstration of knowledge, for 
nothing was known in the first place, suggests no alternative hypotheses about 
the internal production of dream narratives. It is a proposition of no use to die 
experimental scientists. Not surprisingly, the scientist either mistakes the 
philosopher for an arm-chair theorist or mistakes the philosopher to be telling 
him that he cannot intelligibly formulate hypotheses which he plainly knows 
he can, for he already has a variety of confirming and disconfirming evidence.
3. Demonstration that telling a dream is caused by ’memory mechanisms' would 
not show that the dreamer remembers anything that happened during sleep. 
Scientists are captivated by the idea that telling a dream  is essentially 
similar to recounting events recently witnessed, despite the obvious evidence 
that the subject recently saw and did nothing. Unfortunately, researchers 
assume, despite die absence of anything corresponding to the events a witness 
remembers, misremembers or forgets, that what is retained is not an ability 
previously acquired without awareness but knowledge about something of 
which the subject was aware during sleep. They confuse the inner causes of our
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disposition to awakening narratives with the occurrence of some thoroughly 
mysterious ’inner experience' of which the subject is, somehow or other, 'aware'.
The prejudice tliat something 'like' the ostensible contents of our dream 
narratives is remembered from sleep encourages a misunderstanding of the not 
implausible hypothesis that w hat causes our awakening impressions as if of 
events witnessed are brain processes similar to those which occur when we 
remember events recently witnessed. It is a mistake to confuse this causal 
hypothesis witli the hypothesis that a person's awakening impressions are 
memories of w hat recently seemed to him to be happening. It does not follow 
tliat, if neurological processes normally operating in cases of remembering also 
operate in a case of appearing to remember, then there is in the latter case 
something which is remembered. It requires further argum ent that we were 
aware of what we appear to remember, or of sometiiing wliich seemed to us like 
what we appear to remember, or of some actions or intentions in virtue of wliicli 
we may be said to have believed falsely what we appear to remember. We 
could in fact remember something which is the normal cause of our awakening 
impressions of dreams; but it is doubtful that peripheral physiological 
behaviour let alone central brain processes are remembered upon awakening.
It is probably false that everything we call 'remembering' has a common 
neurophysiological cause. Scientist need much more precise characterisations 
of the kinds of abilities for which they postulate distinctive internal systems 
than is provided by the everyday use of terms like 'remembering'. In practice 
these more precise characterisations are provided by experimental paradigms 
which, not surprisingly, attract die criticism of being artificial and removed 
from the vast diversity of everyday phenomena we call 'remembering' [Neisser 
(1978)]. But let us suppose that it is not improbable tliat our awakening 
impressions of dreams are produced by events witliin us similar to those which
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explain paradigm  cases of remembering events recently witnessed whilst 
awake. Still, it is one thing to hypothesize that acts of remembering have a 
common neurological cause, and quite another to say tliat every act which has 
that kind of neurological cause is an act of remembering.
My impression of sheep recently chewing in the vegetable garden is caused 
by the sheep which recently got through the open gate. A complex chain of 
events stretches between those sheep and my present memory of tliem and, no 
doubt, the most interesting part of this causal chain lies within my skull. Let us 
suppose that part of the story, presumably some fairly central process enabling 
me to make use of and retain information gained through perception, is likely to 
feature commonly in a variety of distinct cases of remembering what one has 
seen or seemed to see. This process may be identified and studied by scientists 
independently of what has gone on outside my skull and even independently of 
the peripheral physiological mechanisms registering sensory stim uli. 
However, the wider context is essential to determine that I saw and remember 
sheep. It could have been that I saw goats and misremember tliem as sheep. It 
could have been that I hallucinated the whole incident. The facts of the case 
cannot be determined without regard to my recent behavioural history and the 
events impinging on my surfaces.
That some distinctive neurological mechanism causes my impression of 
rampaging sheep is insufficient reason to say that I remember or misremember 
anything, unless some assumption is made about tlie normal context in which 
that process operates. This is not to say that the fact that my present 
im pression has a particular neurophysiological cause is irrelevant to 
establishing what if anything we remember. It is relevant in much the same 
way that the fact that I have a vivid impression as if of sheep recently 
rampaging is relevant to what if anything I remember. Present impressions as
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if of events recently witnessed usually (Russell would say 'necessarily') occur 
when I remember what I recently saw or seemed to see. Let us suppose tiiat sucli 
present impressions are produced by characteristic neurophysiological processes 
and that, such processes usually (Martin and Deutcher (1968) would say 
'necessarily') occur when I remember what I recently saw or seemed to see. At 
face value, the occurrence of my present impressions or other evidence of tlie 
neurological processes which typically produce such an impression would be 
very good evidence that I remember seeing, or at least seeming to see, 
rampaging sheep. For, normally, I have a vivid impression of X only where, in 
the recent past, I have seen X or have at least seen someüiiiig Y of a kind which 
is sometimes, and for explicable reasons (e.g. its likeness when silhouetted 
against the sun), mistaken for X. Such is the general pattern of nature.
Even so, in some cases, the pattern of things is incomplete. Suppose, for 
example, tliat there was nothing in the garden resembling sheep or tliat I spent 
die morning playing chess with my computer and did not once glance out into 
tlie garden. Where such facts are known then neither my present impression as 
if of sheep, nor the occurrence in me of the type of neurophysiological processes 
which normally produce memories of sheep, would be sufficient evidence for 
tlie conclusion that something is remembered.
So far, I have argued that scientific research into 'dream recall' need not be 
concerned with the question as to whetlier anytWng tiiat happens to us during 
sleep is remembered; it may properly concerned itself w ith the causes of 
aw akening narratives associated w ith  sleep, in particu lar w ith  the 
neurophysiological mechanisms which produce our apparent memories as if of 
events witnessed; it may proceed on tlie assumption tliat, in general, notliing is 
remembered from sleep. Unfortunately, few sleep researchers would regard 
their efforts in this light. Most investigators suppose botli tliat dreaming is an
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'experience' perfectly isomorphic witli some more or less central brain process 
and that our 'verbal reports' of this experience are caused by that brain process. 
The hypothesis that our aw akening narratives are memories of this 
'experience' is supposed to be justified by demonstrating tliat they have tlie 
right sort of causal connections to the right sort of cerebral processes occurring 
during sleep. The 'right sort' of processes are tliose which are analogous to 
what normally goes on in us in paradigm cases of remembing events recently 
witnessed when awake.
Most sleep researchers would mistake my claim tliat notliing or nothing 
much of what happens during sleep is remembered upon awakening for a rival 
speculation about the inner causes of our awakening impressions. They would 
mistake it for the hypothesis that the neurophysiological causation of 
narratives or dreams is not analogous to that of paradigm cases of remembering 
waking perceptions. They would regard my strictures on die concepts of memory 
and perception as amateurish efforts to advance the hypodiesis that the 
dreams we tell are akin to the 'confabulations' of victims of Korsakoff's 
syndrome, that they have a common explanation with deja vu or with die 
'memories' surgically induced by Penfold.
Sleep researdiers are by and large confused about the distinctions between a 
causal explanation of our apparent memories in terms of brain processes and die 
discovery of what, if anything, is remembered. Uie generation and testing of 
hypotheses about the neurophysiological causes of our awakening narratives is 
die business of diese scientists. So long as they are getting along with tiiat, 
perhaps it does not matter very much that sleep researchers talk as if they 
were investigating w hat is remembered upon awakening. Is it not a merely 
philosophical quibble that, when presenting their results, scientists tend to
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indulge in a thoroughly confused preamble about 'private experience', 
'phenomenal aspects', 'parallel dualism' and the like?
Unfortunately, I suspect, the 'common sense' assumption tliat our awakening 
narratives of dreams are genuine memories of 'inner experiences' has had a deep 
and distorting influence both on the direction of research and upon the 
interpretation of the experimental results. My suspicion is tliat scientists 
would do their science better if they were liberated from the prejudice that 
whether or not something is remembered from sleep depends upon the occurrence 
of some 'inner experience' which, if not identical to the brain processes under 
investigation, is somehow supervenient upon those processes and can be inferred 
from them. Wlietlier or not tliis suspicion is justified, the point remains that it 
is no business of empirical scientists (or anybody else, for that matter) to 
attempt to infer some further sort of entity or activity in addition to biological 
processes and the functional characteristics of those biological processes.
My main purpose is not to argue that scientists are conceptually confused 
about 'dreaming', 'memory' and 'perception'. It is to argue tliat empirical 
research into sleep and dreams is coherent with the assumption that dreams 
are what we appear to remember on awakening whether or not anyüiing is in 
fact remembered. My contention is that what scientists are concerned with 
w hen they question whether or not dream narratives are 'memories' of 
■perceptions' are questions about the cerebral causes of our awakening 
narratives, questions which may be satisfactorily answered w ithout the 
encumbrance of supposing that there is 'sometliing' which the person within 
whom  these processes occur actually perceives or remembers. Where 
neurophysiological evidence is supposed to confirm or disconfirm the 
hypothesis that sometliing is 'perceived' during sleep and 'remembered' upon 
awakening, scientists can be taken to be using these terms quite legitimately in
248
The Dispositional Analysis: Rememhering Without Past Experience
a 'narrow' sense which should be distinguished from that of everyday 
language. W hat researchers mean, in tliis narrow sense, is that, in respects 
consistent with an explanation of a person's behavioural inertia and inability 
to perceive his environment, brain events and processes occurring during sleep 
cause our awakening impressions as if of events witnessed in a manner tiiat is 
analogous with the internal causation of paradigm cases of remembering events 
recently witnessed whilst awake.
Thus scientific studies of 'dream recall' need not be particularily concerned 
with tlie only sense in which dreams may literally and plausibly be said to 
remembered (i.e. with tlie retention or loss of a behavioural disposition to tell 
a certain dream). Research into 'dream recall' may be concerned only with a 
'narrower' analogy between internal events inferred in cases of remembering 
events witnessed and in cases, associated witli recently awakened subjects, of 
merely appearing to remember events witnessed. However, I now wish to argue 
that scientific studies of dream recall can and should be taken to imply that to 
remember or forget a dream  is to retain or lose the ability to tell a dream, 
whether or not that ability is acquired 'through experience'.
4. Scientific talk of dreams being ’remembered’ or ’forgotten’ would, like 
scientific talk  of dream ing being a ’perceptual activity ', be a purely  
metaphorical m anner of expressing the Causal Hypothesis, unless it were 
supposed to imply the Dispositional Hypothesis.
There are two senses in which telling a dream upon first awakening may be said 
to be a phenomenon of 'memory'. In tlie first sense, all that is implied is the 
hypotiiesis that, at some level of centrality, there is a similarity among tiie 
brain processes which produce our impressions as if of events witnessed between 
the case of telling a dream and the case of remembering events witnessed. The
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term  'memory' is here used metaphorically to refer to some hypothetical 
internal process (the 'laying down of a memory trace') defined by some limited 
aspects of its normal functional characteristics or 'narrow causal role'. Strictly 
speaking, it is not implied, in this sense, that telling a dream is a genuine case 
of remembering anytliing. It does not follow from the occurrence of certain brain 
processes within him that a person is aware of anything, unless it be inferred 
from the occurrence of these processes that he is currently disposed to do or say 
things that would show him to have certain beliefs and intentions about his 
sensible environment, and such behavioural effects are specifically excluded 
from the scientific hypothesis that there is an analogy among central brain 
processes between sleeping and waking.
In the second sense, it is implied that the original telling of a dream is a 
case of remembering only where one is demonstrating a disposition or capacity 
previously acquired and retained during sleep. The terms 'remembering' and 
'forgetting' refer literally to tlie retention or loss of a non-consciously acquired 
and retained ability to tell a dream if awoken and promptly questioned. Iii this 
sense, it is not implied that telling a dream is remembering something wMch 
happened to the subject or of which he was aware during sleep.
Corresponding to the two senses in which the original telling of a dream 
may be said to be a phenomenon of 'memory', there are two hypotlieses open to 
scientific investigation. Firstly, there is the Causal Hypothesis that, in 
telling a dream, our impressions as if of events witnessed are produced by 
internal processes occurring during sleep similar to those which occur in cases 
where we rem ember events witnessed. And, secondly, there is the 
Dispositional Hypotiiesis that, in telling a dream, we are exercising a 
disposition to tell a certain dream (if awoken, prompted, etc.) unconsciously 
acquired and retained during sleep.
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W hen researchers talk of dreams being 'remembered' they could be 
understood to imply the Causal Hypotiiesis. On my account, this talk is 
consistent with the conclusion that, in telling dreams, we do not remember 
anything that happened to us during sleep. All that is meant by the terms 
'remembering' or 'forgetting' is that some brain process occurring during sleep 
explains telling or failing to tell a dream  upon awakening in a manner 
analogous to the internal explanation of a person's remembering or forgetting 
events previously witnessed. This use of these terms is entirely metaphorical. 
Confusion arises where the hypothesis that our awakening impressions have a 
certain internal etiology is m istaken for the hypothesis that we are 
remembering something, namely, an 'inner experience'.
It seems to me, however, that research directed towards the Causal 
Hypothesis can and should be regarded as presupposing tlie Dispositional 
Hypothesis. It would be reasonable for scientists who advance the Causal 
Hypothesis to do so on the tacit assum ption that it follows from the 
Dispositional Hypothesis via the further Hybrid H ypothesis that the 
internal explanation of the retention or loss during sleep of a disposition to tell 
a dream (if awoken, prompted, not distracted, co-operative, sincere, etc.) is 
analogous to the internal explanation of the retention or loss of a witness’ 
disposition to say what, at a given time, he perceives (if prom pted, not 
distracted, co-operative, sincere, etc.). Importing this assum ption into 
scientific talk has the advantage that talk about dreams being 'remembered' or 
'forgotten' during sleep may be construed as literally true or false without 
thereby rendering it probably false in advance of scientific research.
Whereas the empirical fact that we do not typically remember what 
happened during sleep is conclusively established witliout reference to brain 
processes occurring during sleep, it is open for scientists to provide some testable
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account of telling a dream as the retention or loss during sleep of a disposition to 
an apparent memory if awoken. Hence, when researchers talk of a person 
'remembering a dream' they may only be taken to mean, metaphorically, that a 
person's awakening impression has a certain kind of internal cause, but tliey are 
are better understood to mean, literally, that he is exercising an unconsciously 
acquired and retained disposition to tell a certain dream.
In telling dreams, we could typically remember Üie causes of our awakening 
impression as if of events witnessed, but the empirical evidence shows 
conclusively tliat we do not. I take it to follow from the empirical fact that 
nothing, or nothing much, of what happens to us during sleep is remembered 
upon awakening, tliat tlie concept of dreaming should be clearly distinguished 
from the concept of the normal cause of our teUing a dream upon waking. To use 
the word 'dreaming' to refer to the typical neurophysical cause of telling a 
dream upon awakening (supposing that tliere is sudi a typical cause) would be 
to sustain the widespread confusion between two kinds of explanation of a 
person's awakening narrative. The causal explanation of a person's present 
capacity or disposition to tell a story should be distinguished from the 
explanation of it as the retention of a capacity or disposition previously 
acquired. Once that distinction is made, there is a good reason to reserve the 
verb to dream' for the acquisition of a behavioural capacity or disposition 
rather than merely for tlie occurrence of a functionally distinctive kind of brain 
process. For this allows us to give some (perhaps undeserved) plausibility to 
the commonplace tiiought that dreaming a particular dream is something tliat 
can be remembered or forgotten during sleep. By contrast, the price of insisting 
that 'dreaming' is the normal cause of awakening narratives of dreams is the 
unmitigated conclusion that we do not remember dreaming, for there is
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insufficient reason to suppose that we are aware of the neurophysiological 
processes which occur within us whilst we are asleep.
Only if we distinguish 'dreaming' as tlie unconscious acquisition, however 
briefly, of the capacity to tell a dream if awoken can we give some plausibility 
to the hypothesis that a person is remembering or has forgotten a dream dreamt 
earlier in the night. Everyday questions about remembering and forgetting 
dreams dreamt at particular times during sleep are best vmderstood as questions 
about whether telling or failing to tell a dream on awakening is the retention or 
loss of a capacity or disposition acquired earlier in the night; that is, about 
whether, on awakening, a person remembers or forgets an apparent (usually 
merely apparent) memory he would have had earlier if awoken. Scientific 
discoveries about the typical causes of telling a dream which support content- 
relative predictions about the content of a person's apparent memories if 
awoken would be crucial to test everyday talk about the acquisition and 
retention of the disposition to tell a particular dream. But if we were to call 
that neurological cause 'dream ing', rather than the disposition which it 
typically explains, we would rule out 'dreaming' from among the kinds of 
things which a person may plausibly be said to remember or forget during sleep.
Experimental work on sleep and dreams could be coherently understood on 
the assumption that, strictly speaking, noticing is remembered from sleep when 
a person tells a dream. It is possible that scientific talk of 'remembering' or 
'forgetting' dreams during sleep be regarded as entirely metaphorical, that it 
implies nothing more than the Causal Hypothesis about the etiology of our 
awakening impressions as if of events witnessed. However, scientists can and 
should be construed as presupposing the Dispositional Hypothesis when they 
talk of dreams being 'remembered' or 'forgotten' during sleep.
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A distinction is draw n by scientists between processes which produce 
dreaming (e.g. the firing of FRF neurons associated w ith StageREM sleep, 
Hobson & McCarley (1977)) and factors which determ ine a person's 
subsequently ability to remember a dream  dreamt (e.g. momentary arousal 
interrupting dreaming, allowing the trace to be coded for subsequent retrieval 
from long-term storage, Koulack & Goodenough (1976)). Tliis distinction is best 
understood as an explanation of inferred discrepancies between what a person 
says upon awakening and what he would have said if awoken earlier. The 
main problem confronting any theory of 'dream  recall' is to establish 
experimental criteria for the acquisition of a disposition to tell a dream if 
awoken.
What Goodenough (1978) calls the problem of defining dream recall failure 
is, according to the Dispositional Hypothesis, the problem of identifying tlie 
acquisition and loss during sleep of a disposition to tell a certain dream (if 
awoken, etc.). According to tlie Causal Hypothesis, tlie problem is that of 
identifying the acquisition and loss of an internal process occupying tlie role of 
memory trace in some model of episodic memory. In principle tlie two 
formulations of tlie problem are distinct. However, tlie problems merge where 
it is supposed, according to the Hybrid Hypothesis, that the the acquisition of 
a disposition to tell a dream (if awoken, etc.) is explained by the occurrence of 
an internal modification (the 'laying down of a memory trace') which is known 
in paradigm cases of remembering events witnessed to mediate between the 
perception of an event and the subsequent recollection of what happened or 
seemed to happen.
The possibility of distinguishing 'recall' factors among the circumstances 
affecting the likelihood of a person having a dream to tell presupposes that 
there is some means of identifying, without awakening the subject, the
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acquisition and loss of the capacity or disposition to tell a certain dream (if 
awoken, etc.). W hat I call the Hybrid Hypotiiesis predicts that there is an 
analogy between the internal processes normally responsible for the retention of 
a witnesses capacity to say what happened or seemed to him  at the time to be 
happening and tlie internal processes normally responsible for the retention or 
loss during sleep of a dreamer's capacity to tell his dream (if awoken, etc.). 
There is no necessity that the internal processes responsible for the retention 
during sleep of a disposition to tell a certain dream be the same as those 
responsible for the retention of knowledge of events witnessed. But the Hybrid 
Hypothesis is a reasonable starting point (the only one we have) for 
experimental research.
5. It is not a necessary condition of remembering that a person have consciously 
represented what he remembers either now or in the past.
Malcolm spoke, perhaps uncharacteristically, of relating a narrative as if of 
past events witnessed under the influence of an impression. No wonder that 
Pears (1960) questioned whetlier Malcolm's account of remembering dreams is 
"too thin and Humean". The idea that what we say when telling a dream is 
answerable to sometliing present wliich connects us with something past comes 
very naturally to us; it is as if one has before one the very colours, tlie tastes and 
texture of one's dream and struggles to find tlie correct description before the 
impression fades or is corrupted. Many philosophers have been struck by tlie 
idea that our knowledge of the past must be grounded, if not in inference from 
the publicly observable effects and traces of the past (e.g. ruins, records and 
libraries, etc.), then in a kind of inference from privately observable effects and 
traces of the past recorded within us. Russell captured the thought when he 
said that "memory demands an image". Russell followed in the empiricist
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tradition by conceiving of memory as a source of knowledge akin to perception. 
W hat justifies a claim to see something, on the empiricist account, is tliat one's 
knowledge is based upon one's having an immediate impression of it; similarly, 
what justifies a claim to remember something is that one's knowledge is based 
upon a present impression of it. Our memoiy-claims may be more or less accurate 
representations of past events, but it is only to the extent tliat what we say 
faithfully describes our present impression that we remember what we truly 
say.
Dennett (1976) observed that in remembering an event we "interpret, 
extrapolate, revise". He supposed, like Russell, that there is a distinction 
between what we directly remember and the indefinitely various tilings we we 
can do and say because we remember. "What is the raw material, the evidence, 
the basis for those reconstructions we call recollections?", Deimett asked [BS. 
p.l32]. Hie question is essentially that which Russell thought must have an 
answer when he postulated tlie 'memory image'. Russell's claim that memory 
requires an image was not arrived at by careful introspection. The memory- 
image is a tlieoretical construct supposed to explain how it is that we can 
presently Icnow something because we experienced it in the past. Dennett 
abandons any pretence that w hat Russell dem anded (the distinctive 
evidentiary contribution of memory to what "we call recollections") must be 
discoverable among the phenomenal accompaniments of recollection:
"Whatever it is that is directly remembered can play its evidentiary role in 
prompting an answer of recollection witliout coming into consciousness. This 
suggests that when we remember some event, tliere is some limited amount of 
information tiiat is there, not necessaiily in consciousness but available in one 
way or anotlier for utilisation in composing oui recollections and answering 
questions we or otliers raise. Perhaps what occupies tliis functional position is
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an immensely detailed recording of our experience to which our later access is 
normally imperfect and partial. . [BS. p.l33].
Dennett denies that the present representation of past experience need be 
transparently available to conscious inspection. Furthermore, he supposes that 
the present representation could correspond to a past representation of 
experience not available to concurrent conscious inspection. We have, Dennett 
observes, a capacity to remember features of the objects of our past experience 
which previously went unremarked, to which we previously paid no or little 
reflective attention.
I agree with Dennett that it is not a necessary condition of remembering 
that what one remember be the object of present conscious inspection or of past 
conscious inspection. But I do not thereby accept his contention that the 
postulation of internal representations to which we have no privileged access is 
part of our ordinary talk about 'remembering'. And I certainly do not thereby 
accept that what we can remember about our past experience transcends our 
abilities to say at the time what we are experiencing in virtue of its being the 
product of a representation stored in short-term memory'.
6. Even supposing that to remember is to know now because one Icnew in the past, 
it is not a necessary condition of remembering that the knowledge retained be 
stored as an internal representation or ’trace'.
In his introduction to Representations, Fodor suggested that tlie inevitable 
doom of philosophical behaviourism lay in the fact that persistent questions 
about the explanation of our behavioural capacities demand that we postulate 
internal thought processes m ediating between stim ulus and behaviour. 
Consider the explanation of 'Eureka' phenomena produced by sleep. What 
questions is it reasonable to ask about a person who awakes witli an original
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solution to a puzzle? Malcolm suggested that all psychology can say is that a 
person has acquired an ability without the exercise of his intelligent and 
creative capacities. There are interesting questions about the physiological 
processes which produce this result. But the physiological explanation is of 
quite a different order from explanations citing processes of reasoning, trial and 
error, self-criticism, following hunches and so on tliat are appropriate to 
waking people engaged puzzle-solving.
Experimental results might establish many interesting tilings. We might 
hypotliesize tliat tlie first four hours of sleep are best for cross-words and test 
this by waking subjects at different times. We might hope to relate the 
acquisition of intelligent capacities to electro-chemical processes in tlie brain. 
But need anything be supposed about unconscious tiiought processes occurring 
during sleep? Need it be supposed that the explanation of one's awakening 
capacity in terms of non-conscious thought process during sleep shows that 
anything is remembered? On Dennett's view, and Fodor's, we haven't got a clue 
how to relate physiological processes to intelligent behavioural capacities in 
any detailed way without conceiving of those processes as computational 
m anipulation of symbols. To say, as Malcolm would, tiiat such talk is 
metaphorical 'as if  talk is arbitrary without some account of what makes it 
literally true of people and, according to Dennett, the best account we can give 
of the legitimacy of ascribing mentalistic terms to people, namely, that it is 
predictively valuable, is the same account of the justification of talking this 
way of sub-behavioural mental processes. Once again, my hostility towards 
scientific explanations in terms of internal representations is muted. But my 
sympathies lie with Malcolm against the attempt by philosophers like Fodor 
and Dennett to regard ordinary talk of remembering as a species of information 
processing theory. Even if ordinary talk of remembering were a species of
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causal explanation, it would not follow tliat the causal connection between a 
person's present and past knowledge m ust be m ediated by an internal 
representation.
Russell thought it possible tliat the 'ultimate' explanation of memory- 
knowledge could simply be that we have a present memory-image of certain 
events because in the past we experienced those events. Russell found nothing 
repugnant in the notion of 'Mnemic' causation according to which an event in tlie 
distant past may explain an event in the present without implying anything 
about a process of contiguous events mediating between past and present. He did 
not doubt tliat it is probable that our past experience effects our present 
memory-image by means of a modification of our physiological structure 
continuous between die two but he saw no particular reason for saying here that 
what is very probably true must be true. Many philosophers have rejected Üie 
notion of Mnemic causation and have argued, in contradiction to Russell, that 
the continuous existence of a 'trace' or 'engram' is part of tlie very concept of 
memory.
W hat is not at issue is that the explanation of the connection between 
present knowledge and past experience offered by 'He remembers' presupposes 
that during the intervening period a person has retained his normal 
physiological constitution and that some processes within him  formed a 
continuous chain of cause and effect between his past experience and present 
dispositions. W hat is at issue is whether it is implied that there is a 
distinctive kind of physiological modification brought about by a person’s 
experience of past events which is a persistent representation of tliat past 
experience in one who is disposed to recall those events given the appropriate 
occasion and cues. Broad makes this clear in his criticism of Russell:
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"On tlie trace tlieory there is a special persistent condition, which was started 
by the past experience and would not have existed witliout i t . . . On the tiace 
tlieory, if you were to take a cross-section of tlie history of tlie experient's body 
and mind anywhere between the past experience and tlie [recall] stimulus you 
would find sometliing Viz., the trace, which coiresponds to and may be regar ded 
as tlie representative of past experience . . .  On Mr. Russell's tlieory . . . tliese 
intermediate slices . . . would contain nothing which corresponds to and 
represents the past experience" [Quoted from The Mind and its Place in Nature in 
Malcolm (1977) p. 187].
The idea of a persistent representation stored in our minds or brains is, on 
the face of it, implicit in many of the kinds of tilings we ordinarily say about 
recalling. It is entirely natural for us to say tliat we are searcliing in our minds 
or racking our brains for some piece of information and to explain our inability 
to find it in terms of either the loss or decay of what was one deposited tliere, 
the insufficiency of present clues to identify its exact whereabouts, by its never 
having taken up fixed residence in the first place. According to Martin & 
Deutcher (1966), the idea of a memory trace,
" . . .  is ail indispensable pait of our idea of memory. Once we accept the 
causal model for memory we must also accept the existence of some sort of tr ace 
of stiuctural analogue of what was experienced . . . There is an inevitable 
recourse to metaphors about the storage of our past experience involved in our 
idioms and tiiought about memory" [p. 189].
As Malcolm noted, Martin & Deutcher take our ordinary talk of storage to be 
botli metaphorical (a metaphor for the retention of an ability) and literal 
(implying tliat some neural representation exists continuously in the brain). It is 
not entirely clear whether they mean that literal storage is retention in 
memory or whether is the only kind of explanation imaginable of tlie
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continuous possession of an ability. But either way, they take it that when we 
say that a person remembers something we are, firstly, giving a particular kind 
of causal explanation of how a person knows something now because he acquired 
that knowledge through his past experiences and, secondly, imply tliat tlie I
appropriate kind of causal connection is mediated by a continually existing 
feature of that person which effects his exhibition of knowledge when 
prompted.
Several philosophers, Malcolm among them, have responded to Martin &
Deutcher by arguing that our ordinary idioms of storage are merely metaphors 
for retention. As Ryle had it, what is most often implied when we accoimt for 
someone's knowing something by saying that he remembers it is tliat he learned 
something and has not forgotten it. To say that he remembers how to tell tlie 
joke about the 'ticket to heaven' is to say that he can still tell the joke and not 
to mention something that we should find in him existing independently of any 
of the situations in which he might attempt to tell tlie joke. Malcolm criticised 
philosophers and scientists for mistaking the implications of our everyday 
idioms:
"Martin and Deutcher declare that out 'recourse to metaphor about tlie storage 
of our past experience" is "inevitable". Whetlier or not these metaphors are 
inevitable, they aie natural. Just as natural as exclaiming, when bitterly 
disappointed in love, tliat "my heart is broken." To take the storage metaphors .
. . as giving some warrant to tlie assumption of traces (literal storage) is both 
humorous and saddening. It has the comical aspect of being deceived by a pun.
But when one sees tliis pun playing a part in die creation of a mytliology of 
traces, where theories and reseaich are pursued in dead earnest, one cannot help 
feeling a kind of grief" [Memoiy and Mind p. 199].
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Malcolm was prepared to grant Martin & Deutcher that 'He remembers it' 
is ordinarily a form of causal explanation. He disagreed with them tliat the 
kind of causation involved eitlier implies the availability of a general law or 
the mediation of a process or chain of contiguous events. But tliere are some 
grounds for questioning the assumption that 'He remembers' functions to cite a 
particular kind of causal explanation of how a person knows something now 
because he acquired that knowledge through his past experiences.
7. Talk about remembering is not a form of causal explanation.
According to Squires, tlie fundamental lesson to be learned about the everyday 
concept of memory is not just tliat retention in memory does not imply literal 
storage but that it does not even imply that one has something now because one 
had it before. Martin and Deutcher were correct when they argued that 
memory implies something more that that one previously had some knowledge 
and that one have that same knowledge now. But they were wrong to suppose 
that the further feature is causal connection rather than uninterrupted or 
continuous possession. It is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
uninterrupted retention tliat there should be a causal connection between tlie 
same past and present states. The stash of money Grandma kept under the 
mattress may have retained its value because tliere was zero inflation and not 
because it had that value in the first place. My Government Bonds may be 
worth now what they were when I purchased them five years ago because 
repayment at tlie original real value was guaranteed after five years; but they 
did not retain the same value over that time (as I'd have known if I'd read tiie 
penalty clause for early repayment).
Squires (1969) argued tliat conditionals of the form 'if X had not been F 
yesterday then it would not be F now' do not always express a causal condition.
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They often function to rule out certain kinds of causal explanation - nothing of 
the relevant kind has happened - without thereby citing an alternative cause.
"Having seen that such conditionals are at least tine in many cases of 
retention, the causal theorist mistakenly supposes tliat tliey assert causal 
connections. This leads to the belief tliat there is a causal chain, perhaps 
discoverable by scientists, which mysteriously links tlie states of tlie object 
through time . . . "  [p.l82].
Of course, the claim that X has retained F my lead us to anticipate an 
explanation of why X was F in the first place; but it would be a confusion to 
suppose that X having F is itself offered as a causal condition of X having F.
The claim that 'He remembers . . . ' serves primarily to attribute the 
continuous possession of a capacity or ability, meets the objection tliat retention 
of a capacity does not imply continuous possession of it. It is commonplace tliat 
a person may forget something - suppose he tries on several occasions to bring it 
to mind and fails - then, suddenly, it comes back to him, he remembers. It does 
not seem correct to say, as Munsat (1966) [p.25 ] did, that either the person 
knows all along (at least in some sense of 'subconscious knowledge') or he does 
not remember. Neither the Trace Theorists nor tliose like Squires and Munsat 
who deny that continuous possession implies a causal connection can admit that 
the apparent 'gap' is genuine. But the Trace Theorist might surmise that he is 
better able to explain tlie distinction between what is stored in a person and 
what capacities he may demonstrate because of tliis on some occasions but not on 
others. This would be a mistake. To suppose that what is continous is some 
concrete property of the individual's brain does not help us unless it is said in 
what respect that property was the same. It is not sufficient that it retain the 
same structural properties and not retain the causal function necessary to 
produce what Martin & Deutcher call 'acts of remembering' of the same kind.
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Metaphors suggesting that the trace was difficult to locate (e.g. 'lodged away 
in the innermost recesses of one's mind', 'temporally obscured by other things 
which keep coming to mind') are misleadingly ambiguous. On the one hand 
they imply that something remains the same, tlie trace, but, on the other hand, 
they imply that something has changed, namely, the capacity to remember 
(e.g. to produce a certain piece of information at will, to tell the joke witliout 
being prompted at the punch-line). What the metaphors of searching do is to 
specify what exactly has been retained. Even taking tlie metaphors seriously, 
for a moment, what is retained in memory cannot be an intrinsic structural 
property of the trace which was lost and found but a dynamic property of what 
it takes (what cues, what prompts, etc.) to make the trace active in producing 
the relevant 'act of remembering'.
Squires suggested that the best way to dispel tlie appearance of a gap in 
w hat we know w hen we suddenly remember something is to start by 
characterising our correct performances as displays of knowledge, or cognitive 
ability, rather than as 'acts of memory'. The question about w hat is 
remembered is then more clearly seen as a question about which of our present 
cognitive capacities we have had continuously. It is a question about the 
history of our cognitive abilities, not about the character or causes of those 
abilities.
"Tiie problem can appear insoluble if we begin by calling such things memory 
acts and tlien describe them as exercises of the disposition to remember. To 
appeal beyond the acts themselves seems like explaining house-building as tlie 
kind of thing done by house-builders. But [if we do not appeal to capacities 
beyond the acts] we are forced to discover or invent special features of tlie 
memory acts themselves, just as there aie special features by which house­
building can be distinguished from other activities. No suitable ‘defining
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characteristics' are to be found, however, because, unlike such üiings as house 
building , we do need to appeal to capacities in explaining remembering, only 
this is saved from circularity by tlie fact that tlie relevant capacities are not 
initially characterised as capacities to remember" ['Squires (1969) p. 186].
When someone does something they were recently unable to do, it may 
appear as if some ability has reappeared rather than been retained. But this 
appearance is dispelled when we try to specify more exactly the difference 
between the ability that was lost and the ability presently demonstrated. To 
borrow Squires example, a teddy-bear may lose his ability to squeak-when- 
poked during the winter when it is damp but may regain his ability to squeak- 
when-poked when summer arrives. True, an ability has been lost and regained 
(Teddy's ability to squeak-when-poked) but there is also an ability which has 
been possessed continuously, that is, Teddy's ability to squeak-when-poked- 
during-the-summer. According to Squires, when we say that some action 
demonstrates memory, we have in mind a more or less precise characterisation 
of a capacity demonstrated by that action wliicli has been acquired in the past 
and has never been lost. When we say sometliing is now remembered that was 
previously forgotten, we mean to qualify the description of the original 
capacity to exclude what has been lo st, we do not mean to say that one and tlie 
same capacity has been lost and later recovered; "when we forget sometliing 
and then remember it, the capacity we lose is not the capacity we keep" [ibid. 
p.l86].
Reference to the continuity of our cognitive capacities often occurs in tlie 
context of explaining those capacities. To say that our present capacity has a 
historical continuity is not to say what the cause of our ability is, but it may 
often point in the direction of an explanation of how we acquired tiie ability in 
the first place. It may well be that there is an inevitable reference to causal
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conditions in our explanation of the acquisition of cognitive abilities through 
learning and experience. However, the fact that 'He remembered . . . ' i s  often 
inteqected into a causal inquiry does not mean that a causal connection is being 
cited. Martin & Deutclier supposed that the capacity we retain in memory must 
have a cause in past experience; but, even if ti\e Idnd of capacity that can be 
remembered must have a causal explanation, the cause is not an explanation of 
our remembering tiie capacity.
8. It is not a sufficient condition of remembering that the dream told have been 
dreamt during sleep.
W hat is tire relationship between telling a dream  one has dream t and 
remembering it? Is every case of telling a dream  dream t during sleep 
necessarily a case of remembering? Is every case of being unable to tell a dream 
one has had a case of forgetting? Tlrese questions sharpen tire contrast between 
three different accounts of remembering dreams. The Dispositional Analysis 
allows that a dream (or fragment of a dream) dreamt during sleep may be told 
without exercising memory, for it is a necessary condition of remembering a 
dream  that a person could have told that dream if awoken earlier. The 
Reductive Analysis, as defended by Malcolm, holds that every case of telling a 
dream is necessarily a case of remembering because here the verb 'to remember' 
adds nothing to the bare fact that a person awoke with an ability to tell a 
fictitious story which he did not have when he fell asleep. The Causal 
Analysis, as defended by Dennett, holds that every case of telling a dream 
dreamt during sleep is a case of remembering because even the fragment of a 
dream dream t immediately before awakening is registered and stored for a 
m om ent in a short-term  m em ory system postulated  to explain the 
('introspective') processes by which what is immediately before one's mind is
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normally be expressed. The Dispositional Analysis departs from the Reductive 
Analysis by implying a causal assumption about a normal process of awakening 
such that the dream told is explained in terms of events occurring prior to 
awakening. But where the content of the dream  told is determ ined 
immediately prior to awakening, there is no account of the ability to tell that 
dream being retained during sleep. The Causal Analysis proposes to give such 
an account in terms of a storage model of memory whicla is supposed to afford 
sub-behavioural criteria for 'remembering' independently of tlie retention of an 
ability to do or say something.
Malcolm (1959)(1963) saw a problem with tiie idea that telling a dream is 
a case of 'remembering'. He could not fit telling a dream to the paradigm of 
'factual memory' for he saw no account of 'knowing during sleep' which would 
allow that a person knows the content of his dream upon awakening because he 
knew it in the past:
"There is often no doubt that knowledge of a dream is memory, e.g. when one 
knows that one had a dream last week or last montli. But if a person awakened 
suddenly from sleep and immediately declared that he had a dream, should we call 
this remembering tliat he has a dream? I am not sure: but if so tlien this use of 
"He remembers tliat p" does not fall under our analysis of factual memory [since 
we could not determine that he previously knew tliat he dreamt] . . . Our 
definition gives a coirect account of the central use, but not perhaps of every use 
of tlie locution" ['A Definition of Factual Memoiy', Knowledge and Certainty 
1963 p.240].
Malcolm's conclusion was that there is no distinction between being able to tell 
a dream and remembering it, between being unable to to tell a dream one has 
had and forgetting it. However, the price of tliis identification of being able to 
tell a dream dreamt during sleep with remembering it is to allow, as Malcolm
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did, that the verb 'to remember' does not apply here in its usual sense. I take 
the view that to say 'remembering' has a special sense here is in effect the 
conclusion, explicitly drawn by Squires (1973), that strictly speaking we do not 
remember a dream told upon first awakening.
It is a tempting to equate the hypoüresis that a dream was 'forgotten' from 
sleep with the hypothesis that a person dreamt a dream during sleep but 
failed to be aware of it on awakening. One might suppose, for example, that 
the hypothesis 'Betty forgot her dream about singing in Tosca' is equivalent to 
the hypothesis 'Betty would have had an awakening impression as if of 
singing in Tosca if she had not been distracted by Joe's snoring'. But the 
Dispositional Analysis resists this account of 'forgetting' dream s. It 
distinguishes the bare proposition that a person was unaware of his dream or 
failed to tell his dream  from the additional proposition that he forgot his 
dream. The Dispositional Analysis distinguishes between a dream which a 
person is unable to tell because sometiring in his awakening circumstances 
detracts from his capacity to judge the matter (e.g. he is distracted) and a 
dream which a person is unable to tell because he has forgotten it.
According to the Dispositional Analysis, the counterfactual statement 'X 
would have been aware of dream p if awoken in a normal manner (such that 
peculiarities of the manner of awakening do not explain his apparent memory) 
and prompted to try to remember events recently witnessed witliout distraction' 
is consistent witii tlie proposition that X remembers dream  p. On the 
assumptions that X remembers his dream but failed to tell it, the statement 
implies that the failure is due to the inappropriateness of the actual 
circumstances for exercising the capacity he possesses. By contrast, the 
counterfactual X would have been aware of his dream even if awoken in a 
normal (such that peculiarities of the manner of awakening do not explain his
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apparent memory) and prompted to try to remember events recently witnessed 
without distraction' offers a different kind of explanation of tlie failure to tell 
a dream. It asserts that a dreamer would be unable to tell his dream p however 
ideal the waking circumstances. In other word, it asserts tliat X fails to tell his 
dream p because he has lost the capacity to do so, i.e. because he has forgotten 
his dream p.
Supposing, which Malcolm did not, that 'knowing a dream' during sleep is 
properly explained as the acquisition of a capacity during sleep to tell a dream 
upon awakening, a problem remains about accounting as memories cases of 
telling a dream  (or fragm ent of a dream) dream t im m ediately before 
awakening. A dream  (or fragment of a dream) dreamt immediately before 
awakening is one which one could not have told if awoken a moment earlier. 
We seem forced to distinguish between cases of telling a dream which exercise 
an ability retained from moment to moment during sleep and cases of telling a 
dream which merely exercise an ability acquired and not lost. Is the telling of 
a dream or fragment of a dream a case of remembering where it is not the 
exercise of a capacity retained during sleep? Where the ability or know-how 
in question has just been acquired, where no moment has passed in which it 
could have been lost, should the exercise of that ability be accounted a case of 
'remembering'?
Malcolm's response to sucli questions would probably have been to observe 
that we ordinarily talk of 'remembering' without excepting cases of dreams 
dreamt 'immediately before' awakening. We have, on Malcolm’s account, no 
idea of tlie occurrence of dreams at particular times wiüiin a period of sleep. 
He would take the observation that we do not distinguish dreams according to 
when they were dreamt within sleep to show that what we ordinarily mean by 
'remembering dreams' cannot be accounted for in terms of the retention of an
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ability from moment to moment within sleep. But to my mind this response 
simply begs the question which arises if we suppose dreams to be dreamt at 
particular times within sleep about whether retention (over and above mere 
acquisition without loss ) is a necessary condition of remembering. If we were to 
suppose that dreams are dreamt at particular moments during sleep and were to 
say, as we do, of every particular case of telling a dream  that it is 
'remembered'; would our saying this show that it is consistent witii our general 
use of the verb 'to remember' that a dream dream t immediately before is 
'remembered'? Or would our saying that dreams are remembered simply imply 
the hypotliesis that most dreams told would have been told if one had been 
awoken earlier (and tliat we have no reason to suppose of any particular case 
that it is an exception)?
9. The usefulness of models of short-term memory in explaining our 
'introspective’ reports does not show that telling a dream or fragment of a 
dream dreamt immediately before awakening is remembering.
In the previous chapter, I argued that the Reductive Analysis failed to account 
for die temporal distinction we commonly draw between dreaming a dream 
during sleep and telling it upon awakening. Dennett (1976) argued that this 
was a problem common to any attempt to reduce our 'introspective' reports to 
dispositions to verbal behaviour. He suggested that die temporal distinction 
should be understood in term s of the distinction draw n by cognitive 
psychologists among factors whicli explain a person's performance between die 
information stored in a 'memory trace' and the 'prompts' or 'cues' which 
activate it. The temporal location of dream is given by the 'laying down' of die 
appropriate 'memory trace'. This seems to afford Dennett a neat account of the 
comiection between what it is for a dream told to have been dreamt during sleep
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and what it is for the telling of a dream dreamt immediately before awakening 
to be remembered. The dreaming of a dream is the occurrence of some brain 
process the normal function of which is identified according to some model of 
short-term memory as the 'laying down of a trace'; the telling of a dream is a 
case of remembering where it is explained in terms of brain processes the normal 
functions of which are identified by a model of short-term memory, the 
processes of awakening corresponding to 'prompts' or 'cues'. In short, a dream is 
dream t during sleep and remembered upon immediate awakening where it's 
telling is explained by an information processing model of short-term memory.
The problem of accounting a case of telling a dream an exercise of memory 
witliout implying that there was some previous occasion upon which a person 
would have told tlie same story if awoken is one which preoccupied Dennett 
(1976). Dennett sees ordinary talk about the mind as justified where it succeeds 
in charting the acquisition, loss and retention of tlie behavioural dispositions of 
rational agents. But where no such account can be given of folkpsychology as an 
Intentional System Theory it should be critically judged as an attempt at sub­
personal Cognitive Science, a speculation about tlie internal process which 
produce our dispositions to behaviour.
Dennett regards 'telling a dream' as a phenomenon which illuminates a 
common feature of our everyday claims to 'introspective' knowledge. On 
Dennett's view, a person's assertions about what he immediately seems to see, 
what he feels, thinks, intends and so on do not readily reduce to self­
attributions of behavioural dispositions. In common witli narratives of dreams, 
our 'introspective reports' imply a distinction between w hat we actually say 
and why we say it, as if there were grounds for one's judgment accessible only to 
oneself. Dennett regards our self-expressions in the present tense, like our 
narratives of dreams in the past tense, as putative claims to knowledge
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acquired prior to its earliest possible expression, claims which cannot be 
accounted for in terms of the retention of behavioural capacities whicli might 
have been previously exercised.
Dennett views w hat he calls Malcolm's 'criteriological move' as 
premature: the conclusion that our narratives of dreams in particular, or self- 
expressions generally, are answerable to nothing which can be discovered in a 
person's past behaviour or 'consciousness' should be reached only after it has 
been decided by reference to scientific theories and evidence whether they 
have any justification as descriptions of the internal processes which normally 
cause us to express them. He attempts to show that a temporal distinction 
between what we say about ourselves and the grounds of our saying it may be 
justified in term s of an inform ation processing theory  a ttribu ting  
representational properties to structures in the brain. The identification of the 
cause of our self-expressions as 'memory traces' according to a cognitivist tlieory 
of short-term memory would, Dennett suggests, justify our implication tliat we 
say what we do because it corresponds to something whicli has happened inside 
us. Our commonplace conviction that dreams are remembered is to be 
understood, according to Dennett, as an assertion of the Causal Hypothesis, 
tliat telling a dream is produced by internal processes similar to tliose which 
mediate (at least in the short term) between the registration of a sensory 
stimulus and the exercise of an ability to say w hat was perceived. What 
Dennett seems to have in mind is that, if a person's awakening capacity to tell 
a dream can be explained by analogy with the sort of 'sensory stores' postulated 
by cognitive psychologists to explain the role of cues given immediately after 
an item is momentarily flashed upon the screen in determining what a person is 
able to say about what was on the screen, then his capacity to tell a dream may
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be accounted a capacity to remember, notwithstanding that the dream told 
would not have been told if he'd been awoken at an earlier time.
I have agreed with Dennett that Malcolm's account of the temporal 
location of dreaming is one that should not be reached witliout reference to 
scientific research. I am also persuaded that the only kind of research in view 
which might show that dreams are dreamt or occur during sleep is tied to the 
analogy between telling a dream and remembering events witnessed drawn by 
the Causal Hypotliesis. If you twisted my arm (really hard) I'd probably 
accept tliat postulation of 'memory traces' and other internal representations is 
unavoidable in establishing systematic inferences from brain processes in sleep 
to what a person is disposed to say if awoken. However, it seems to me that tlie 
germ of Dennett's account of remembering dreams is the idea that it is a 
sufficient condition of remembering that there be a temporal distinction 
between tlie dreaming of a dream  (whether or not characterised as 'laying 
down a memory trace') and the telling of a dream. This is to say that, if a 
person is asked to say what he diinks and his reply is determined by processes 
occurring prior to the prompt (perhaps characterised as 'laying down a memory 
trace') rather than by variables introduced by the prompt, it is correct to say 
that he 'remembers'.
Dennett intended to blur the distinction we ordinarily draw between being 
able to say what was immediately going through one's mind and rememhering. 
His point was to emphasise tliat our 'introspective' capacity to say what was 
immediately going through our minds is fallible and open to scientific criticism. 
I think it is possible to agree with Dennett on this point, but to resist his 
assim ilation of saying w hat was imm ediately before one's mind and 
'remembering' in its everyday sense. When we say a person remembers what
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was on his mind we ordinarily imply that, if he had been asked sometime 
earlier, he could have told us then what he tells us now.
10. It is not a necessary condition of remembering that the knowledge or ability 
exercised was previously acquired 'through experience'.
Putnam (1961) and Chihara & Fodor (1967) put forward a Causal Analysis of 
'remembering dreams' in response to Malcolm's argument that the Received 
Opinion is an untestable hypothesis (and tiierefore cannot be implicit in 
ordinary language). Their suggestion was that the Received Opinion, the 
hypothesis that in telling a dream  we remember perceptions, thoughts, 
sensations, etc. from sleep, could be confirmed by the discovery that the 
internal causes of 'telling a dream' (dreaming) are brain processes which, if 
they were to occur when a person is awake, would have causes and effects, in 
relation to stimulus and behaviour, typical of perceptions, thoughts, sensations, 
etc. Dennett's (1976) paper "Is Dreaming an Experience?" may be regarded as an 
attem pt to head off a certain kind of objection to Causal Analysis of 
remembering dreams. The objection to the Causal Analysis anticipated by 
Dennett is that scientific justification of the Causal Hypothesis would not 
amount to a vindication of tlie Received Opinion. For, tlie objection goes, the 
discovery that the retention or loss of our awakening dispositions to tell a 
dream' (if prompted, etc.) has tlie same internal explanation as the retention or 
loss of our dispositions to 'say what one perceived' (if prompted, etc.) leaves 
open a question about whether the disposition to tell a story was acquired 
through experience. And it is an essential claim of the Received Opinion that 
dreaming is an 'experience' akin to perception.
Dennett sees that the phrase 'through experience' m ust add some 
substantial and testable qualification to the requirem ent that w hat is
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remembered must be knowledge previously acquired. I take his point to be that 
folkpsychology, lacking empirical evidence about our internal mechanisms, 
fails to supply an adequate explanation of what it is for our verbal dispositions 
to first person psychological sentences to be acquired 'tlirough experience', and 
that the task (which may prove not to be very important or worthwhile) falls 
to sub-behavioural scientific psychology. If, according to such a theory, 
dreaming turns out to be an 'experience', that conclusion would be a new 
discovery; it would not be a confirmation of a conviction for which we have any 
pre-scientific justification. Nothing we already know - nothing stemming from 
the imdoubted success of folk psychology in predicting behaviour - gives us any 
reason to be confident that dreams are experiences, or even that a notion of 
'experience' will have any useful place in sub-behavioural cognitive science.
Dennett regards dreaming as a phenomenon which illustrates a general 
problem  for philosophical attem pts to analyse experience in terms of 
dispositions to u tter first person psychological sentences. Dennett is 
sympatlietic to these attempts as an alternative to the Cartesian mythology of 
infallible introspection. But he sees that it is a feature of our ordinary notion of 
experience tliat w hat we experience outstrips our capacity to currently say 
what we are aware of. A person can say retrospectively what he was aware of 
even though he could not have told us about them at the time. If so, there must 
be some criteria which can establish tliat a person remembers p prior to it being 
inferred from this fact that he experienced p.
In 'Towards A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness' [BS. Ch.9] Dennett 
sketched an outline of the kinds of 'functional saliencies' which any plausible 
theory of experience would have to integrate. His claim was that the 
postulation of three distinct sub-personal agencies (a Public Relations, a Buffer 
Memory and a Control Humunculus) and of certain Computer Access Relations
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between them (subject to selective bias, interpretation, inference or censorsMp) 
may provide the means to justify what is wortliwhile in our pre-scientific 
intuitions about the 'Personal Access' we have to our inner selves. Dennett 
suggested that Cognitive Science may accommodate the folk psychological 
hypotheses that one experiences more at any time than one is currently able to 
say on the assumption that "the content of one's experience includes whatever 
enters (by normal routes) of information tlie buffer memory M" [BS. p.l69].
This "theoretically promising adjustment in our ordinary concepts" [BS. 
p.145] would allow that what we experience is an objective fact logically 
independent of the content of the first person past tense psychological sentences 
we are now disposed to utter, even where nothing in our past behaviour could 
show us to have misremembered or forgotten. It would also mean that whilst, 
trivially, w hat we actually say (barring insincerity, slips of the tongue or 
misunderstanding the words chosen) constitutes what we mean to say - "cannot 
fail to do justice to the [personal] access we have to our own inner lives " [BS. 
p.171] - a person has no special access to tlie causal grounds of his publicly 
evident avowals of semantic intent. You may say what you w ant to say, but 
have no privileged authority as to why you want to say what you say.
The problem about identifying dreaming with entry into Buffer Memory is 
that it does not distinguish between the content of: 
seeming to see, tliinking, imagining (p), and 
dreaming (seeming to see, thinking, imagining p).
Hie question about whether dreaming is an experience is inextricable from tlie 
question as to whetiier dreams are identical with perceptions, tlioughts images, 
or some such mental phenomenon occurring in waking life. If, on Dennett's 
account, the content of a dream is just that given by the normal causal role of an 
item in Buffer Memory, then the content of a dream is not adequately identified
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with perceptions, tlioughts, etc. That identification must depend upon die 
causal role of the brain token entering into Buffer Memory in producing 
concurrent dispositions to behaviour. Hence, as discussed in Chapter Four 
('"Perceptions' During Sleep"), Dennett proposed tliat the question about 
whetiier dreaming is an experience must be decided, in part, according to the 
peripheral physiology of StageREM sleep.
Thus Dennett attempted to strike a balance between the notion that what 
we experience can outstrip our capacities for concurrent self-expression and tlie 
notion that there is more to self-consciousness than subliminal registration of 
stimuli in information processing stores (e.g. the Buffer Memory). I disagree 
w ith Dennett that it is necessary to give an account of dream ing as an 
'experience'. (If it were, I fear that Dennett's functionalist substitutes for 
Cartesian notions of 'inner awareness' fail to meet that necessity.) But I do 
allow that it w ould be an objection to our conviction that dreams are 
remembered from sleep if there were no clear temporal distinction between 
what we actually say and why we say it. Whether or not there is such a 
temporal distinction might well turn upon the question about whether normal 
processes of telling a dream (or fragment of a dream) dream t immediately 
before awakening can be accounted for by an information processing model of 
short-term memory. But the use of the term 'memory' in connection with such 
models should be distinguished from our everyday notion of short-term memory 
(i.e. the retention of a capacity beyond the moment at which its first exercise 
could have been prompted).
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CONCLUSION
A TRUTH OF UNDERWHELMING UNIMPORTANCE?
1. Summaiy of Argument
In the Introduction, I offered a Scheme of Argument. I'll re-print it here, and 
then give a summary of w hat I hope I've done chapter by chapter. The 
arrangement of cliapters does not fit exactly with tlie Scheme of Argument. But 
it should be clear enough to the reader how the Scheme of Argument has been 
filled out:
SCHEME OF ARGUMENT (Re-Printed from Introduction)
1. It is preferable tliat our conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and 
remembered or forgotten upon awakening be taken as a speculative hypothesis 
yet to be confirmed or disconfirmed by future scientific research than tliat it be 
taken to be an hypothesis for which we already have sufficient evidence, 
where what evidence we already have, if sufficient to pass judgment, would 
render our conviction false.
2. The Received Opinion that dreams are perceptions, thoughts, images, or 
some such mental acts or events occurring during sleep is false judged by what we 
already know about sleeping and waking, and we know pretty much all about 
sleeping and waking tliat is relevant.
3. It is preferable that our conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and 
remembered or forgotten upon awakening be understood as a speculative 
hypotliesis open to future scientific investigation than that it be 'saved' from 
possible disconfirmation by being rendered empirically empty.
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4. According to tlie Reductive Analysis, to say tliat a person 'remembers' a 
dream from sleep does not strictly speaking imply tliat he remembers anytliing; 
it is simply a metaphorical way of saying that he has an apparent memory of 
events upon awakening wliich is not a memory of waking life.
5. The Causal Hypothesis, that 'telling a dream' is typically caused by brain 
processes similar to those which explain a witnesses' report of what he 
recently saw and did, is a speculation one might reasonably make in virtue of 
the programme of scientific research suggested by it, tliough we are not entitled 
to assert it witli any confidence on the basis of evidence presently available.
6. It is better that our conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep be 
taken to imply the Causal Hypothesis tlian it be taken to imply the Received 
Opinion.
7. It is better that our conviction tliat dreams are remembered from sleep be 
taken to imply the Causal Hypothesis than that it be rendered trivially true 
by the Reductive Analysis.
8. Scientific confirmation of the Causal Hypotliesis would not confirm the 
Received Opinion; at most it would show that our dispositions to apparent 
memories if awoken are acquired and retained with an order, pace and duration 
analogous to the acquisition and retention of a witness's ability to report events 
perceived.
9. Additional confirmation of the Representational Hypothesis, that a 
person's description of his dreams corresponds to a brain structure realised 
during sleep in virtue of common representational qualities, would not confirm 
the Received Opinion for it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
'remembering' in everyday discourse that a person's words or actions correspond 
to some structure in his brain process in virtue of its representational qualities; 
it would not show that a person loiew (was aware of, conscious of, experienced.
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or represented to himself) Ms brain structure under tlie interpretation given to 
it by cognitive scientists.
10. Scientific confirmation of the Causal Hypothesis would  show that 
something, namely, tiie ability to tell a dream, is remembered from sleep; for it 
is a sufficient condition of 'remembering' in everyday discourse tliat a person 
exliibit a know-how previously acquired and not lost.
11. Our conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or 
forgotten upon awakening is best understood as the speculative hypothesis that 
'telling a dream' is typically the exercise of a capacity acquired and retained 
during sleep to tell a story without invention or inference as if of events 
witnessed and deeds done (no matter how improbable or impossible), a story 
wMch is not a memory of waking life and need not be a memory of occurrences 
during sleep.
In Part One ("What Appears to be Remembered") I argued tliat the 
Received Opinion is false. In telling a dream a person is not typically 
remembering events, actions, processes or anything else wMch happened during 
sleep. The relevant evidence is provided by familiar everyday observations 
about w hat people appear to remember upon awakening and about what 
happened wMlst they slept, ratlier than by formal scientific investigation. In 
Chapter one ("Events Witnessed and Deeds Done"), I argued that sober 
reflection on what we already know shows that, in 'telling a dream', a person 
usually does not remember perceptions and actions from sleep. I argued tliat 
popular faith in the Received Opinion relies upon an unwarranted inference 
from an incontestable premise (that, in 'telling a dream', a person typically 
awakes with a vivid impression as if of events witnessed and deeds done but 
does not remember anything from waking life) to a doubtful conclusion (tliat, in
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'telling a dream', a person typically remembers what, during sleep, he seemed 
to see and tried to do). I argued tiiat consistent application of the reasons why 
we suppose tliat a person is not remembering what he seemed to see or tried to 
do whilst awake conclusively settles that, in 'telling a dream ', a person 
typically does not remember what, during sleep he seemed to see or tried to do.
In Chapter Two, I argued that the introspective model of imagination and 
other 'items of consciousness' cannot account for our apparent knowledge of the 
characters, objects and events of a dream. The ability to tell a dream cannot be 
reduced to memory of thoughts and intentions directed towards images. Even if 
a person telling a dream  did remember thoughts and images from sleep, die 
ostensible content of a typical dream narrative is too unlike a series of mere 
thoughts and images to bear identification. My conclusion from Part One 
(What Appears To Be Remembered) was not merely tliat there is no general 
account of what dreaming consist in, as if the fact tliat we do not remember 
illusory perceptions, thoughts or images shows tliat we do remember sometliing 
else, some irreducible mental activity. My conclusion was that when we 
'remember dreams' we generally remember nothing of what happened during 
sleep.
In Part Two ("Scientific Studies of Sleep and Dreaming"), I argued that 
experimental sleep research is consistent with the conclusion tliat a person 
telling a dream is typically not remembering mental acts, events, states or 
processes from sleep. In Chapter Three ("'Actions' During Sleep"), I allowed 
that the scientific study of sleep might have shown that in some special cases 
(e.g. sleepwalking, sleeptalking, night terrors, prearranged 'signalling' from 
sleep) a person remembers actions or events from sleep. But the evidence turned 
out to show that even in the cases of sleeptalking and lucid dreaming, where 
there is some association between the story a person tells upon awakening and
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w hat he was observed to do or say during sleep, tlie disassociations are 
sufficient to render doubtful the hypothesis that a person was expressing during 
sleep thoughts and intentions about what he seemed to perceive or what he 
imagined. This conclusion was not an objection to the endeavours of researchers 
in the field. For the truth or falsity of the Received Opinion turned out to be 
inessential either to 'cognition' inferred according to Arkin's information 
processing model of sleeptalking or to 'imagination' inferred according to 
LaBerge’s physiological model of lucid dreaming.
In Chapter Four ('"Perceptions During Sleep"), I argued that neither 
evidence of physiological activity peripheral to the central nervous system 
(e.g. eye movements, muscular twitches, penes erections, etc.) interpreted as 
'covert behaviour' during sleep, nor evidence of neurological activity of tlie 
forebrain interpreted as critical responses to internally generated 'stimuli' 
supports the Received Opinion. I made an effort, following Putnam (1962a), 
Squires (1973) and Dennett (1976) to clarify to the sort of psycho-physiological 
correlations that the would-be defender of the Received Opinion (unimpressed 
by the arguments of Chapters One and Two) might hope to find. But my 
primary aim was not to suggest that the scientific hypothesis that dreaming is 
a 'perceptual activity', construed as a defense of the Received Opinion, is 
experimentally false. For tlie point of experimental research is not to justify 
the Received Opinion. My primary aim was to show that the scientific talk of 
dreaming as an 'experience' akin to perception or vivid imagination has a 
significance quite apart from the truth or falsity of tlie Received Opinion.
The scientific hypothesis that StageREM sleep is a period of 'perceptual 
activity' should not be confused with the hypothesis that a person's awakening 
narrative is a memory of what during sleep he perceived or seemed to perceive. 
On my account, it is reasonable for scientists to suppose that, at some level of
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'centrality', there is a similarity between the causal explanation of telling a 
dream  and of reporting events witnessed. The scientific hypothesis that 
StageREM is a period of 'perceptual activity' should be understood 
metaphorically to assert such a causal analogy. Admittedly, scientist's often 
talk as if the dem onstration that the physiology of StageREM sleep is 
remarkably akin to the physiology underlying waking perception shows more 
than just that. They often talk as if, in addition, it shows that the person's 
awakening 'report' of a dream was, after all, 'correct'. This is to confuse tlie 
experim ental plausibility of the Causal H ypothesis w ith contentious 
philosophical claims about the reference of first person psychological 
sentences.
In Part Three ("The Dispositional Analysis") I questioned tlie implications 
of tlie conclusion tliat tlie Received Opinion is false. The conclusion I drew from 
the empirical fact that, in telling dreams, a person does not generally remember 
anything of which he was aware whilst asleep is tliat a dream is best regarded 
as tlie content of a certain kind of fictitious story a person is able to tell without 
invention or inference, as if he were remembering events witnessed and deeds 
done (no matter how incredible or unimaginable), where he is not remembering 
waking episodes and whether or not he is remembering sometliing of what 
happened during sleep. This conclusion is not new. It was drawn by Malcolm 
(1959) and by Squires (1973). Malcolm's conclusion was that the concept of 
dreaming is not a theoretical concept referring to sometliing wliicli explains our 
awakening impressions; it is an analytic truth that dreams are what we appear 
to remember upon awakening where we are not remembering. Squires, as I read 
him, concluded tliat dream ing is a bad theoretical concept; that, strictly 
speaking, there are no dreams; and that if talk of 'remembering dreams' is to 
reasonably survive the discovery that tlie Received Opinion is false, it should
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be purged of its empirical assumptions. The conclusion I drew, in disagreement 
with Malcolm, was that our conviction that dreams are dream t during sleep 
and remembered or forgotten upon awakening is a theoretical hypothesis open 
to scientific investigation. But, in disagreement with Squires, I argued that it 
is an hypothesis which survives the falsification of the Received Opinion.
In Chapter Five ("Dreaming W ithout Experience"), I argued that the 
Reductive Analysis is, in itself, an incomplete account of tlie ordinary concept of 
dreaming for it gives no account of talk about dreams being dreamt during sleep. 
I defended the Dispositional Analysis as an elaboration of tlie Reductive 
Analysis. It retains the identification of die content of a person's dream with 
the content of his apparent memory on awakening, where he is questioned or 
otherwise prompted to try to remember events recently witnessed and is not 
distracted but adds to die Reductive Analysis an account of what it is for a 
dream to be dreamt at a particular time within a period of sleep. According to 
the Dispositional Analysis, our conviction diat dreams are dream t during 
sleep, diat dreams are uniquely identifiable by die dreamer and time dreamt, 
implies the assumption that what dream  a person would tell 'if awoken' is 
determined prior to and independently of the contingencies of the process of 
awakening. The Dispositional Analysis offers an account of the dreaming or 
'occurrence' of a dream as the acquisition of a disposition to appear to remember 
events, if awoken in a manner which is both normal and has no significant 
effect upon what a person appears to remember, where he is questioned or 
odierwise prompted to try to remember events recently witnessed (no matter 
how incredible or unimaginable) and not distracted.
In Chapter Six, I argued that assumptions about die causal explanation of 
telling a dream  whilst central to our talk about dreams being dream t or 
occurring during sleep could not explain our commonplace conviction diat dreams
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are remembered or forgotten during sleep. Ordinary talk of remembering and 
forgetting not a does not aim to give a causal explanation of our abilities; it 
intends only to give a historical profile of tlie retention and loss of our abilities. 
If scientific talk of 'remembering dreams' is taken to be equivalent to the 
Causal Hypothesis then, like scientific talk of dreaming being a 'perceptual 
activity', its significance should be regarded as strictly metaphorical. But it is 
possible to take such talk literally. For scientific research centred around the 
Causal Hypothesis may be taken to presuppose the Dispositional Hypotliesis 
that telling a dream  is typically the exercise of an ability retained from 
moment to moment within sleep. It seems to me an advantage to construe 
scientific talk of remembering dreams consistently with the everyday use of the 
verb 'to remember'.
In Chapter Six, I resisted Dennett's (1976) suggestion tliat tliere is a notion 
of 'remembering dreams' which does not imply that a dream remembered upon 
awakening is one which die dreamer could have told if he had been awoken 
earlier. I took his idea to be that, where the determination of the content of a 
person's dream prior to awakening is explained by an information processing 
model of short-term memory, the fact diat a dream told was dreamt during 
sleep is a sufficient condition of its being remembered. In resistance to Dennett's 
suggestion, I argued that a causal-cum -representational analysis of 
remembering dreams does not escape the need to distinguish between the 
everyday notion of memory appropriate to retaining an ability to tell a dream 
and a technical notion of storage in short-term 'memory'.
2. Reflections upon the Conclusion
I have defended the conclusion that our commonplace conviction diat dreams 
are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten upon waking is, at best, a
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speculative hypothesis open to a very reasonable scepticism. Is not this 
conclusion outrageous? How could it be doubted tliat dreams are remembered 
from sleep? Is it not a fundamental feature of our notion of a person and of the 
mental attributes which define him that he has a unique capacity to remember 
what he seemed to see, tried to do, imagined, felt, and so on, in the recent past? 
If a person's knowledge of his dreams is not safe, what is?
Let us distinguish between the appearance of confident recollection and tlie 
substantive content of our conviction. The appearance of confident recollection 
stems from the fact that telling a dream is a remarkable phenomenon in which 
words and images come to us as if we were remembering recent adventures. That 
telling a dream  is, in many respects, 'like' remembering recent perceptions, 
thoughts, images, and so on, is not in doubt. It is not suggested tliat a dreamer 
'makes up' tlie story he tells upon awakening, that he is insincere, that he is 
careless, that he exaggerates, or any such thing. His confidence in expressing 
what appears to have happened is a natural feature of telling a dream. That 
is what it is like for him. Questioning tliis appearance of confident recollection 
would be as absurd as questioning a person's sincere and confident judgment tliat 
tills book has the same colour as that book.
What is in doubt is whether the confident appearance of recollection has 
any grounds, whether it is true according to its correspondence witli sometliing 
not given witli the awakening phenomenon of telling a dream. The recognition 
tliat it does not should leave us in a position where any substantive content one 
can plausibly imply into the rhetoric of recollection is a bonus. The 
Dispositional Analysis does no t detract anything from  the confident 
appearance of recollection. It does not imply tliat we should stop telling 
dreams or that we should express ourselves more modestly. Here is 
philosophy, not taking away or reducing what we all thought we knew for sure.
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but giving more substance and plausibility to our ordinary convictions tlian tliey 
probably deserve!
Following Dennett (1976) I have tried to show that the conclusion that 
nothing is remembered from sleep cannot be avoided either by a Cartesian 
mythology of infallible introspection or by Malcolm's (1959) insistence that the 
relationship between 'telling a dream' and remembering a dream  is logical. 
Instead, I have suggested that tlie conclusion can be avoided (or at least 
m itigated) by an alternative account of our awakening certainty that 
something is remembered: what I cannot doubt when telling a dream is that tlie 
story we are able to tell without inference or invention is one we could have told 
if awoken at some time sooner. That there is a unreasonable gap between the 
confidence of our awakening conviction and tlie grounds we have for it is not an 
objection to my analysis unless some better account of our conviction that dreams 
are dreamt during sleep can be given. My argument has been that neither the 
Reductive Analysis nor tlie Causal Analysis provide a better alternative to the 
Received Opinion than does the Dispositional Analysis. In particular, the 
Causal Analysis which has received most support from contemporary analytic 
pliilosophers reacting against Malcolm's attack on the Received Opinion, has 
no advantage over the Dispositional Analysis in justifying the confidence of our 
awakening conviction that something is remembered.
Strictly speaking, the Dispositional Hypothesis, that telling a dream is 
typically the exercise of a disposition acquired during sleep and not lost, is not 
equivalent to the Causal Hypothesis. But it remains that the only kind of 
systematic 'do-able' experimental work in view is tied to the analogy between 
dreaming and waking perception, and that otlier possible means of charting the 
acquisition, retention and loss of dispositions to tell dreams are undirected stabs 
in the dark. For a brief period, in the late fifties and early sixties, it looked as
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if psycho-physiological research was beginning to establish correlations of 
some specificity between types of physiological phenomenon and types of 
dream  narratives a person would tell if immediately awoken. Sadly, as 
observed in Chapters Three and Four the promise of a tlieory enabling us to 
infer from observations of sleep the acquisition of a disposition to tell a certain 
kind of dream has gone unfulfilled. A pessimistic view of tlie ability of 
psycho-physiological research to justify our conviction that dreams are 
remembered from sleep might lead one to reflect that, perhaps, our ordinary 
convictions about dreaming are, after all, idle speculations incapable of guiding 
a systematic research programme. But, if that were the case, it seems to me 
that the Dispositional Analysis would have no advantage over tlie Reductive 
Analysis of 'remembering dreams’. If our conviction tliat dreams are dreamt 
during sleep and remembered or forgotten were merely an idle speculation, 
detached from scientific research, there would be nothing in our use of tlie verb 
to dream' to distinguish it from a merely metaphorical manner of saying that 
telling a dream is very much like remembering events witnessed, except, that 
is, in regard to whether anything is actually remembered.
Perhaps I should have been content to stop with Squires at the point of 
recognising that tlie Received Opinion is a bogus attempt to explain and justify 
our natural inclination to tell a story as if of events past:
"But in tlie daik hour's of the morning, when tlie perfumes of the night aie in 
one's nostrils or tlie flesh creeps at the tliought of tenors past, how absurd it 
seems to deny tliat sometliing is remembered! It is tlie magic of this primitive 
certainty that sustains the scotched myths; not laboratory evidence, reflection 
upon unusual occunences or even grammatical illusions. In tlie cold light of 
day, perhaps we should also wake up to the fact tliat tliis spell-binding certainty 
only shows what it shows: tliat we somethnes wake up witli apparent memories.
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But could the rest be dogmatism about slumber? Have we been dreaming?" 
[Squhes (1973)]
Perhaps all that should be said is that the Received Opinion is false. After 
all, as Dennett observed:
" . . .  one needn't always counter a tlieory witli a theory. Hoaxism is a worthy 
opponent of tlie most elaborate theory of clairvoyance, and it consists of but a 
single statement, supported, of course, by a good deal of sleutiling." [Dennett 
(1978) p.xi]
By offering the Dispositional Analysis as an alternative to the Received 
Opinion (or perhaps just a dull substitute for it!) I seem to have committed that 
sin against which Malcolm repeatedly warned, namely, the sin of looking 
everywhere for explanations and justifications.
Wright, struggling to reconcile Wittgenstein's critical insights witli a more 
positive account of folk psychology as a rationalising predictive theory along 
the lines proposed by Davidson and Dennett, expresses a familiar feeling of 
being crushed between silence and nonsense:
"[T]he situation can seem intensely unsatisfying. The philosophical 
consciousness abhors a vacuum. If tlie model of the inwaid-looking observation 
statement fails, must tliere not be sometliing better witli which to replace it?
. . .  Why should self-knowledge, and tiie language game in which we express 
it, allow of illuminating comparison, if not witli reports of observation, then 
with anythmg else? Yet the sorts of account which can seem to be needed could 
only consist ultimately in such a comparison." [Wright (1991) pp.146-147] 
Could it be that I (a failed Wittgensteinian) am forced to turn to Fodor for 
reassurance? "Explanations are a Good Thing!", 1 can hear him  saying, "A 
theoretical account of our ordinary convictions which is coherent and not 
plainly false is better than nothing!"
289
A  Truth Of Underwhelming Unimportance?
But oh! how dull and technical is the account I have given of what we 
commonly believe ourselves to be doing when we tell a dream: "Exercising a 
disposition to tell a fictitious story acquired and retained during sleep!" How 
could that be w hat we undoubtingly believe? What a ridiculous suggestion! 
Isn't it better to plainly insist that telling a dream is magic? For when one tells 
a dream it is:
"... as if a snapshot of tiie whole scene had been taken, but. only a few 
scattered details of it were to be seen: here a hand, tliere a bit of face, or a hat - 
tlie rest is dark. And now it is as if we knew quite certainly what the whole 
picture represented. As if I could read tlie darkness." [Philosophical 
Investigations s.635]
3. An Open Question; Are dreams dreamt during sleep and remembered or 
forgotten upon awakening?
The tru th  of our conviction tliat dream s are dream t during sleep and 
remembered or forgotten upon awakening is most clearly seen to be at issue in 
arguments over Globot's Hypotliesis tliat dreams are dreamt during the process 
of awakening immediately before being 'recalled'. The clearest rival to 
Globot's Hypothesis is the view that dreams are dreamt during sleep with an 
order, pace and duration comparable to waking perception or imagination. In 
tliese final pages, I mean to suggest that the issue between these rivals remains 
a 'meaty' bone of scientific contention. Despite the abandonm ent by 
contemporary psycho-physiologists of any general ambition to chart content- 
specific indexes of dreaming, die issue between Globot's Hypotheses and its 
rival remains amenable to experimental evidence and tiieoretical debate.
Anything worth calling a 'tiieory of dreams' m ust provide a systematic 
explanation of die sources, die materials and narrative structure of our dreams.
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This much is not at issue between those who take tlie dream to be the content of 
a person's awakening impression and tliose who assume the dream to be a 
'presentation' occurring during sleep. The urge to construct such a theory is 
encouraged by the ancient belief that a person's dreams contain important 
information, particularly about himself, wlnich is more or less explicit in his 
awakening narrative. The fact that dreams are remarkable imaginative 
creations full of invention and symbolism far in excess of our everyday waking 
abilities, togetlier with the fact that dreams are generally full of surprises and 
suspense beyond our will, naturally suggests tliat they originate in a source 
'external' to the conscious mind of the dreamer, a source having creative and 
insightful intelligence of a peculiar kind but no less powerful and sophisticated 
tlian that consciously exercised by us in waking life. The seminal questions 
about the causal explanation of dreams can be posed and answered without 
supposing that the dream er does anything whilst asleep. Once this is 
recognised, the question about whether or not the dreamer is simultaneously 
conscious of some by-product of the processes whereby he is able to tell a 
marvellous story upon awakening become relatively uninteresting.
The question about whether dreams are dreamt or 'occur' during sleep can be 
seen as a question about what Dennett (1976) called tlie 'composition' process by 
which we acquire the ability to tell a fictitious story upon awakening. Freud 
famously argued that an adequate account of the sources of dreams could not be 
given in terms of tlie physiological registration of stimuli during sleep. But 
Freud accepted the standard view that associations between events in the 
sleeper’s environment and the dreams he tells establish a temporal location to 
the composition process whereby disturbing intrusions are symbolically 
incorporated into dream in order to 'guard sleep'. On this assumption, tlie 
phenom enon of associations between dream s and events initiating or
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contemporary w ith  the process of awakening creates a problem for the 
hypothesis that dreams are dreamt during sleep.
Freud discussed the idea that dreams are sometimes composed very quickly 
on arousal and then remembered as if they had taken much longer time to go 
through during sleep in The Interpretation of Dreams at pp .87,131 & 636-8. He 
referred to an already vast nineteentli century literature on tlie topic and 
offered his own hypothesis that dreams are sometimes ancient fantasies stored 
in the memory and 'triggered' upon awakening. A dream reported by Maury, a 
19th century French psychologist, was already famous when Freud came to 
discuss it. Maury's lengthy and coherent dream culminated in his being 
guillotined. He awoke to find tliat the bedhead had fallen and struck him 
across the back of his neck. The awakening stimulus apparently determined 
the final event of his dream. And yet the narrative of tlie dream led so 
naturally to tliis conclusion, that is would seem mere prejudice to insist that the 
awakening stimulus was incorporated into a dream  which was already 
completed up to its penultimate details. Maury supposed that the arousing 
stimulus initiated the composition of the dream which was then 'dreamt' (both 
the composition and tlie dreaming' occurring at a very rapid pace, almost 
instantaneously) immediately prior to being 'recollected' as if it had taken 
much longer than it had. Maury's explanation of his dream attracted a great 
deal of critical attention in its time and the phenomenon fascinated Freud.
On the assumption tliat dreaming is an 'experience' akin to perception or 
imagination, it is not surprising that Maury's critics were perplexed by tlie 
hypothesis that we experience tlie dream at an accelerated rate prior to 
'remembering' it. But what Freud found equally puzzling was the idea that the 
unconscious or subconscious composition process should be able to achieve such 
marvellous 'dream-work' in so short a space of time:
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"We should never dare to atUibute such rapidity to thought-activity in waking 
life, and we should therefore be driven to conclude tliat tlie dream-work possesses 
the advantage of accelerating our thought-processes to a remarkable degree" [ibid. 
p.637].
The problem between Maury and his critics arose over tlie implied pace at 
which the composed dream was 'presented' or 'gone through' by the dreamer 
prior to recollection. Freud saw no problem in dispensing with tliis problematic 
element in the explanation of 'remembering' an arousal dream: "it is not 
necessary that [the dream] should have been gone tlirough during sleep" [ibid. 
p.638/9]. He hypothesized an alternative explanation which eliminated tlie 
quasi-perceptual presentation process prior to 'remembering'. Freud supposed 
that the awakening stimuli, rather than initiate an elaborate composition 
process on the spot (with or without a simultaneous presentation to tlie sleeping 
or half-sleeping mind) might trigger a ready-made phantasy stored in the 
mind which is tlien 'remembered' as if it had been experienced during sleep.
"Is it so highly improbable tliat Maury's dream represents a  phantasy which 
has been stored ready-made in his memory for many years and which was aroused 
- or would 1 say 'alluded to' - at tlie moment at which he became awaie of tlie 
stimulus which awoke him? If tliis were so we should have escaped tlie difficulty 
of understanding how such a  long story witli all its details could have been 
composed in the extremely short period of time which was at the dreamers [sic. 
emphasis added] disposal - for the story would have been composed already" [The 
Inteipretation o f Dreams p.637].
In effect, Freud re-set the problem raised by Maury's dream as a problem about 
the pace and duration of a non-conscious cerebral process which causally 
explains the manifest content of the stories we have to tell upon awakening.
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The theoretical problem  need not concern the nature of any supposed 
'presentation' process intervening between composition and 'recollection':
"It is not necessary that [the composed] phantasy should have been gone 
through during sleep; it would have been sufficient for it merely to be touched 
on. What 1 mean is this. If a few bars of music are played and someone 
comments tliat it is from Mozart's Figaro (as it happens Don Giovanni) a 
number of recollections are roused in me all at once, none of which can enter my 
consciousness singly at tlie first moment. The key phrase serves as a port of 
entry tlirough which the whole network is simultaneously put in a state of 
excitation. It may be tlie same in tlie case of unconscious tliinkiiig. The 
rousing stimulus excites tlie psychical port of entry which allows access to tlie 
whole guillotine phantasy. But the phantasy is not gone tlirough during sleep 
but only in the recollection of the sleeper after his awakening. After waking he 
remembers in all its the details the phantasy which was stined up as a whole in 
his dream. One has no means of assuring oneself in such a case that one is 
really remembering something one has dreamt. . . " [ibid. p.638].
Mullane (1983) cited Freud's reaction to M aury's dream  as a clear 
illustration of how thoroughly Freud was m islead by thinking "even 
metaphorically or anthropomorphically of unconscious thinking as a non- 
conscious replica of conscious thinking"[p. 193], Mullane thought that the 
hypotliesis of an ancient phantasy stored away for many years is far-fetdied, 
and that Freud would have seen this if he have properly distinguished 
between the properties of the unconscious processes which explain our mental 
life and the properties of the conscious, reasoning activities of people. He took 
it to be symptomatic of Freud's homuncularism that the 'labours' of dream-work 
must take the dreamer (or rather tlie 'ego') much time and bother. If Mullane’s 
criticism is well-directed then once Freud had allowed that there is no
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necessity that the phantasy, triggered on awakening, be 'gone through' prior to 
it being 'remembered', tlien there is no reason why he should prefer the 
hypothesis that the phantasy had lain in memory for some years to the 
hypothesis that the dream had been composed in the moment of awakening 
immediately prior to being 'remembered'. But Mullaine's criticism of Freud 
does not seem entirely justified to me. If one is looking for cerebral processes 
producing impressions as if of recent perceptions, it is plausible to suppose tliat 
the appropriate mechanisms are pretty much those which normally operate to 
produce memories of w hat one recently perceived. On this plausible 
supposition we might share Freud's unwillingness to hypotliesis that the 
composition process might create in a flash the kind of complex narrative 
exemplified by Maury's dream. Tlius, the most plausible explanation of the 
hypothesis that dreams are normally dream t during sleep (that telling a 
dream is caused by processes analogous to tliose underlying perceptual memory) 
itself leads one to postulate something like Freud's stored phantasy or 
Dennett's (1976) Cassette Hieory to explain phenomena akin to Maury's dream.
I discussed in Chapter Four ('"Perceptions' During Sleep"),tlie use of such 
associations by Dement & Kleitman (1956) and other researchers to show that 
dreams are dreamt during sleep witli a pace and duration comparable to waking 
perception or imagination. In an interesting paper. Hall (1981), a respected if 
iconoclastic sleep researcher, argued that the methodology of 'dating' a dream 
according its association with events in the environment of the dreamer of 
which he might be 'subliminaly' aware, can be experimentally applied in 
defence of Globot's Hypothesis. Hall argued tliat tliere is evidence that events 
happening around us as we awake have a formative effect upon the dreams we 
tell. Hall argued, in addition, that an investigation of the morning habits and 
concerns of individuals discovered strong associations betw een that
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individual's dreams and what might be supposed to be on his mind as he 
awakens. My point is not to criticise or approve Hall's argument. I cite it as an 
example of how, according to the Dispositional Analysis, our ordinary 
assumption that dreams occur during sleep may be called in question by 
scientific research. Zuger (1966) provides another paper from the scientific 
literature suggesting evidence against the assumption that 'dreams' are dreamt 
during sleep. Zuger's proposal was that it may be useful to distinguish between 
dreams we could have told upon first awakening and 'dreams' that occur later 
in the day, possibly in response to some waking situation which 'triggers’ an 
apparition of memory. Some of what we call 'dreams' may, Zuger argued, 
deserve an explanation akin to that fitting deja vu.
Giora (1973) pointed out a connection between evidence relevant to Globot's 
Hypothesis that "a dream is an awakening that is beginning" and evidence 
relevant to the hypothesis advanced by Goodenough & Koulack (1976) and 
other modern researchers that dreams are remembered or forgotten according to 
a consolidation process activated upon arousal. A  major problem for any Üieory 
which takes a person's disposition to tell a dream if awoken to show tliat he 
has dreamt is to explain why dreams are so readily forgotten. There is, as 
Goodenough (1978) explained, a huge discrepancy between the frequent and 
voluminous dream narratives that can be elicited from a person if he is awoken 
and questioned during the night and the relative paucity of normal morning 
recall. Even people who claim never or seldom to dream produce frequent and 
lengthy dream narratives when awoken in the Sleep Laboratory. The major 
problem confronting theories of dream  recall is the explanation of this 
discrepancy.
The standard view taken by experimental scientists (e.g. Hobson (1989)) is 
that our amnesia for dreams is 'state-dependent' upon the physiology of sleep.
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Goodenough (1978) drew a distinction between content-based and state-based 
theories of dream-recall. He argued that our liability to forget dreams cannot 
be explained in terms of their content alone. For example, Freud's claim that 
dream s are forgotten because their latent content is disturbing cannot 
sufficiently account for what we forget and what we remember. Goodenough 
argued that some notion of state-dependent amnesia must be employed. He 
hypothesized that some feature of sleep is responsible for a failure 
ofconsolidation of memory beyond a few minutes. Tlie Arousal-Retreival model 
of dream recall advanced by Goodenough & Koulack (1976) proposes tliat some 
degree of 'arousal' must interrupt a dream dreamt during tlie night before it can 
be successfully retrieved in the morning. The theory supposes that there is a 
transfer of memory trace from short to long-term storage in order to allow (on 
the assumption that dreams are dreamt which a pace comparable to waking 
perception) tliat we can recall elements of an interrupted dream dreamt a few 
minutes before awakening . But it explains tiie subsequent loss of the ability to 
recall in terms of a state-dependent failure to 'encode' the items newly arrived 
in long-term storage in sucli a way that they can be subsequently retrieved. As 
far as I can judge from my survey of the experimental literature, Goodenough & 
Koulack's Activation-Arousal model is far and away the most widely accepted 
explanation of dream amnesia. The standard view taken by researcliers seems 
to be that tlie only dreams we remember are those which have been interrupted 
or shortly followed by a momentary awakening.
One way to explain away the discrepancy between our dispositions to tell 
dreams if awoken during the night and the dreams we can tell upon actually 
awakening, is to suppose that dreams are an 'artifact of arousal'. What is the 
distinction between Goodenough & Koulack's Arousal-Retreival hypothesis 
(that we are only retain an ability to tell a dream  if its formation is
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interrupted by an arousal) and the hypotliesis that dreams are produced by the 
process of arousal? The arousal-artifact hypotliesis needs to be treated witli 
care. For, of course, no one denies that awakening is an important causal 
condition of telling the dreams we have had. The arousal-artifact hypothesis 
might imply either the hypothesis that tlie normal process of awakening is not 
analogous to tlie normal process by which a witness is prompted to say what he 
saw, or it might be taken to imply tliat tliere is no normal process of awakening, 
i.e. that peculiarities of the process of awakening determine the specific 
content of our awakening narratives. Only on the latter understanding does the 
arousal-artifact hypothesis promise to dissolve tlie problem about explaining 
why so many dreams dream t during the night are forgotten upon awakening. 
The supposed discrepancy between dreams dreamt during tlie night and dreams 
recalled in the morning would evaporate when it is supposed tliat people do not 
dream dreams during sleep.
I have tried here to suggest that the issues surrounding Globot's Hypotliesis 
are still very much alive in scientific work on sleep and dreams. Despite the 
sinking of the grand ambitions of 1960s psycho-physiology to establish content- 
relative indexes of dreaming (some flotsam remains in LaBerge's work on lucid 
dreams), question about the formation, retention and loss of our dispositions to 
tell dreams remain open to research. On my interpretation of ordinary talk 
about 'remembering dreams', our commonplace conviction that dreams are 
dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten during sleep, stands to be 
confirmed or disconfirmed according to the development of scientific research 
already in progress. This reassures me that the im putation of theoretical 
assumptions into ordinary talk of 'remembering dreams' has, for the time being 
at least, an advantage over the gloomy silence recommended by Malcolm.
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AFTERTHOUGHT
4. Every few mornings, when I awake with a dream to tell, the thesis defended 
here appears to me to be utterly incredible, and yet, upon reflection, the same 
tlresis appears to me to be too obvious and trivial to have been worth the labour 
of argument.
Like many philosophical theses, the conclusion that it is doubtful whether 
dreams are remembered from sleep appears at one moment to be a laughable 
absurdity and at the very next moment to be a tru th  too obvious and 
unexceptional to warrant much effort in its exposition.
What's all tlie fuss about? Isn't it obvious that narratives of dreams are a 
Idnd of fictitious story, except, of course, that we do not make up tlie images and 
words which come to us as if we were remembering events witnessed? Whoever 
seriously thought that in 'remembering dreams' he is genuinely remembering 
historical events, things that actually went on in the wee small hours? I might 
suppose that the story I tell now is one I would have told if awoken earlier in 
tlie night. But what could be more reasonable than to question whether tliis is 
in fact the case?
Well, every few mornings, isn't tliere a moment - tliat moment of awakening 
with a dream to tell - when I cannot doubt tliat sometliing is remembered? And, 
in that moment, does not the thesis defended here appear to me as mad and 
incredible as you like?
Perhaps. And yet it is true.
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